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ABSTRACT 
.This essay investigates the interconnection of tense, 
existence and generality and its representation in first 
order theories. The central chapter deals with first 
order theories which employ tensed quantifiers; that is, 
where '(3x)(-x-)' represents the tensed 'There is ... ' 
locution. An attempt is made to draw together into one 
system the advantages of Prior's system Q and Kripke type 
systems without their disadvantages, where these advantages 
are first two valuedness (a characteristic of Kripke type 
systems but not of Q) and secondly having as valid certain 
mixing formulas (a characteristic of Q but not the Kripke 
type systems). This is attempted by introducing a predicate 
modifier, the * operator which is a negation operator, into 
Kripke type systems which involve a more complex syntax. 
It is claimed that systems involving * are not only useful 
for founding tensed quantification theory but also, in the 
context of modal systems, for representing essentialist 
claims. It is also argued that systems involving * are 
equivalent to systems without * but which also contain a 
tensed existence predicate. 
The discussion of * systems is within that framework which 
treats tensing to be adverbial in character and consequently 
as representable using sentence operators after Prior. 
Besides model-theoretic semantics homophonic semantics are 
offered for this representation of tense. An alternative 
approach is to treat tensing as indexical in character. 
Two such analyses are examined, namely the Russellian and 
the QUinean. We attempt to provide semantic reasons 
why it is that QUine puts forward his analysis rather 
than the Russellian analysis. The main reason, we argue, 
is that the Russellian approach is inadequate for re-
presenting certain tensed existence claims. 
The essay also contains a chapter on existence, one on 
Aristotle and tense and a chapter on the Medieval theory 
of appellation. There are brief discussions of 'tense-
lessness', aspect and a tentative attempt to place doubt 
on the indexical analysis of tense on the basis that 
'now' unlike 'here' is not indexical because it is not 
rigid relative to an occasion of use. 
INTRODUCTION 
The central theme of this essay is the interconnection of 
tense, existence and generality and its representation in 
first order theories. The essay is split into three parts 
where the first two parts are mainly stage settings for the 
final lengthier part. 
In the first part of the essay, consisting of the first two 
chapters, we look at certain aspects of the Ancient and 
Medieval accounts of tense. These chapters are very pre-
liminary in which various bits of material are assembled, 
as it were, into a pile. The framework of the machine in 
which they function co~es afterwards, particularly in part 
three. Chapter one is centrally concerned with comments 
by Aristotle about tense, existence and generality and in 
Chapter two we look at the Medieval's account of the same 
subject matter. 
The second part of the essay consists of Chapters three and 
four. In Chapter three we look at the bases of two standard 
frameworks for the logical analyses of tense. One framework 
treats tense modification as being adverbial making central 
use of Prior's tense operators. This analysis we call the 
Lp analysis. The other framework analyses uses of tensed 
sentences on the basis that tense is an indexical feature of 
language. This analysis we call the LD analysds. In order 
to set up these frameworks at the end of Chapter three some 
preliminary discussion is required. This includes an account 
of 'tenseless' verbs where we make a distinction between what 
we call 'tenseless' verbs proper and what we call 'detensed 
verbs', a distinction we utilize in part three. There is als 
in this chapter some discussion of the relationship between 
sentences involving tenses only and those which also involve dat 
expressions together with a very tentative discussion of 
tensing in English. 
In Chapter four we offer semantics for the sentential Lp 
analysis. Two sorts of semantics are offered; first model 
theoretic and secondly homophonic semantics. In order to 
set up homophonic semantics certain problems have to be over-
come. We claim that these are best overcome via a consider-
ation of the two-dimensionality of 'now'. This property of 
'now' occurs when it is treated as a sentence operator within 
the Lp framework. So we ask if 'now' has an analogous 
property if treated as an indexical and answer this using 
rigidity. We then consider two arguments against the LD 
approach. One of these which purports to show that there 
is a logical deficiency in the LD analysis we claim is un-
founded. On the other hand, the other argument, which we 
tentatively put forward, attempts to show that 'now' is not 
an indexical like 'here' on the basis that 'now', unlike 'here' 
is not rigid relative to an occasion of use. 
The final part of the essay consists of the last three 
chapters. The main theme here is first order tensed 
• 
theories with particular emphasis on questions about existence. 
It is in this part of the essay where the various issues dis-
cussed in the opening two chapters re-emerge in full. 
Chapter five examines the LD analysis; Chapter six first 
order Lp analyses and finally Chapter seven is devoted to a 
discussion about tensed existence. 
2. 
In Chapter five two structural analyses of the uses of 
tensed sentences are considered; first a Russellian 
analysis, the L~ analysis, which analyses uses of tensed 
predicates into tenseless predicates with an extra place 
for time variables or constants and secondly, a Quinean 
analysis, the L~ analysis, which treats temporal expressions 
as belonging to the logical subject. The L~ approach 
therefore takes as values of variables not ordinary con-
tinuants but their four-dimensional counterparts. Our main 
concern in this Chapter is to offer reasons other than those 
based upon scientific grounds why Quine claims that appli-
cation of standard first order theory to temporal matters 
must be done within the L~ framework and not the more intuitive 
L~ framework which preserves our ordinary ontology. We 
attempt to show that the following three claims can not be 
held together within an L~ framework unlike an L~ framework; 
first, that the existential quantifier must always be read 
tenselessly, secondly that there is only one sense of 'exists', 
a tenseless sense represented by this quantifier and finally 
that a canonical notation should be able to represent uses 
of tensed sentences involving tensed existence claims. Our 
attempts to show this are based upon arguments which show 
that the L~ theorist can not represent certain sorts of 
sentences including certain sentences involving tensed 
existence claims without introducing extra machinery. 
Chapter six, the central and longest chapter of the essay, 
looks at first order Lp theories. Two sorts of systems are 
considered; first, standard systems which make use of 
tenseless quantifiers and secondly systems employing tensed 
quantifiers - that is, where '(3x)(-x-)' represents the tensed 
3. 
'There is ... ' locution. Homophonic semantics are given 
for some of the systems discussed and model-theoretic 
semantics for all. Although the majority of this Chapter 
is concerned with tensed quantifier systems our discussion 
is expanded to include quantified modal logics. 
Two sorts of system employing tensed quantifiers are on 
the one hand Prior's system Q and on the other hand those 
based upon Kripkean modal systems whose semantics allow for 
possible worlds to differ in what exists with respect to 
them and where the quantifiers are restricted. Prior's 
system Q, unlike Kripkean systems, has the disadvantage that 
it is not two valued whereas Kripkean systems have the dis-
advantage, unlike Q, that no mixing formulas are valid. 
So we attempt to construct a first order theory which is on 
the one hand two valued yet on the other hand has as 
theorem s intuitively acceptable mixing formulas. In order 
to do this we introduce a negation operator, the * operator, 
which we claim is a predicate modifier. We attempt to 
show that there is a close connection between the problem 
of founding adequate tense and modal first order systems 
employing restricted quantifiers and the representation of 
weak and essentialist necessity (and tensed analogues). 
We offer then as extensions to Kripkean type systems systems 
which involve the * operator. 
However,we show that systems employing the * operator are 
equivalent to systems involving an existence predicate with-
out this operator. This pOint about 'reducibility' of 
systems (to ~ystems without *) brings us into the final 
chapter. Here our aim is to draw together points made about 
existence in Chapters five and six (and earlier chapters) 
into a single discussion. An attempt is made to show that 
the first two theses of that trilogy mentioned in connection 
with Chapter five above are not correct. That is, that 
the existential quantifier must be read tenselessly and the 
other claim that there is only one sense of 'exists', a 
tenseless one, represented by the quantifier. Instead, we 
attempt to argue that there is more than one sense of 'exists' 
and that these senses are of first level predicates. 
Consequently, we claim that the existential quantifier should 
not be understood as representing existence; instead it 
should be read as 'Some x such that it ... ' which does not 
have that extra predicative 'There is ... ' element as in 
'There is an x such that it ... '. 
5. 
PART ONE 
TENSE AND GENERALITY IN ANCIENT 
AND MEDIEVAL LOGIC 
CHAPTER ONE TENSE AND ANCIENT LOGIC 
1.1 Singular Statements and Tense; Genesis of a Tradition. 
In the chapter on substance in the 'Categories' Aristotle 
discusses a puzzle. He wants to cla~ that what is most 
distinctive about primary substances is their ability to 
receive contraries; an individual man hot at one time may 
be cold at another. But, someone may object, statements 
and beliefs are also like this. 
"For the same statement seems to be both true and false. 
Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is 
sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement 
will be false. Similarly with beliefs." 
(Cat. 4a23 - 4a 26) 
In attempting to solve this problem Aristotle does not 
relinquish the view expressed here that a singular statement, 
at least, may vary in truth value over time. Very briefly, 
his solution is that primary substances receive contraries 
only because they can change whereas statements and beliefs, 
strictly speaking, do not because they are completely un-
changeable. Their variation in truth value over time, a 
variation which is not to be seen as a variation of properties 
is completely attributable to change in substances. 
Perhaps this puzzle arises for Aristotle because he treats 
a statement here in one important respect like a primary 
substance; they both appear to have individual histories. 
A person who was a child becomes an adult while a statement 
which was true becomes false. This idea that a statement 
has a history is part of the Stoic notion of an 'axioma' 
considered below. Now, one way to avoid this resemblance 
between statements and primary substances is to clearly 
distinguish the type statement from its token instances. 
This presumption tha statements can and do vary in truth 
value over time is not unique to Aristotle; it is main-
tained throughout the logical tradition which he founded 
until, at least, the end of the Medieval era. He was not, 
however, the only founder of systematic logic. Mention 
must also be made of the Megarian and Stoic logicans who 
held this view of a statement, such as Chrysippus, Diodorus 
Cronus and Philo whose logical ideas became engulfed within 
the Aristotelian tradition in the early centuries A.D. 
It is this feature, truth variability, which is central for 
understanding their debate about the nature of modality. 
Diodorus argued in the now very obscure but then highly 
thought of 'Master Argument' that the possible is that which 
either is or will be. An alternative account, the Stoic 
theory, connects the possible with what is true at some time. 
Accordingly a necessary statement is one which does not 
admit of being false at any time or admits of being false 
but is prevented by external circumstance. (Mates 1953 p. 41) 
Exemplified, then, in this discussion is a belief common to 
Ancient and Medieval logicians alike that there is a close 
connection between the content of certain modal and temporal 
notions (as opposed to only accepting that there are formal 
similarities between them - see chapter 6). Besides these 
Megarianand Stoic views Aristotle claims that, in one sense, 
the capable is that which is realized ('De Interpretatione' 
23a7 - 10) and the Medieval logician William of Sherwood 
writes 
"Notice, however, that 'impossible' is used in two ways. It 
is used in one way of whatever cannot be true now or in the 
future or in the past ••• It is used in the other way of 
7. 
whatever cannot be true now or 1n the future although 
it could have been true in the past •.• '.' 
(J 966 p. 41) 
It is not just statements as linguistic items which can 
vary in truth value over time but also, according to the 
Ancients, what they express. This comes out clearest 
in the case of the Stoics but there is no reaSOil to 
doubt that Aristotle also held this view. For he 
believed that statements are symbols for thoughts in the 
soul ('De Interpretatione' 16a 19) and, moreover, as noted, 
he allows beliefs to vary in truth value. The Stoics 
developed quite a complex theory about what it is that 
statements express, namely 'axioma' which differ from 
Fregean thoughts in two important ways. In the first 
place they are tensed and secondly they can, like individ-
uals, cease to exist by being destroyed and, presumably, 
though this is not mentioned, come into existence as well. 
(Kneale and Kneale 1962 p. 154). In order to appreciate 
what is involved in this idea that a thought can be 
destroyed Stoic views about inferential connections between 
statements need to be taken into account. Sextus Empiric.us 
mentions that there are three types of atomic Stoic state-
ment; 'definite' such as 'This man walks', 'indefinite' 
like 'Someone walks' and, finally, 'intermediate' which 
involve proper names such as 'Socrates walks' (Mates ibid 
p. 30). Now, neither an indefinite nor an intermediate 
statement can be true unless a related definite statement is. 
Consequently, Chrysippus argued that while Dion is alive 
the axioma expressed by 'This man is dead' (where 'this man' 
indicates Dion) is impossible because it is self-contradictory 
and when Dion is dead the axioma ceases to exist so the 
8. 
question of its truth or falsity does not even arise. 
(Kneale and K~eale ibid p. 154). An axioma, then, is 
destroyed when it ceases to be expressible. This view, 
as far as we know, is not explicitly held by any logician 
after the Stoic period until very recently when Prior in 
1957 argues for a variant of it. 
Sections 6.5 and 6.6). 
(This is discussed in 
Logic's concern is with principles of valid inference. 
Central to and underlying this is the notion of truth-
preservingness which, of course, in turn depends upon an 
account of truth. Now, given the Ancient account of a 
singular statement one should expect that it would be 
truth at a time (and, hence, truth-preservingness at a 
time) which is to be fundamental to logic. For, clearly, 
a consequence of the Ancient view of a singular statement 
is that tense distinctions are a proper subject for 
logical reflection. This consequence does hold in the 
Megarian and Stoic case but, on the other hand, tense 
considerations do not figure very much in Aristotle's 
systematic logical writings for reasons which are noted 
in the next Section. 
Unlike the Medievals the Ancients also discussed the 
'impure' tenses, that is, tenses other than the simple past, 
present and future (see Section 3.5). According to 
Diogenes, Chrysippus wrote works on tense; one entitled 'On 
Temporal Expressions' and another 'On Axiomata in the 
Perfect Tense'. And Priscian, the grammarian, gives the 
Stoics credit for distinguishing a use of the present tense 
which expresses (what is expressed in English by) the 
9. 
continuous present (Kneale and Kneale ibid p. 153). 
Aristotle does not mention these tenses in his logical 
writings but he does discuss certain aspects of them in 
connection with action. (See Kenny 1963 Chapter VIII 
and Potts 1965). 
10. 
1.2 Aristotle on General Statements and Tense. 
Because logic's concern is with principles of valid 
inference an important question is which areas of discourse, 
if any, are to be taken as central when one attempts to 
provide a systematic account of these principles? Both 
Quine (see Section 5.1) and Aristotle answer this question 
in terms of scientific and mathematical discourse since 
they both base systematized logic primarily on these 
disciplines where, of course, tense does not figure much. 
In this Section attention is paid to what little involve-
ment tense has in Aristotle's account of generality. 
Aristotle, according to Ross (1949 p. 33), undertook the 
study of the syllogism as a stage on the way to the study 
of scientific method. This comes out very clearly in the 
opening section of the 'Prior Analytics' the work in which 
he systematizes syllogistic logic. 
"Our first duty is to state the scope of our inquiry and to 
what science it pertains: that it is connected with 
demonstration and pertains to a demonstrative science". 
(24a l0 - 24a 12) 
Which sciences, then, are demonstrative? In Chapter 12 
of the 'Categories' where Aristotle discussed different 
senses of priority he says that in the demonstrative sciences 
there is a prior and a posterior in order because the 
elements are prior in order to the diagrams. This shows 
that he, at least, took geometry to be one of these sciences. 
Ross believes that he did have that discipline in mind as 
a paradigm example, inevitably so, because the mathematical 
sciences were the only ones which had been to any degree 
developed by the Greeks at the time Aristotle wrote 
(1949 p. 52). 
11. 
In the 'Posterior Analytics', especially in the first 
few chapters, Aristotle expounds his theory of demon-
strative science. This concerns the logical form 
scientific theories do or should exhibit (Barnes 1975A 
p. 65). They should be axiomatized deductive systems 
consisting of a set of demonstrations which are a type 
of syllogism. Because he sets up his account of a 
syllogism with the organisation and presentation of the 
results of scientific research in mind one should expect 
him to pay special attention to definitions and to general 
statements of the sort that concern relations between 
kinds of things (Kneale and Kneale 1962 p. 5). This 
turns out to be the case. In Chapter 2 of the 'Prior 
Analytics' the only premises he mentions for a syllogism 
are the universal and the particular as though singular 
statements are not a proper part of syllogistic reasoning. 
And other than two examples of (invalid) syllogisms 
involving singular statements Aristotle concentrates 
exclusively on syllogisms which involve general statements. 
At one point he actually refuses to countenance such 
premises. 
"We must select consequents not of some part but of the whole 
of the subject e.g. not those of some individual man but those 
of every man; for it is from universal premise that the 
syllogism proceeds." 
(Prior Analytics 43b l2 - IS) 
This refusal is based upon Aristotle's view of scientific 
knowledge. In the 'Prior Analytics' (32b 18) he claims 
that there is no scientific knowledge of what is indetermin-
ate; that is, of that which is capable of happening both 
in a given way and otherwise like the walking of an animal. 
12. 
Similarly, in the 'Posterior Analytics' (Chapter 8) he 
claims that there can not be a demonstration of perishable 
facts. Instead, scientific knowledge is to consist in 
knowledge of general facts about permanent relations 
between kinds of things. Obvious candidates here are 
those which concern the subordination of a species to a 
genus. 
The fundamental scientific principles upon which demon-
stration rests are not only general but also necessary. 
"Since it is impossible for that of which there is under-
standing simpliciter to be otherwise what is understandable 
in virtue of demonstrative understanding will be necessary, 
(it is demonstrative if we have it by having a demonstration). 
Demonstration, therefore, is deduction from what is necessary." 
(Posterior Analytics 73a 21 - 4). 
Roughly speaking, this is based upon the following line 
of thought. The existence of logic depends upon there 
being sciences and sciences, in their turn, depend upon 
there being determinate natures. And it is the grasp of 
these natures via sense perception which is the basis for 
scientific knowledge. 
So far emphasis has been put on the connection between the 
syllogism and demonstrative science. Aristotle, however, 
does allow the formal machinery a wider use. For besides 
demonstrative syllogisms there are also dialectical and 
modal ones. Dialectical syllogisms are closely connected 
with argumentation, particularly of a philosophical sort. 
A premise is posited in order to draw out, syllogistically, 
untenable consequences so as to show whether it or its 
contradictory is sound. Premises of dialectical and modal 
syllogisms which are valid need not be necessary. For in 
the case of the modal syllogism Aristotle writes 
13. 
"Now every premise is of the form that some attribute 
applies, or necessarily applies, or may possibly apply, 
to some subj ec L." 
(Prior Analytics 2Sa l - 3). 
Despite this, however, it is important to realize that 
the primary function of the syllogism for Aristotle is 
connected with demonstration. Up to and including the 
second century A.D. Aristotle's categorical syllogism 
was associated with geometrical demonstration whereas 
Stoic logic was associated with dialectic. It was 
thought then, that these two systematized logics have 
,} if ferent fields of application. (Kneale and Kneale 
1962 p. 182). 
When discussing general statements Aristotle introduces 
some technical terminology, namely that of 'term' and 
that of ' ... contained in ... ' or' ... belongs to ... ' or 
' ... applies to ... ' These terms of art have, of course, 
a central place in the subsequent history of logic. By 
a 'term' he means 
" .•. that into which the premise can be analysed viz. the 
predicate and the subject with the addition or removal of 
the verb to be or not to be." 
(Prior Analytics 24a 16 - 24a 18). 
And for one term to be wholly contained in another 
" ... is the same as for the latter to be predicated of all 
the former. We say that one term is predicated of all 
of another when no examples of the subject can be found 
of which the other term can not be asserted." b 
(Prior Analytics 24 27 
This terminology is geared towards a particular sort of 
statement containing the copula; namely, instances of (1). 
(1) Things of sort A are cases of sort B. 
Bamng logic upon this kind of statement which may be called 
a 'classifier statement' for obvious reasons, has general 
14. 
repercussions for tense's involvement in logic. One 
repercussion is that even when tensing is taken into 
account the continuous tenses are neglected because 
instances of (1) are not open for such tensing. 
From a logical point of view, this introduced terminology 
provides a perspicuous framework within which to represent 
classifier statements. In the following valid argument 
All animals are living beings 
All persons are animals 
All persons are living beings 
the occurrence of 'animals' not only occupies a subject 
(or part of a subject) position but also a predicate (or 
part of a predicate) position. Unless these roles have 
something in common it is unclear why the inference is 
valid. By utilizing the technical terminology the argu-
ment is re-written as 
Animal belong to living being 
Person belongs to animal 
Person belongs to living being. 
This is a more perspicusus representation for its validity 
is merely a consequence of the transitivity of the 
' ... belongs to ... ' relation. In one sense, then, the 
notion of a term is intended to transcend the subject/ 
predicate distinction. But this does not mean that that 
distinction is unimportant. Alexander of Aphrodisias 
when considering why it was that Aristotle introduced the 
term' ... belongs to ... ' suggests three reasons, one of 
which is that it brings out clearly which term is the 
subject and which the predicate (Patzig 1968 p. 11). 
15. 
Patzig, himself, fills this out by suggesting that while 
'A is B' is not very perspicuous since it does not bring 
out that it is A which is subordinated to B. 'A belongs 
to B' does. The introduction of a common element which 
can be used in both subject and predicate positions also 
allows for the introduction of variables, namely term 
variables. And this adds weight to the point that 
Aristotle's main concern was with general statements 
because a singular term can, at best, only occur as part of 
a predicate term. 
Because the interesting true classifier statements are true 
unrestrictedly Aristotle takes the view that a universal 
statement is one in which a term is purported to be wholly 
contained in another in such a way as to be temporally 
unrestricted. 
"Now I say that something <holds> of every case if it does 
not hold in some cases and not others, nor at sometimes 
and not at others." 
(Posterior Analytics 73a28 - 30). 
This is hardly surprising given the connection between the 
syllogism and scientific methodology. Aristotle, however, 
also argues for this in connection with a syllogism which 
consists of a mixture of assertoric and problematic premises. 
"We must understand the expression 'applying to all' not as 
qualified in respect of time e.g., 'now' or 'at such-and-such 
a time' but in an absolute sense; for it is by means of 
premises taken in this latter way that we affect our syllogisms. 
If the premise is taken as relating to the present moment there 
will be no syllogism. For presumably there is no reason why 
at some time 'man' should not apply to everything that is in 
motion: i.e. if nothing else were then in motion; but the 
term 'in motion' may apply to all horses and 'man' cannot apply 
to any horse." 
(Prior Analytics 34b7 - b16). 
Here he is claiming that if one wants a valid mixed 
syllogism whose conclusion is problematic from universal 
16. 
assertoric and problematic premises then the former 
must state something which is permanently true. The 
example he gives offends this rule and produces a false 
conclusion, 'All men are possibly horses', from true 
premises. 
Because a universal statement is, in Aristotle's eyes, 
temporally unrestricted it can not change in truth value 
over time. Its time of use is irrelevant to assessment 
of its truth value. In contrast Aristotle also held 
the view, noted in the first section, that singular 
statements can and do vary in truth value over time. 
These different views naturally fit into two different 
logical frameworks. On the one hand, a framework 
which takes as basic statements that can vary in truth 
value over time and on the other hand one in which they 
can not. These frameworks we develop in Chapter three. 
One difficulty then for Aristotle's views is how both 
these accounts of a statement fit together within a single· 
framework. Now, one aspect here of this difficulty is 
whether or not a particular statement such as 'Some person 
runs' can change in truth value over time. If it can, 
then what is its inferential connection with the temporally 
unrestricted universal statement 'All people run' given 
Aristotle's square of opposition? On the other hand, if 
it can not then what is its connection with singular state-
ments which can? We shall briefly return to this pOint in 
Section 1.5. Before then in the next two sections we look 
at Aristotle's comments about tense and the verb as contained 
in his 'De Interpretatione', comments which expand upon his 
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view that singular statements can vary in truth value 
over time. 
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1.3 Aristotle on the Verb; Tense and the Verb. 
Aristotle expressed the view that singular statements 
can change in truth value over time and this is because 
they contain tense elements. In 'De Interpretatione' 
there are comments which bear upon the question of how 
tenses structurally contribute to a singular statement. 
Central here is his distinction between names and verbs. 
Names, he says, are spoken s,>unds significant by convention 
without time (19a 19 - 20) whereas 
"A verb is what additionally signifies time ••• , and it is 
a sign of things said of something else. It additionally 
signifies time: 'recovery' is a name but 'recovers' is a 
verb because it additionally signifies something's holding 
now. And it is always a sign of what holds, that is, holds 
of a subject." 
Two important distinctions between names and verbs are 
mentioned here. First, verbs are signs of 'what is said' 
of subjects (that is, they are predicative) and secondly, 
they also signify time. 
Ackrill points out in his notes to the translation 
(1963 p. 119) that it is unclear from the text how Aristotle 
would analyse such sentences as 'Socrates is a man' or 
'Socrates is white'. The problem is, what is to count as 
the verb in these sentences? The two specific features 
which come together in 'runs' are divided between the 'is' 
and 'a man' in'Socrates is a man' and between 'is' and 'white' 
in 'Socrates is white'. While the copula introduces time 
determinations the expressions 'a man' and 'white' introduce 
the 'what is said'. The available evidence in the text 
does not point to a unique answer as Ackrill shows. Four 
points of reference are the following. 
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(a) In Chapter One (16a 15) he gives 'white' as an 
example of a verb and in Chapter 10 (20 a 32) he gives 
'not-just' as an example of an indefinite verb 
(see 1. 4). But because the copula can be omitted 
in Greek Ackrill points out that these examples can 
be thought of as 'is white' or 'is not-just'. 
(b) In Chapter Ten (20b 2) name and verb are said to be 
transposed in sentences whose word-by-word trans-
lation Ackrill gives as 'is white man' and 'is man 
white' . Here it is 'white' which is treated as 
the verb. 
(c) In Chapter Ten (19b 21) Aristotle, it seems, is un-
certain of how to characterize the 'is' in 'a man is 
just' . He says 
"But when 'is' is predicated additionally as a third 
thing ... (I mean, for example, 'a man is just'; here 
I say that the 'is' is a third component - whether 
name or verb - in the affirmation." 
(d) In Chapter Twelve (21 b 9) Aristotle claims that to 
say that a man walks is no different from saying that 
a man is walking. And this appears to support the 
view that 'is white' is the verb. 
Two different analyses of a singular statement can be 
discerned here. One analysis which bears upon Aristotle's 
account of a statement as offered in his syllogistic 
writings centres on pOint (c) and utilizes a general form 
of po i n t (d). He analyses 'All persons are animals' in 
his syllogistic writings as 'Person belongs to Animal' 
(see the last Section) where the copula has become a third 
item relating terms. Therefore the statement 'Socrates is 
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white' can be taken as 'Socrates now belongs to white 
things', a form suitable for a syllogism (which allows 
for tensed si~gular statements). But what about state-
ments which do not contain a copula like 'Socrates knows' 
or 'Socrates kicks Callias'? It appears that a generalized 
version of (d) was implicitly invoked. Care, however, 
must be taken in expressing point (d). In English, it is 
better not to say that 'Socrates runs' is no different from 
'Socrates is running' because of the change in tense (and 
anyway, 'Socrates knows' cannot be dealt with in this way 
- See 3.5). Moreover, 'Socrates is running' unlike 
'Socrates is a person' is not in the form of a classifier 
statement. Instead then, it is better to say that 
'Socrates is a runner' is no different from 'Socrates runs' 
where both are to be understood non-frequentatively. And 
somewhat more awkwardly, 'Socrates kicks Callias' becomes 
'Socrates is a kicker of Callias'. One consequence of 
this view is that in a fully analysed Aristotelian logical 
language there are no verbs in his sense (except, perhaps, 
the existential 'is' as used in 'Socrates no longer is'). 
An alternative analysis of a singular statement in which 
the copula belongs with the predicate can also be discerned. 
Because ' ... is (now) a runner' performs the same role in 
'Socrates is (now) a runner' as 'runs' does in 'Socrates 
runs' it can be taken as a verb in Aristotle's sense. This 
analysis has much more in common with twentieth century 
analyses than does the term analysis. 
explain the validity of the inference 
All animals are living beings 
All persons are animals 
For now in order to 
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All persons are living beings 
appeal has to be made to the predicative role of 'is an 
animal' in both the (grammatical) subject and predicate 
positions. 
This discussion brings out a problem which Ackrill remarks 
upon (ibid p. 121). What precisely is the force of 
Aristotle's discussion of the verb? Is his distinction 
between names and verbs with its two facets grammatical or 
logical or even a mixture of the two? (This last case 
occurs when his distinction concerning the 'what is said' 
is understood logically whereas reference to time is under-
stood grammatically only - see Section 3.2 on this). As 
we shall note in Section 2.4 there is tension between the 
term analysis of a statement and Aristotle's account of 
tense and the verb. This tension can be overcome if his 
comments about tense are taken grammatically only. 
However, in what follows we assume his comments have logical 
force since that is where their interest for us lies. 
There is no clear answer to this question of import from 
what Aristotle,himself, says. And to make matter worse 
he mentions at 16a 18 a contrast between two senses of 'is' 
which lets it be understood 'either simply or with reference 
to time'. But in no place that we know of does he elucidate 
what he means here by 'simply'. 
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1.4 Aristotle on the Verb; Inflected and Indefinite Verbs. 
Aristotle distinguishes between names proper, indefinite 
names and inflections of names; labels which he also 
uses to mark distinctions amongst verbs. A difficulty 
here is that it is unclear whether or not the motivation 
for these distinctions amongst verbs is the same as that 
for the corresponding ones amongst names. 
He writes concerning inflected names. 
"'Philo's' 'to Philo' and the like are not names but inflections 
of names. The same account holds for them as names except that 
an inflection when combined with 'is' 'was' or 'will be' is not 
true or false whereas a name always is. Take, for example, 
'Philo's is' so far there is nothing either true or false." 
('De Interpretatione' 16a32-16b6). 
Unlike names proper, then, they do not form a complete 
sentence when combined with existential uses of 'is'. 
In the case of verbs he writes 
" •.. 'recovered' and 'will-recover' are not verbs but inflections 
of verbs. They differ from the verb in that it additionally 
signifies the present time they the time outstde the present." 
(ibid 16b16 - 16 19). 
There is a different contrast here. Ackrill (1963 p. 121) 
comments that if Aristotle had wished to draw a similar 
distinction for verbs he could have done so, a distinction 
which would mark the indicative mood from other moods. 
But this depends upon emphasizing only that an inflected name 
together with a verb does not produce anything which is 
true or false rather than emphasizing that they do not 
produce a complete sentence. So, perhaps inflection is 
to be given no more weight in Aristotle's thought than that 
of a grammatical notion which would then give a unity to 
both name and verb inflection. But there is a problem with 
this interpretation; verbs were not only inflected for 
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tense but also for mood and person which are not 
mentioned here by Aristotle. Let us not pursue this 
point. 
What is certainly true is that tense inflection takes on 
a logical significance given Aristotle's account of a 
singular statement together with his view that verbs 
introduce time determinations. Sentences such as 'Socrates 
sits' and 'Socrates sat' are to be distinguished in such 
a way as to be systematically connected. The latter is 
true now if and only if the former was true. Accordingl~ 
one can interpret Aristotle to be making the claim that a 
sentence like 'Socrates sat' is to be analysed as 'Socrates 
sits + past inflection' where 'sits' is the verb proper. 
This line of thought closely connects tense and mood. 
For instance, we may compare 'Socrates sits + imperative' 
as an analysis of the imperative 'Sit Socrates!' Not 
only this but there is also a closer analogy to be made 
given Aristotle's account of modal statements. He dis-
tinguished between 'A belongs to B' and 'A necessarily 
belongs to B' as noted in Section 1.2. Consequently, if 
the verb proper is taken as basic to predication dis-
tinctions can be made between 'A now belongs to B', 'A 
belonged to B' and 'A will belong to B'. This similarity 
between tense and modality is fundamental to Prior's 
analysis of tense as revealed in his tense logics. This 
adverbial treatment of tense we develop in Chapter three. 
Another aspect of Aristotle's discussion of the veIbis what 
he calls an 'indefinite verb'. In the case of general 
names he writes 
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" 'N ' . . ot man 1S not a name nor 1S there any correct name 
for it. It is neither a phrase nor a negation. Let 
us call it an indefinite name." 
(De Interpretatione )6a 29 - 32). 
Ackrill suggests (p. 117 - 8) that he calls them in-
definite because they 'stand for' no definite kind of 
thing in the sense that they 'stand for' things which 
may belong to any species or category. In the 'Prior 
Analytics' (24 a 20 - 23) Aristotle also introduces 
'indefinite statements' which are general but indefinite 
as to whether they are to be understood as universal or 
particular; his example is 'Pleasure is not good'. 
In the case of indefinite verbs he says 
" 'Does not recover' and 'does not ail' I do not call 
verbs. For though they additionally signify time 
and always hold of something, yet there is a difference -
for which there is no name. Let us call them indefinite 
verbs because they hold indifferently of anything whether 
existent or non existent." 
(De Interpretatione )6b )) - 16b 16). 
Ackrill comments (p. 120 ibid) that it does not seem 
helpful to call 'does not recover' an indefinite verb 
because it is not a sign that something indefinite holds 
but rather that something definite does not hold. 
Can sense, however, be made of Aristotle's suggestion that 
'does not recover' is called 'indefinite' because it 'holds 
indifferently of anything whether existent or non existent'? 
Relevant to this is his discussion of opposition between 
'things' in the 'Categories' Chapter 10. There he dis-
tinguishes between four kinds of opposition; relatives, 
. 
contraries, privation and possession and finally, affirmation 
and negation (11 b17). It is only the last three which are 
relevant here. There are, Aristotle says, two types of 
contraries; first, those for which it is necessary that 
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one or the other of the pair belong to the things they 
naturally occur in or are predicated of (11 b38 - 40). 
Examples, he gives, of these are the pairs sickness, health 
and odd, even. In contrast, there are pairs of contraries 
for which there is something intermediate (12b 10 - 11). 
These include the pairs black, white and just, unjust. 
Possessions and privations like sight and blindness, 
Aristotle says, are only spoken of in connection with what-
ever is naturally a possessor. Moreover, he believes that 
a possession is only absent from something at a time when 
it is natural then to possess it. 
Unlike pairs of statements involving contraries or possession 
and privation it is necessary that one or other of an 
affinnation and its negation be true. And this is so, 
he writes, despite there being contraries without inter-
mediates. For it is not necessary that 'Socrates is sick' 
or 'Socrates is well' be true. 
"For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, 
but if he does not both will be false; neither 'Socrates 
is sick' nor 'Socrates is well' will be true if Socrates 
himself does not exist at all." b b 
(Categories 13 17 - 13 18). 
Similarly in the case of possession and privation. If 
Socrates does not exist then neither 'Socrates has sight' 
nor 'Socrates is blind' is true. In contrast, it is 
necessary, for one of the pair 'Socrates is sick' and 
'Socrates is not sick' to be true. If he does not exist 
then 'Socrates is sick' is false and so 'Socrates is not 
sick' is true (lSb 31). It is important to note that 
Aristotle is here appealing to the sentential nature of 
the negation in 'Socrates is not sick'. Is he maintaining 
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that the non-existence of the subject makes an affirm-
ative present tensed singular statement false and con-
sequently a negative one true? And is it this which 
underlies his account of an indefinite verb; in particular, 
on the point that sentences which involve the verb proper 
can only be true if the subject exists whereas those which 
contain indefinite verbs can be true even if the subject 
does not exist? If so, as Ackrill points out (ibid p. 111), 
how is this to be reconciled with Aristotle's contention 
that 'Homer is a poet' does not entail 'Homer is' (De 
Interpretatione 21 a 25)? 
Aristotle's discussion centres on the interrelation between 
tense. prediction, negation and existence in connection with 
singular statements. An important question here and one 
which is relevant to understanding the Medieval philosophy 
of language is what is the relationship, if any, between 
the tensed existential 'is' and the tensed copula? Or, 
alternatively expressed, what is the connection between 
present tensed predication and the tensed existential 
predicate 'is'? The simplest connection maintained is 
that an affirmative present tensed predicate can only be 
true of present existents. This involves two claims. 
First, to be something now is to be now ~nd secondly, its 
converse, to be now is to be something now. The latter 
appears to be unexceptionable for to assert that something 
is without being anything requires there to be a totally 
indiscernible existent. The Stoics appear to have 
believed that there is this simple connection. For, as 
noted in 1.1, they held the view that atomic sentences such 
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as 'Some person runs' or 'Socrates runs' can only be 
true if a relevant sentence of the fo~m 'This person runs' 
is true. But, as they realized, this creates difficulties 
one of which centres on the sentence 'Dion is dead'. 
Neither Aristotle nor the Medievals held that there is 
such a simple connection. As noted Aristotle remarked 
that 'Homer is something (say, a poet)' does not entail 
'Homer is'. Moreover in 'De Sophisticis Elerchis' he 
writes that it is an error to believe in that simple 
connection, an error which can give rise to fallacies. 
"Those [fallacies] that depend on whether an expression is 
used absolutely or in a certain respect and not strictly, 
occur whenever an expression used in a particular sense is 
taken as though is were used absolutely e.g., in the 
argument 'if what is not is the object of an opinion that 
what is not is': for it is not the same thing 'to be x' 
and 'to be' absolutely." 
The Medievals expanded upon this as we note in Section 
2.3. They distinguished between two types of affirm-
ative present tensed predicate. First, those which can 
only be true at a time of existents then and secondly those 
like ' ... is an object of an opinion' which can also be 
true of non-existents. The latter sort were said to have 
ampliating force because their extensions at a time are 
ampliated (extended) beyond the then existing objects. 
Consequently, when ~ is a non-ampliating predicate in the 
present tense 'a is ~' implies 'a is (now)'. And, the 
predicates Aristotle employs in Chapter 10 of the 'Categories' 
namely 'is sick' 'is well' 'is blind' and 'has Sight' are 
all non-ampliating. 
The full force of Aristotle's discussion of indefinite 
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verbs has not yet been brought out. As a conjecture 
what may lie behind his discussion is that 'not' in 
'Socrates does not recover' can be treated either as a 
sentential operator or as a predicate modifier. A 
sentence like 'Socrates does not recover' can then be 
analysed either as 'It is not the case that Socrates 
recovers' or into subject 'Socrates' and predicate 
' ... does not recover' where the predicate is ampliating. 
In this latter analysis the particle 'not' maps non-
ampliating (and ampliating) predicates into ampliating 
prediates. So it may be this, then, which underlies 
his suggestion that an indefinite verb holds indifferently 
of existents and non-existents. 
This suggests that there might be room for two kinds of 
negation which have different semantic force. One kind 
affects the existential presupposition and the other does 
not. Fundamental to this latter kind is that it maps 
non-ampliating into non-ampliating predicates. This fits 
in with Aristotle's account of contraries which have no 
intermediates. Also of relevance here is the Stoic 
distinction between negation and privation. 
"A negation ••. is formed from a proposition by prefixing the 
negative 'not'. A privation is an atomic proposition 
obtained from another atomic proposition by reversing the 
predicate: 'This man is unkind'." 
(Mates 1953 p. 31). 
Involved in this is the suggestion that a distinction 
between two such kinds of negation may in the final analysis 
depend upon distinguishing sentential from predicate negation. 
It is this suggestion which we consider in Chapter six in 
some detail. We introduce as a negation operator the * 
operator which we claim is a predicate modifier and which 
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has the property of mapping non-ampliating predicates 
into non-ampliating predicates. We attempt to show that 
this operator has some interesting properties, properties 
which are useful for setting up tensed quantification 
theory. 
The fact that certain affirmative predicates have ampliating 
force may c]eate difficulties for Aristotle's account of 
'thing' as contained in Chapter two of the 'Categories' 
(and hence also for the Medieval theory of predication as 
inherence - see Section 2.2). Very briefly, Aristotle 
held that certain things are either 'said of' individuals 
or are 'in' them. The former are those which yield 
definitions of types of individual substances as in 
'Socrates is a person' where person is said of Socrates. 
On the other hand it is accidents which are 'in' individuals. 
In 'Socrates is white' it is whiteness which is claimed 
to be 'in' Socrates. (The Medieval theory of inherence 
extended Aristotle's notion of 'in' to cover all predication). 
But what is to be made of sentences which involve ampliating 
predicates like 'Socrates is famous'? To claim that fame 
is now 'in' Socrates is to claim that accidents can be 'in' 
non-existing objects. And this is to accept that non-
existents at a time may then have properties. We shall 
note in Chapter six that Prior rejected this view since 
he believed that to exist now is just to have properties 
now. In contrast, we note, in Chapter seven, that both 
Meinong and MacColl did hold the view that non-existents 
can have properties. 
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1.5 Generality and Tense; Some Remarks. 
In this Section attention is paid to the interconnection 
of tense and generality within the framework of the term 
analysis. As a point of entry we first consider the 
question of how Aristotle's account of a singular state-
ment fits in with his account of a universal statement, 
a question we noted in Section 1.2. 
Aristotle distinguished between the temporally unrestricted 
(1) and the temporally restricted (2). 
(1) All As are Bs. 
(2) All As are now Bs. 
He also claimed that verbs differ from names in two ways; 
first by introducing the 'what is said' and secondly by 
signifying time. Now, as we noted, under the term analysis 
these aspects are split up; the former is introduced by the 
predicate term whereas the latter by the copula. Given 
this then what difference is there in the tensing of the 
two uses of the copula in (1) and (2)? For, unlike instances 
of (1) those of (2) can vary in truth value over time. 
One reaction here is to claim that not all uses of the 
copula are tensed uses. For instance, in (3) the copula 
may be said to be 'tenseless'. 
discussed in Section 3.2). 
(3) All numbers are prime. 
(Tenseless verbs are 
Even accepting this, can it be maintained that the contrast 
between (1) and (2) resides in a difference between tense-
less and tensed copula uses? One source of doubt is that 
if (3) is understood 'tenselessly' then it is not clear that 
there is a statement 'All numbers are now prime' which 
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is to be contrasted with it. For otherwise there would 
be two fundamentally different predicates' ... is (tenseless) 
prime' and ' ... is now prime' applying to the same sorts 
of things. Moreover, if it is this distinction between 
tensed and tenseless which underlies the difference between 
(1) and (2) then it is a total mystery why (1) implies (2). 
This suggests, then, that in cases where there is a contrast 
to be made between statements like (1) and those like (2) 
then the former type do contain tensed copula uses albeit 
not simply tensed but complexly tensed. An alternative 
reaction here is to claim that both (1) and (2) are present 
tensed. For the period of time known as the present varies 
appreciably according to context. For instance, consider 
the following set of sentences 
(4) He wins 
(5) He is hungry 
(6) He is ill 
(7) He loves her 
(8) He is called 'Johnny' 
(9) The sun rises in the East 
(10) Gold is heavier than silver. 
Here, there is a gradual transition from what is more or 
less momentary to what is 'eternally' true (Jespersen 1961 
p. 17). Hence, it may be claimed that both (1) and (2) 
are present tensed. Jespersen, for instance, writes 
" ••• one might feel tempted to speak of an 'omnipresent' time 
or tense .•• but no special term is needed .•• If the present 
tense is used, it is because they are valid now; the linguistic 
tense expression says nothing about the length of duration 
before or after the zero-point ••• " 
(ibid). 
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But for logical purposes there is a need for distinguish-
ing between (1) and (2) in order to account for inferential 
connections. Unlike (2), (1) implies 'All As will be Bs'. 
Now, fundamental to tense logic is the notion of truth at 
a time. Consequently, it is useful to distinguish between 
the pOint present or the order present and the present 
understood as a period of time which may vary from context 
to context in length. This difference results in similar 
differences between two notions of past and future, a 
difference between order and period notions. And it is 
assumed here that the pure tenses express temporal order 
only. A more detailed account is given in Sections 3.4 
and 3.5. 
The question of distinguishing (1) from (2) occurs also 
at the particular level. 'All persons are moving beings', 
'No person is a 'moving being', 'Some person is a moving 
being' and 'Some person is not a moving being' have to be 
in the same tense unless understood to involve multiple 
generality for otherwise the right logical connections 
according to the square of opposition would not hold 
between them. So, in one sense, the particular statement 
'Some person is a moving being' can be taken to be temporally 
unrestricted. Yet, in another sense it can be understood 
to be variable in truth value over time. This looks to 
be the case in the inference from 'Socrates is a moving 
being' to 'Some person is a moving being' given that 
'Socrates is a person'. 
Without a formal network within which to consider the 
matter it is difficult to distinguish between temporally 
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rCHtricted and unrestricted statements. In later 
chapters ways of distinguishing such kinds of statements 
are considered, ways which depend upon an account of the 
contribution tenses can make to the truth conditions of 
statements containing them. In the rest of this Section 
a number of informal remarks about the term analysis of 
a statement are made. 
One suggestion for distinguishing between (1) and (2) is 
that the unrestricted 'All As are Bs' is true iff the 
temporally restricted 'All As are now Bs' is always true. 
But, there is a problem with this under the traditional 
analysis of a statement because 'All As are now Bs' pre-
supposes that there are now both As and Bs. Consequently, 
the temporally unrestricted statement would not only pre-
suppose that there are As and Bs at some time but more 
strongly that there As and Bs at all times. 
So far attention has been paid to the unrestrictedness of 
Aristotle's universal statements. However, in the context 
of a demonstrative syllogism a universal statement is also 
necessary. This notion of necessity may be taken to be 
physical necessity, a feature of scientific laws. Whereas 
a universal statement 'All As are Bs' is true (given the 
Boolean understanding of 'All') iff for any x, if x is an 
A then x is a B, a law is true iff also if y which is not 
in fact an A were to be an A then it would also be a B. 
Although laws are standardly expressed in the universal 
form 'All As are Bs' it is assumed here that their correct 
form of expression is 'Necessarily, All As are Bs'. 
Under the term analysis (1) and (2) are represented by 
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(1') and (2'). 
(1') A belongs to B 
(2') A belongs now to B. 
Are the terms 'A' and 'B' in these the same in the two 
cases? That is, is 'Person' ('Moving Being') the same 
term in 'Person belongs to moving being' as it is in 
'Person belongs now to moving being'? It may, for 
instance, be thought that the semantic role of 'Person' 
in these statements differ in that in the former case it 
'specifies' persons at any time whereas in the latter it 
only 'specifies' presently existing people. Closely 
related to this is the question is 'Person' the same term 
in 'Person belongs now to moving being' as it is in 
'Person belonged to moving being'? Discernible here is 
a line of thought, fundamental to the Medieval theory of 
terms, that the interpretation of a term is determined by 
its use in the context of a sentence. For De Rijk 
(1967 p. 569) points out that the Medieval theory of 
supposition is to be understood as an answer to problems 
which appear in the investigation of the logical import 
of the copula in categorical affirmative statements. 
Consequently the Medievals were interested in how tensed 
copulation affects the interpretation of terms and it is 
this aspect of their theory of language which is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
After the Medieval era many theorists took the copula to 
be 'tenseless' in a~l uses. But this creates the difficulty 
of being able to distinguish between 'A belongs to B', 
'A belongs now to B' and 'A belonged to B' . One way these 
were distinguished was by making the terms themselves carry 
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the tense distinctions. For example according to 
Whatley 
"The Copula, as such, has no relation to time but expresses 
m~rely the agreement or disagreement of two given terms: 
hence if any other tense of the substantive verb besides 
the [timeless] present is used ••• if the circumstances 
of time do really modify the sense of the whole proposition 
... then this circumstance is to be regarded as part of 
one of the terms: .•. as 'this man was honest'; i.e. 'he 
is one formerly-honest'." 
(quoted from Prior 1957 p. 105). 
This has the consequence that tense distinctions are to 
be taken adjectivally; just as 'tall' restricts 'man' 
in 'tall man' so 'formerly' restricts 'honest' in 
'formerly-honest' . 
Both Aristotle and the Medievals travelled some way along 
this path of attributing certain temporal distinctions to 
the terms. For instance in 'De Sophisticis Elenchis', 
a work in which Aristotle discusses and classifies certain 
paralogisms he gives as examples of equivocation of terms 
the subject terms 'the sick man' and 'the sitting man' in 
the statements 'the sick man is healthy' and 'the sitting 
man stands up'. For it was concluded from these that the 
same man is both seated and standing or both sick and 
healthy at the same time. As Aristotle notes 
" ••• it is he who stood up who is standing and he who is 
recovering who is in health: but it is the seated man 
who stood up and the sick man who was recovering." 
(16Sb38 - 166a 2). 
His solution here is to claim that a sentence like 
'The sick man does so-and-so' is ambiguous between 'The 
man who is sick does so-and-soland 'The man who was sick 
does so-and-so'. A clearer example of the ambiguity is 
'A man sitting in this room fired the fatal shot'. The 
ambiguity involved here is considered in more detail in the 
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next chapter, particularly in Section 2.4. 
One final point in this chapter concerns a particular 
interpretati~n of universal statements. Earlier in 
this Section the view that the distinction between (1) 
and (2) resides in the tenseless I tensed difference was 
summarily rejected. There is, however, one line of 
thought for which this account of their difference is 
appropriate. Basically, this is that (1) and (2) differ 
in what they are about. Whereas (2) concerns individual 
As and Bs, if there are any, (1) is to do with kinds of 
things. Now, this distinction is of importance for 
understanding certain aspects of Medieval metaphysics, 
namely their long debate concerning universals. This 
distinction is met again in chapter seven in connection 
with existence claims. 
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CHAPTER TWO TENSE AND TERMS IN MEDIEVAL LOGIC 
2.1 Introductory Comments on the Medievals. 
Chapter One dealt with Aristotle's account of singular 
statements together with certain aspects of his discussion 
of general statements. In the case of universal state-
ments his discussion is tied up closely with his philosophy 
of science as expounded in the 'Posterior Analytics'. 
On the other hand his views on singular statements are 
expounded in the 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione'. 
And it was these latter two works which were the only 
generally available translated works of the Organum in 
the Latin West until the first half of the twelfth century. 
High Medieval logic carne to fruition after the discovery 
of the remaining works of the Organum. This logic was 
not only a continuation of Aristotle's but also contains 
certain important extensions, in particular, the theory 
of terms within which tense considerations loom large. 
Aristotle's vision of demonstrative science plays no part 
at all in the early development of Medieval logic. It 
was 'De Sophisticis Elenchis' and not the two Analytics 
which made the biggest impression upon twelfth century 
logicians. Later writers, however, and, in particular, 
Ockham who wrote in the fourteenth century were influenced 
by Aristotle's theory of science. (See Ockharn 1964 
p. 3 - 17). Moody notes that Ockham viewed logic very 
much in the spirit of Aristotle 
" •.. [Logic's] ulterior purpose is that for the sake of which 
logic exists - namely, the science of nature. It is worth 
noting that Ockham here speaks as if logic were the instru-
ment only of the philosophy of nature and not of 
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· .• metaphvs ics. I, 
(1935 p. 32). 
In contrast, Sherwood, a thirteenth century logician, 
looked upon logic along with his comtemporaries as one 
part of the 'trivium' concerned with the sciencf of 
discourse. 
"This science [of discourse] has three parts: granunar 
which teaches one how to speak correctly; rhetoric which 
teaches one how to speak elegantly; and logic which 
teaches one how to speak truly." 
(1966 p. 21). 
De Rijk in his work 'Logica Modernorum' (1962 and 1967) 
argues that there are two factors central to the rise of 
terminist logic out of it s Aristotelian origins, namely 
the discovery of 'De Sophistici Elenchi' in about 1130 in 
Paris and much more importantly, a renewed interest in 
grammar. It is then, the interconnection of these factors 
which go some way to explain the subtleties of the Medieval 
philosophy of language. For to show why certain arguments 
are fallacious depends upon a sensitivity for language and 
in particular for the semantic roles of various words. 
In Ancient times grammar and philosophy were closely 
connected but after about 200 B.C. under the Alexandrians 
they became detached and grammar carne within the province 
of literary studies (Robins 1967 p. 22). Dionysius Thrax 
who lived about 100 B.C. and was taught by an Alexandrian 
wrote in an important grammatical work that the grammarian's 
chief concern is with practical knowledge of the general 
usages of poets and prose writers (rather than with the 
formal working out of regularities in language - Robins 
ibid p. 31). This trend continued under the Latin 
grammarians until the eleventh century when the divorce 
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betweon philosophy and grammar ended as dialectic 
became more prominent. 
After about 1150 grammarians became much more interested 
in syntax. In particular they approached it in a 
contextual manner concerning themselves with ascertaining 
the function of a word according to its use in a statement. 
This interest laid the basis for a fruitful interplay 
between grammar and philosophy (De Rijk 1967 p. 115). 
For one important consequence of this syntactic interest 
was a fundamental shift in semantics. In the eleventh 
century and earlier the meaning of a term was judged not 
by any criterion of its use in some actual construction 
but by its original imposition - the purpose for which 
it was principally or properly invented (De Rijk ibid 
p. 110 - 111). This shift away from meaning as original 
imposition to an approach in which the force and function 
of wordsar~ determined by the sentential role in which 
they occur resulted in terminist logic. Unlike the Ancient 
and early Medieval grammarians, then, the terminists had 
a clear idea of the fundamental importance of the statement 
as the verbal context within which the meaning of a term 
is to be determined. And eventually, the word 'supposition' 
was used to characterize the semantic role of a term within 
a sentential context. This (extensional) property of a 
term was distinguished from its 'signification' which was 
its meaning by itself (and did have some connection still 
with imposition in its earlier history). 
The upshot of this was that treatises on the modes of 
signifying were written works which Robins calls 'speculative 
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grammars' (1967 p. 74). From the grammarian's point 
of view the discussion of tenses in these 'grammars' is 
disappointing because of their total concentration upon 
the pure tenses. (This may connect up with the point 
that the paradigm Aristotelian statement is a classifier 
statement which is not open for continuous tensing). 
From the logician's point of view these Medieval works 
are of interest especially in connection with their 
discussion of the contribution pure tenses make to the 
truth conditions of statements containing them. The 
main feature here of this discussion is the thesis that 
the semantic role of a general term may vary in the 
context of statements which only differ in their tensing. 
In order to bring out informally this feature as clearly 
as possible a brief outline of the contribution tense 
consideration made to the rise of terminist logic is 
given. 
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2.2 Tense and the Rise of Terminist Logic. 
Boethius speaks of fallacies in connection with the 
opposition of statements. The most important passage 
where he does this is his second commentary on Aristotle's 
'De Interpretatione' (De Rijk 1962 p. 24). Aristotle 
makes a passing reference to 'De Sophisticis Elenchis' 
in Chapter Six of that work. 
"I speak of statements as opposites when they affirm and 
deny the same thing of the same thing - not homonymously 
together with all other such conditions that add to counter 
the troublesome objections of sophists." 
(17a 34 - 17a 38). 
De Rijk points out that as late as the twelfth century 
little attention was given to Boethius's commentary on 
this passage. However, once 'De Sophisticis Elenchis' 
became known interest increased considerably. Boethius 
mentions six cases in which the opposition of statements 
is frustrated by a fallacy. One of theseis the fallacy 
of different times as in 'Socrates sits and does not sit' 
where 'reference' to two different times is involved. 
However, what is more important for understanding the 
Medieval theory of tense and terms is not this fallacy 
but the fallacy of univocation (and it~ difference from 
equivocation). Equivocation occurs in 'Cato runs and 
Cato does not run' where 'Cato' stands in the first place 
for Cato Censonius and in the second for Cato Marciae. 
On the other hand univocation occurs in '(A) man runs and 
man does not run' where 'man' is univocal because it 
'refers' to individual men and to the human species. 
What then is the difference here? 
An expression is univocal if when within the context of 
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different statements and arguably because of those contexts 
it may have different semantic roles without having a differen 
signification. In contrast an expr~ssion is equivocal 
because it has more than one signification and it is this 
which explains its varying semantic role in different 
statements. The full impact of this distinction depended 
upon that contextual approach to syntax which was a feature 
of the renewed interest in grammar in the twelth century. 
Interestingly, univocation was taken to occur within the 
context of differently tensed statements. Fundamental 
here is the Medieval acceptance that a general statement 
as well as a singular statement can vary in truth value over 
time. Two technical notions, 'supposition' and 'appellation' 
play an important role in this acceptance. 
Originally, it appears, the term 'supposition' had only 
grammatical content. In Priscian's writings it probably 
means 'grammatical subject' (De Rijk 1967 p. 516). On 
the other hand, 'appellation' had from early days semantic 
content. The proper function of a name (in Aristotle's 
sense of 'name') was to 'call' or 'make present' an in-
dividual thing in a talk or discussion by means of a symbol 
or sign. (De Rijk ibid p. 556). This feature of 'calling' 
or 'making present' (appellation) became somewhat tightened 
in such a way that the appellation of name was its present 
application only. Now, this semantic feature of a name 
connects up with or is derived from Priscian's account of 
the canonical or basic form of names and verbs. In the 
case of names the basic form was the nominative Singular 
and in verbs the first person Singular present indicative 
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active (Robins 1967 p. 58). Both syntax and semantics, 
then, were geared towards statements which can vary in 
truth value over time. 
The appellative name conveys also a signification which 
was taken as resulting from the original imposition even 
though it was the conceptual presentation of a universal 
nature. The two terms 'appellation' and 'signification' 
became the central terms of the twelfth cen~ury theory of 
meaning. However, such a theory looks to be totally in-
adequate unless provision is made for sentences other than 
in the present tense. And it is here that the notion of 
'univocation' comes into play. For it was assumed that 
the extension of a general term varies according to the 
tensing of the statement within which it occurs. For 
instance, the term 'person' in 'A person sits' was taken 
to have a different extension from its use in 'A person 
sat' . 
In the 'Fallacie Parvipontane' Adam of Balsham mentions 
three kinds of univocation. First, when a word is used 
to denote either itself or what it signifies, secondly when 
a word is used to denote something of a certain kind or the 
kind itself and finally when an appellative name is ampliated 
or restricted in accordance with its connection with a verb 
in the past, present or future tense (De Rijk 1967 p. 528). 
It is this last kind which is discussed in the next two 
sections. Now, a very interesting point here is that the 
twelfth century theory of terms was intended only to take 
account of the last of the three kinds of univocation. 
The first two were put to one side as being non-significative. 
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That is, in this period, tense considerations were 
absolutely central to the general theory of meaning. 
In the late twelth centuny there wa~ a changeover in 
the theory when 'supposition' and 'signification' became 
the focal terms. This was due to taking into account 
those non-significative kinds of univoation as well. 
The central position of appellation was then infringed 
upon and the whole theory widened out into a supposition 
theory which took account of sentences like 'Man is a name' 
and 'Man is a species' which do not depend upon tense 
considerations. The former use of 'Man' was said to have 
'material supposition' while the latter has 'formal 
supposi tion' . In the early supposition theory as found, 
for instance in Sherwood~ only the subject term has 
supposition. Thus, 'supposition' changed in meaning from 
grammatical to semantical subject. However, in the later 
theory as found, for instance, in Buridan and Ockham it is 
not only the subject term but also the predicate term which 
supposits. 
This latter change in supposition theory is connected with 
the changeover from an inherence account of predication to 
an 'identity' account. According to the inherence theory 
a statement like 'Socrates is a person' says that the 
universal nature or form signified by the predicate inheres 
in Socrates. 
"Aristotle however, defines a statement as follows: a 
statement is an expression signifying something of something 
else or something apart from something else. When he says 
'of something else' he means the inherence of the predicate 
in the subject, and when he says 'a~art from something else' 
he means the separation of the predicate from the subject." 
(Sherwood 1966 p. 26) 
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And that it is a form which is predicated 
" the predicate does predicate a form only." 
(ibid p. 113). 
Therefore, a statement like 'Socrates is not ill' 
asserts that illness does not inhere now in Socrates. 
In the case of general statements supposition theory needs 
to be invoked. For example, in 'a person is ill' where 
'person' has personal determinate supposition (and then 
is understood as 'a person, namely ... , is ill') the form 
is said to inhere in the suppositia. 
In contrast to this account of predication was the so-
called 'identity' theory. This theory only makes use of 
extensions of terms where both subject and predicate terms 
supposit. 
"The same sort of account holds in the case of the predicate 
for by the proposition 'Socrates is white' it is asserted 
that Socrates is the thing which has whiteness; therefore 
the predicate supposits for the thing which has whiteness." 
And in Buridan's words 
" •.• for the truth of an 
it is required that the 
predicate stand for the 
(Ockham 1974 p. 189) 
affirmative categorical proposition 
terms, namely, the subject and the 
same thing or things." 
(1966 p. 90) 
This equi-extension account is based upon a tensed 
notion of equi-extensionality. 
Sherwood in his logical writings makes use of the technical 
terms, 'supposition' 'appellation' 'copulation' and 
'signification' . 'Copulation' he took to be a property 
of the adjectival name and in contrast, he took supposition 
to be the property of a substantive name and substantivized 
adjective. Ockham, on the other hand, just makes use of 
supposition both as a property of a subject and a predicate 
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term in a statement. Instead of makil1g use of 
'appellation' he lets it be a special case of supposition 
(1974 p. 188). His objection to 'signification' as the 
connotation of a universal natVre is closely bound up with 
his remarks on universals which are not considered here. 
On the other hand, Ockham retains a notion of a term having 
a particular semantic property independent of context, a 
property which 'signification' covered. But he retains 
this by distinguishing senses of 'supposition', a point we 
look at in Section 2.5. 
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2.3 The Theory of Appellation 
Appellation like signification is a property of a term 
independent of sentential context. 
"Appellation ... is the present correct application of a 
term - i.e. the property with respect to which what the 
term signifies can be [truly] said of something through 
the use of the verb 'is'." 
(Sherwood 1966 p. 106) 
In contrast, the supposition of a term varies according 
to sentential context. For instance, in the statement 
'Some person ran' 'person' was taken to supposit for past 
as well as present people. Of some interest, then, is 
the question in which sentential contexts is the supposition 
of a (subject) term coincident with its appellation? 
Sherwood answers by giving a rule, tne essential clauses 
of which are 
"An unrestricted cormnon term •.• suppositing ~n connection 
with a present tense verb that has no amplicating force 
supposits for those [things] that do exist." 
(ibid p. 123). 
This rule then gives the circumstances in which a term's 
supposition is equivalent to its appellation. However, 
the rule does not take into account negation. For although 
the supposition of 'person' in'Some person runs' coincides 
with its appellation it is not clear whether this is also 
the case in 'Some person does not run'. This is discussed 
later. 
There are two criteria for the appellation of a term. On 
the other hand there is the idea that appellation is the 
present extension of a term and on the other the idea that 
it consist only of present existents. Now, these two 
aspects normally go together but in certain cases they 
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conflict as in 'famous person' whose present extension 
need not just consist of present existents. (Buridan 
calls such terms 'ampliative' - 1966 p. 113). It is 
for this reason that Sherwood stipulates that a term is 
to be unrestricted. Adjectives and relative clauses 
were taken either to restrict a term's supposition as in 
'A white rose is in the garden' where the supposition of 
'rose' is restricted to white roses or to ampliate it as 
in 'A famous person runs' where the supposition of 'person' 
is ampliated. The example of restriction Sherwood gives 
is 'A man who has been ... ' which supposits for things which 
do not exist now in the context of a statement whose main 
verb is in the present tense. But the reason for the 
ampliation here is the subordinate verb in the past tense. 
The condition of suppositing in connection with a present 
tense verb is, of course, the central condition of Sherwood's' 
rule. What is of interest is that Sherwood takes a common 
term to supposit for present as well as pastlfuture things 
in connection with a past I future tensed verb (ibid p. 126 
and Buridan 1966 p. 100). The reason for this is that a 
statement like 'A person ran' was taken to be ambiguous in 
the same way that Aristotle took 'The sick man is healthy' 
to be (see 1.5). However, Sherwood subsumes this ambiguity 
under the compoundedldivided distinction. In the compounded 
sense 'A person ran' is equivalent to 'It was the case that 
a person ran' whereas in the divided sense it means 'There 
is now person who ran'. 
"If compounded ..• the supposition must be stricly indicated 
by the predicate. In that case 'man' supposits for past 
men and not for present [men] except in so far as they are past." 
(p. 127 ibid) 
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and 
"If divided ••. the Suppos1t1On [of the subject] 1S not 
strictly indicated by the predicate." 
(ibid). 
In order to allow for this ambiguity - which is discussed 
in the next section - a subject term in a pastlfuture 
tensed statement was said to have its supposition ex-
tended from present things to include past I future things. 
This account of supposition in past I future contexts creates 
two kinds of difficulty. First, it creates a problem 
for the Aristotelian account of conversion. The statement 
'Some A is B' was said by Aristotle to be equivalent to 
'Some B is A'. But given this ambiguity 'Socrates saw 
something white' does not follow from 'Something white was 
seen by Socrates'. 
" if a shield is white now but was black when it was 
seen by Socrates I maintain that it does not follow if 
the premise is divided. It does follow if the premise 
is compounded." 
(Sherwood 1966 p. 120). 
This problem is more clearly seen in the context of Ockham's 
theory of terms. For he held that both subject and predicatE 
terms supposit. But, he notes, that there is an asymmetry 
of supposition between these in the context of past and 
future tensed statements. 
"For what does the predicate in 'Socrates was white' supposit? 
If it supposits for things that are the proposition is false. 
The response here is that the predicate supposits for things 
that were regardless of whether they still are; therefore we 
have an exception to the rule I stated earlier - that in any 
proposition in which it occurs a term always does or can 
supposit for things that now are. I meant that rule to hold 
only for subjects of propositions." 
(1974 p. 205 - 6). 
Thus, in 'Socrates saw something white' what Socrates saw 
was then white because 'white' is part of the predicate term. 
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But in 'Something white was seen by Socrates' because 
'white' is part of the subject term what he saw need not 
have then been white. 
The second problem this account of supposition in tensed 
contexts creates concerns semantics for past and future 
tenses. For it will no longer be the case that a futurel 
past tensed statement is now true iff the corresponding 
present tensed statement will belwas true. For instance 
by these standard clauses 'Something white was seen by 
Socrates' may turn out false even though by the semantics 
Sherwood, Buridan and Ockham offer it may turn out true. 
This point was noted by Buridan and he took it to show 
that the standard general semantic clauses for past and 
future tenses must be qualified. He writes 
"A proposition of the future is not true if the corresponding 
proposition of the present will never be true. For example 
if this is true: 'Antichrist will preach' it follows that at 
some time this will be true 'Antichrist is preaching." 
(1966 p. 110) 
But this then has the consequence that the statement 
'The white will be black' can never be true. 
"But it has never been true to say that the white is black 
nor will it ever be true to say this." 
(ibid p. 110). 
The final condition of Sherwood's rule for connecting 
supposition and appellation is that the verb should not 
have ampliating force because 
"if the verb is an ampliating verb the subject can supposit 
for something that does not exist." 
(Sherwood 1966 p. 129) 
His example of such a verb is ' ... is praised' in 'A 
person is praised' which he says can now be true of Caesar. 
In such a sentence the term 'person' was said to have its 
supposition ampliated to include things which no longer 
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exist. The existence of such verbs does create a 
difficulty for the inherence theory of predication as 
pointed OU· in Section 1.4. Sherwood merely labels this 
difficulty when he says 
"An ampliating verb is one that signifies a condition that 
can occur in something which does not exist." 
(ibid p. 129). 
The notion of ampliation is used by some theorists, for 
example, Albert the Great (Moody 1953 p. 56) in the context 
of semantics for pastlfuture tense and for modality. 
Just as the supposition of 'person' is ampliated to coVer 
past as well as present people in 'A person is praised' 
this was said to happen also for 'A person ran'. And in 
the case of modal statements the supposition of 'person' 
was said to be ampliated to cover possible people as well 
as actual in 'A person can run'. 
According to the theory of appellation then, the supposition 
of 'person' in 'A person runs' is all presently existing 
persons. Consequently by Sherwood's rule this is also 
the case for 'All people now run' . Thus the theory of 
appellation allows apparent universal statements to be 
capable of truth value variation over time. But what 
about 'Nobody runs' and 'Some person does not run'? In 
his 'Syncategorematica' Sherwood writes 
"Negation takes more than affirmation puts. For example, 
'a man is running' only means that someone is running but 
the negation 'no man is running' extends itself to all ..• 
Let uS say that in a non-amp1iating affirmative proposition 
about the present there is reference to present things alone 
while in a negative to non existents as well." 
( ) 968 p. 98). 
It appears then that the supposition of 'person' in 
'No person runs' and in 'Some person does not run' is 
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extended to include people at all times. But, the 
trouble with this suggestion is that 'All people (now) 
run' and 'Some person does not now run' would then no 
longer be contradictories. For Socrates who no longer 
exists can not now run even if all presently existing 
people are. What this brings out is a particular problem 
for tensed existential generalization. From 'Socrates 
does not run' should it follow that there is someone who 
does not run? This is a problem we shall look at in some 
detail in Chapters five and six. 
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2.4 Tense and Scope. 
According to the Medievals a statement like 'A person 
ran' is ambiguous between 'It was the case that a person 
ran' and 'There is something which is a person now and 
who ran'. Sherwood remarks that this ambiguity is an 
example of the compounded/divided distinction. Aristotle, 
himself, noted that modal statements are open to this 
ambiguity 
"A man can walk while sitting and can write while not 
wr it ing. " a (De Sophisticis Elenchis 166 23). 
The distinction here is between the statements 'A person 
who is sitting can walk' and 'A person can walk while 
sitting' . In modern terminology the ambiguity is one 
of scope and the simplest way to distinguish them is given 
by the difference between (1) and (2) 
( 1 ) (3 x 
(2) (3x 
x is a person) (Sits x A Possibly walks x) 
I 
X is a person)' (Sits x A Walks x). 
Similarly in the tense example the two senses of 'A person 
ran' can be distinguished by (3) and (4) where the quanti-
fier ranges over all objects past present and future. 
(3) (3x) (Person x A Past Runs x) 
(4) (3x) Past (Person x A Runs x). 
(3) is a representation of the divided sense which unlike 
(4), a representation of the compounded sense, carries the 
implication that whoever ran is now a person and so exists 
now, (since 'is a person' is non-ampliating). 
The central feature of the supposition theory is that the 
same term may vary in semantic role according to the 
sentential context in which it occurs. Since this variation 
in semantic role is not dependent upon equivocality of a 
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term (see 2.2) it would appear that it should be 
dependent upon structural ambiguity rather than lexical 
ambiguity. However, it is lexical ambiguity according 
to Aristotle, which accounts for the ambiguity of 
'The sick man is healthy' as we noted in section 1.5. 
But what about the compoundedldivided distinction? Is 
this lexically or structurally based? 
The fact that in more recent times this ambiguity is 
accountable for in terms of scope differences and so 
dependent upon structure does not mean that the Medievals 
saw it in this way. Sherwood writes 
"If compounded it must be pronounced with continuity and 
the continuity of the subject with the predicate signifies 
that the supposition must be strictly indicated by the 
predicate .•• If divided, it must be pronounced with 
discontinuity •.• and the discontinuity of the expression 
signifies that the supposition is not strictly indicated 
by the predicate." 
(Sherwood 1966 p. 127). 
That is, Sherwood views 'compounded' and 'divided' merely 
as labels for the two senses involved, labels given 
because phonetic composition (continuity) and division 
(pauses) allegedly disambiguate an utterance of the ex-
pression. Consequently, in order to represent the dis-
tinction involved a pause marker may be introduced. 
In the divided sense 'A person ran' is to be represented 
as 'A person [pause] ran'. The terms 'compounded' and 
'divided' then relate to disambiguation using phonetic 
marking without commenting on the source of the ambiguity. 
Thus, Sherwood writes 
" 'Composition' indicates on act of discourse and 'Division' 
another, both acts, to be sure being based on a single 
substance of utterance." 
(1966 p. 141). 
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As to the source of the ambiguity Sherwood cJaims it is 
due to the principle that to the same expression there 
corresponds a diversity in reality (ibid p. 140-1). 
Thus it seems that he saw the ambiguity as lexically 
rather than structurally based. Although this conclusion 
appears to be corre('t in the tense examples there is a 
suggestion that the difference involved in modal examples 
is due to the scope of 'possible' (ibid p. 141-2). Two 
closely connected difficulties occur for this lexical 
account. 
First, if 'person' is ambiguous in the context of a pastl 
future tensed sentence then why is it not ambiguous in the 
case of a present tensed sentence? For in 'A person runs' 
the supposition of 'person' is present existents only, and 
hence is strictly indicated by the predicate. Or turned 
around, why is it not the case that in the divided sense 
the supposition of 'person' does . ~t depend strictly upon 
the tensing of the predicate? An account to explain this 
should surely make use of that central feature of supposition 
theory. But pursuing this line of thought results in the 
overthrow of the term analysis and this brings us to the 
second more important difficulty, the nature of this 
lexical ambiguity. 
Surely, the ambiguity depends upon the difference between 
the open sentence 'x is a person' and the open sentence 
IX was a person' which brings out the predicative nature 
of the term 'person' in 'A person ran'. Moreover, 
Aristotle's apparent belief that 'The sick man is healthy' 
is ambiguous in the same sort of way that 'The bank is 
green' is is unsound according to his own principles. 
For unlike the latter the former depends upon differences 
in temporal signification yet Aristotle claimed 
" ... a name is a spoken sound 
without time." 
significant by convention 
(De Interpretatione 16a 19) 
So the conclusion to be drawn here is that 'the sick man' 
contains a hidden verb and that therefore general terms 
are not names. (We believe that this shows that definite 
descriptions should not be treated as singular terms). 
To accept that there are compoundedldivided ambiguities 
in the case of tensed sentences brings out that the 'A 
belongs (now) to B' sort of analysis is inadequate because 
'A belonged to B' is only ambiguous in this way if 
'belonged to' is. That is, unless one is to claim that 
there are two different kinds of simple past (future) 
tenses these ambiguities can not be accounted for while 
~reating tensing adverbially. In Chapter five we criticize 7 
a Russellian analysis of tense on similar grounds. 
This conclusion about terms can be avoided if one treats 
time determinations adjectivally as later term theorists 
did - see comments in 1.5. For then the ambiguity in-
volved in 'The sick man is healthy' is given by the 
d fference between (5) and (6) 
(5) The formerly sick man belongs to (tenseless) 
presently healthy beings. 
(6) The presently sick man belongs to (tenseless) 
presently healthy beines. 
We believe then that these considerations bring out a 
fundamental tension between Aristotle's term analysis of 
general statements (see 1.2) and his account of singular 
statements and their tensing (see 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4). 
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In both Buridan and Sherwood there are interesting 
examples of compoundedldivided distinctions involving 
tense. Sherwood (ibid p. 142-3) gives the following 
example to show that sentences involving the adverb 
'always' may be ambiguous in this way. 
(7) whatever lives always exists. 
(8) Socrates lives. 
(9) .'. Socrates always exists. 
(7) is ambiguous as between (7') and (7") 
(7') (x) Always (lives x ~ Exists x) 
(7") (x) (lives x ~ Always Exists x). 
The general form for the compoundedldivided distinction 
using quantifiers and scope distinctions is that between 
(10') and (10"), where Q is an unrestricted quantifier 
(10') (Qx) Operator (¢x connective ~x) 
( 10" ) (Qx) (¢x connect i ve Opera tor l/ix). 
In Buridan, however, there is an unusual example. He 
claims that in one sense 'An old man will be a boy' is true 
"1lhis is proved since it is the equivalent of the 
statement that he who is or will be an old man will 
be a boy. This is true for Antichrist'''(1966 p. 111). 
But this is not an instance of (10') or (10") but instead 
is (11) 
(11) (3x) Future (Future Old man x A Boy x). 
And there are two senses in which 'An old man will be a 
boy' is false. 
(12) (3x) Future (Old man x A Boy x). 
(13) (3x) (Old man x A Future Boy x). 
(Notice that it can not be represented by (14) in the sense 
in which it is true, because the subject term is 'Old man' 
and not 'boy' - this brings out a problem of capturing the 
medieval account using quantifiers and 'and'.) 
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(14) (3x) Future (Boy x A Future Old man x). 
Besides scope differences on pairs of predicates there 
is also discussion of sophisms which in more recent 
terminology depends upon quantifier scope. Buridan 
(ibid p. 107) distinguishes two senses of 'There has 
always been some person'. The difference was taken to 
depend upon different suppositions of 'person'. In the 
sense in which it is the same person always (represented 
by (15'» 'person' was said to have determinate supposition 
and in the other sense (represented by (15"» it was said 
to have confused supposition. 
(15') (3x) Always (Person x) 
(15") Always (3x) (Person x) 
More famous is Buridan's example 'I owe you a horse' 
(ibid p. 137). 
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2.5 Concluding Rmarks to Part One. 
Central to supposition theory is that notion of un-
ivocality discussed in Section 2.2. However, it seems 
that the Medievals did not see the ambiguities involved 
as dependent upon structure. Nevertheless, they did 
believe that univocality is different from equivocality, 
as we saw. Perhaps this can be understood to be similar 
to a view held by Frege. He believed that within certain 
contexts, oblique contexts, expressions have a different 
semantic role than in non-oblique contexts. The analogy 
is made more complete here if the indirect sense is 
identified with the direct sense of an expression (as 
proposed by Dummett 1973 p. 268). For then an expression 
may vary in semantic role (reference) according to context 
without varying in sense. 
Also central to supposition theory is the term analysis. 
This analysis involves the view that general and singular 
terms are syntactically and semantically on a par. For 
instance, in Sherwood's writings singular terms like general 
terms, supposit for they are said to have 'discrete suppos-
ition' . It may even be claimed that it was because of 
this that there is a need for supposition theory in the 
first place. Indeed, the introduction of the functional 
analysis employing quantifiers, predicates and variables 
does overcome the need for distinguishing between certain 
kinds of supposition. But what about appellation theory? 
Does this also become redundant once quantifiers, predicates 
and variables are introduced? We think not since there are 
still many questions to be answered. Relevant here to 
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these is an idea found in both Sherwood and Ockham that 
there is a 'fundamental' or 'basic' notion of supposition, 
a type of supposition which a term may have independently 
of sentential context. This may take on one of three 
forms (A), (B) or (C) for a term 'T'. 
(A) The term 'T' supposits for all actual and 
possible Ts. 
(B) The term 'T' supposits for all past, present and 
future Ts. 
(C) The term 'T' supposits for all presently existent 
Ts. 
According to which is taken as basic then a term's 
supposition is said to be ampliated or restricted according 
to certain types of sentential context. For instance, 
if (B) is taken as 'basic' then in the sentence 'A person 
can walk' 'person' will be said to be ampliated to cover 
possible people whereas, in contrast 'person' will be said 
to be restricted in 'A person (now) walks'. 
Evidence that there is this idea in both these authors is 
provided by the following quotes. First for (A) from 
Ockham 
" ••. a term supposits personally when it supposits for things 
that are its significata or for things that were, will be or 
can be it s significata... It is for this reason that I ••• 
said that 'to signify' can in one sense be used in this way." 
(1974 p. 204). 
And in the case of (B) Sherwood writes 
"A verb may sometimes restrict as in 'a man runs'. The term 
'man' can supposit for past, present and future men but here 
it is confined to present men by the verb in the present tense." 
(1966 p. 124). 
Also in Sherwood (C) is found 
"Or putting it another way, if we want to speak strictly we 
say that a term supposits on its own for present things and 
if it supposits for other things it will be because of what 
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1S adjoined to it - i.e., an ampliating verb or a past-
tense or future - tense verb ... " 
(1966 p. 130). 
What these three accounts yield is a 'basic' way of 
understanding general statements. For instance, 
Aristotle's distinction between temporally unrestricted 
and temporally restricted readings of 'All Ds are Es' 
(See 1.5) is then, the difference given by (B) and (C) 
respectively. As a lega~y for modern logic (A), (B) 
and (C) provide three alternative ways of interpreting 
standard quantification theory. For they offer different 
ways of considering the range of the quantifiers. 
Especially interesting is the reading embodied via (C) 
which suggests that the quantifiers be taken as ranging only 
over present existents. This provides a basis for tensed 
quantification theory employing tensed quantifiers. 
How do the notions of 'ampliation' and 'restriction' fit 
in with modern logic? In the case of 'restriction' a natural 
suggestion is to follow the Medievals. They believed that 
adjectives and relative clauses restrict terms. Consequently 
if (A) or (B) is taken as the basic notion of supposition 
then tensing may be dealt with adjectivally in the manner 
noted in the last Section. For instance, the sentence (1) 
(1) Socrates was a person 
may be taken as (1') 
(1') Socrates is a former-person 
where the 'is' is not present tensed but tenseless and where 
'former' restricts the term 'person'. In terms of the 
quantifier and variable analysis a standard way of dealing 
with the predicate' ... is a former person' is to introduce 
an extra place into the predicate ' ... is (tensless) a person' 
62. 
to form' is-a-person-at ... ' where the second place 
is open for a time variable or constant. So (1) becomes 
(1") 
(1") (3t) (Before (t, now) A Socrates is-a-person-a t t). 
The restricted general term 'former person' is therefore 
dealt with jn terms of a temporally restricted predicate 
' ... is a-person-at t'. This analYSis of tense, the 
Russellian analysis, is looked at in Chapter five. 
In contrast, a natural way of dealing with ampliation when 
it is dependent upon the occurrence of tense and modal 
expressions in a sentence is to represent it in terms of 
a quantified expression within the scope of an operator. 
For instance, if (A) is taken as basic; that is, in more 
recent terminology the quantifiers range over all possible 
objects then (2) 
(2) It is possible that someone runs 
can be represented either as (2') or as (2") 
(2') Poss (3x)(Person x A Runs x) 
(2" ) (~x) Poss (Person x A Runs x). 
But, if the quantifiers range only over actual objects (so 
'person' is ampliated in (2) ) then (2) must be represented 
by (2'). Thus when (C) is taken as basic (3) when under-
stood to be compounded 
(3) A person ran 
has the form (3') 
(3') Past (3x)(Person x A Runs x). 
This has the consequence that proposal (C) is more sensitive 
to scope distinctions than (B) because (3') will under the 
former unlike the latter mean something different than (4) 
does 
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(4) (ax) Past (Person x A Runs x). 
As we note below it is (C) which Sher'~ood takes as basic. 
That is, he holds that the appellation of a term is its 
'fundamental' property independent of context (barring 
signification). The interest of this for us is that it 
suggest~ a development of tense logics as an extension of 
standard quantification theory when understood to represent 
present tensed fragments of natural language and where the 
quantifiers are temporally restricted. And, it is this 
which is developed in Chapter six of this essay. 
Can this account of ampliation be extended to cover am-
pliating verbs? One suggestion would be that sentence like 
'Someone is famous'is to be analysed in terms of a quanti-
fier within the scope of an intentional operator. But, 
although, this may be true of many ampliating verbs there 
are others like 'x is taller than y' for which intentionality 
is not appropriate. 
Sherwood unlike Ockham takes (C) to be basic. He says 
" ••• strictly speaking, we must say that the verb 'can' and 
others like it ampliate the supposition of a term while the 
verb 'is running' and others like it do not restrict a term 
since a term supposits on its own for present things." 
(1966 p. 131). 
This difference may be connected with these authors' 
different attitudes to the relationship between logic and 
ordinary discourse and between logic and scientific 
discourse. (We may compare here the contrast between 
Aristotle's account of tense as contained in 'De 
Interpretatione' with what little mention there is in his 
formal writings). In recent times the Kneales appear 
entirely to discount (C) as a basic account of supposition 
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(and presumably as a 'basic' way of reading the standard 
quantifiers). 
"But it seems curious that no term is said to have 
appellatio unless it is applicable to something existing 
at the time of speaking; for while it may be important 
to distinguish in logic between terms which have appli-
cation to something past, present or future and those 
which have no application at all, it is not so obviously 
important to draw a line where William of Sherwood and 
other medieval logicians draw a line between terms which 
have appellatio and those which do not." (1962 p.247.8) 
These authors, then, are putting forward the view that 
there is no significant point to Medieval appellation 
theory or more generally to a tensed quantification theory 
involving tensed quantifiers. Although this attitude may 
be connected with relating logic exclusively to scientific 
discourse it is also, if not more importantly, connected 
with the belief (reinforced by twentieth century physics) 
that tensing and indexicals like 'here' or 'I' are to be 
dealt with semantically in the same sort of way. 
Consequently, temporally restricted quantifiers (and hence 
the appellation of a term) are taken to be as useful as 
having spatially restricted quantifiers (or a special 
spatially restricted property of a term). This condem-
nation of the Medieval account of tense looked at in 
twentieth century terms is considered in Part II of this 
essay to which we now turn. 
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PART TWO 
TWO LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE 
ANALYSIS OF TENSE. 
CliAPTER THREE: THE Lp AND LD ANALYSES OF TENSE. 
3.1 Statements and Truth Variability. 
There are two important parts to the construction of a 
semantic theory for fragments of natural language. First 
and foremost is the semantics themselves which give the 
meaning of any statement of some regimented language. 
Secondly, is the working out of sets of translation pro-
cedures from the relevant fragments into the regimented 
language. In the case of semantics for tensed fragments 
there is a general question as to whether or not the central 
unit of the semantics, the statement, can vary in truth 
value over time. For the Ancient and Medieval view that 
(some) statements may vary in truth value over time has 
been criticized on the ground that it confuses the nature 
of truth and falsity. In this Section it is argued that 
accusations along these lines are based upon a preferred 
sense of 'statement' or rather 'proposition'. Consequently, 
it needs to be (at least) recognised that there are alter-
native accounts of what a statement is. 
According to Frege it is what (stating) sentences express, 
namely 'thoughts', which are primarily true or false (1967 
p. 19). Strictly speaking, however, it is not ordinary 
language sentences which express thoughts but uses of them 
since they often contain both tense and indicator expressions 
of one sort or another. Frege writes 
"But are there not thoughts which are true today but false 
in six months time? The thought, for example, that [he tree 
there is covered with green leaves will surely be false in 
six months time. No, for it is not the same thought at all. 
The words 'this tree is covered with green leaves' are not 
sufficient by themselves for the utterance, the time of 
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utterance is involved as well. Without the time 
indication this gives we have no complete thought 
at all. Only a sentence supplemented by a time-
indication and complete in every respect expresses 
a thought." (1967 p.37). 
Consequently, in order to set up a semantic theory which 
captures this Fregean conception a statement is to be 
identified with a potential use of a natural language 
sentence on some occasion. More formally, it may be 
identified as an ordered pair consisting of a regimented 
natural language sentence together with an ordered set 
of indexes which represent a possible occasion of use. 
Now one very important consequence of this account of a 
statement is that they like Fregean thoughts can not vary 
in truth value over time. They are true or false simplicite 
Why did Frege hold the view that thoughts can not vary in 
truth value over time? It seems that this belief is 
inttmately tied up with his doctrine that semantically 
speaking, thoughts and senses (of a proper name) are on a 
par in that they both refer. In the case of thoughts what 
they refer to are the truth values (1960 p. 63). Now, 
it is natural to hold, as indeed Frege did that two different 
referents (of proper names) can not be associated with the 
same sense. (For Frege, the sense of a proper name is 
'the mode of presentation' of the referent). Analogously, 
then, two uses of a sentence like 'Socrates sits' which 
actually differ in truth value on two occasions can not 
express the same thought. In order to take account of 
the difference in sense here time of use needs to be in-
voked as a systematic factor which contributes towards the 
sense of a use of a tensed sentence. This is an argument 
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from 'content'. Closely connected to it but independent 
of the invocation of senses is an argument from extension 
dependent upon the principle that if two uses of a sentence 
differ in their extension (their truth value) then they 
must differ in referential components. Again the difference 
has to be accounted for systematically in the case of uses 
of tensed sentences. This is done by invoking (implicit) 
reference to time via the use of tense. Consequently, 
Frege claims 
"If we say: 'The sun is in the tropic of Cancer' this 
would refer to our present time." (I 960 p. 72). 
In a similar vein Russell criticizes MacColl's distinction 
between types of statement. MacCol1 distinguished between 
statements which are true, false and variable amongst others 
(1973 pp. 307ff). A variable statement is one which can 
vary in truth value over time like 'Mrs Brown is not at 
home' . To this Russell writes 
"Here it is plain that what is variable primarily is the 
meanIng of the form of words. What is expressed by the 
form of words at any given instant is not itself variable; 
but at another instant something else, itself equally in-
variable is expressed by the same form of words. 
Similarly, in other cases. The statement 'He is a barrister' 
expresses a truth in some contexts and a falsehood in others ••• 
Ordinary language employs, for the sake of convenience many 
words whose meaning varies with the context or with the time 
when they are employed; thus statements using such words 
must be supplemented by further data before they become 
unambiguous." (Quoted from Prior 1957 p. 110). 
It is not, however, always the case that a natural 
language sentence expresses a different thought on 
different occasions of use as instanced by 'seven is prime', 
So an alternative proposal to identifying a statement with 
an ordered pair is to hold that a sentence which is to be 
regimented is that unit which expresses the same statement 
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on all its occasions of use. But what about tensing and 
indicator words? Russell proposed that because tensing 
involves implicit time reference one need only make explicit 
that reference. 
"One of the objects to be aimed at in using symbols is that 
they should be free from the ambiguities of ordinary 
language. When we are told 'Mrs Brown is not at home' 
we know the time at which this is said, and therefore we 
know what is meant. But in order to express explicitly 
the whole of what is meant, it is necessary to add the 
date and then the statement is no longer 'variable' but 
always true or false... We may say that 'x is a barrister' 
'Mrs Brown is not at home at the time x'is true for some 
values of x and false for others." (ibid p. lID - III). 
What may generally be called the Frege-Russell account 
of a statement differs from the Ancient and Medieval 
account. The central difference is that alternative 
criteria are invoked for identifying a statement from a 
use of a tensed sentence like 'Mrs Brown is not at home'. 
Given this, it is surprising to find the Kneales (1962 
p. 48ff) accusing Aristotle of confusing the nature of 
truth and falsity by allowing them to be relativized to 
time. He is said to mix up calling a sentence true or 
false with the truth or falsity of the thought it expresses. 
It is the latter, they claim, which primarily has a truth 
value. Curiously, they believe that if Aristotle had 
realised this he would have conceded that different uses 
of the same sentence can express different 'propositions'. 
But, as remarked in Section 1.1, it appears that Aristotle 
did hold that it is 'thoughts' which are primarily true or 
false. And clearly this is true of the Stoics who not 
only believed that 'axioma' primarily have a truth value 
but also that they may vary in truth value over time. 
Johnson also criticized truth variability on the grounds 
69. 
that is is based upon a confusion. 
"Certain logicians have, however, deliberately denied the 
dictum that what is once true is always true and their 
denial appears to be due to a confusion between the time 
at which an assertion 1S made and the time to which an 
assertion refers." (1921 p. 235). 
Both these accusations of confusion depend upon a pre-
ferred sense of 'proposition'. For unlike a Fregean 
thought a Stoic thought is to be identified from a tensed 
sentence independently of its time of use. But how does 
the Ancient account of a statement stand in the light of 
the arguments from 'content' and 'extension'? 
The argument from content was based upon the principle that 
semantically thoughts are on a par with senses of proper 
names together with the idea that different referents can 
not be associated with the same sense. Certainly, this 
latter point is at its strongest in the case of senses of 
proper names although not so strong in the case of definite 
descriptions. However, the whole Medieval doctrine of 
univocation is based upon a rejection of that latter point. 
For they held that the semantic role (extension) of a 
general term may vary according to sentential context even 
though its signification does not. This can be understood 
to be the claim that, for instance, what is meant by two 
occurrences of the predicate' ... is red' in two uses of 
'This poker is red' on (significantly) different time 
occasions is the same despite the possibility, if not 
certainty, that the extension of the predicate at those 
times differ. On the basis of this truth variability for 
statements is acceptable. That is, putting the matter in 
a nutshell, there is nothing wrong with displaying a semantic; 
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in which the extensions of proper names are not reJativ-
ized to time while those of predicates and statements are. 
In reply to the other argument it is sufficient to amend 
the principle that if two uses of a sentence differ in 
truth value then they must dif1er in their referential 
components to the principle that if two uses of a sentence 
differ in truth value at the same time then they must differ 
in their referential components. In connection with this 
it is interesting to note that Johnson who held the view 
that propositions can not vary in truth value over time 
accepted the view that predicatescan vary in extension over 
time (1921 p. 235). 
What about two uses of a sentence like 'I am ill' by 
different people at the same time? Is there a choice open 
here as to their treatment? Neither the Ancients nor the 
Medievals, to our knowledge, allowed that statments may vary 
in truth value from person to person or from place to place. 
It appears then that truth relativization to time is a more 
'natural' notion here. The most modest explanation of this 
is simply that tense and indexical expressions differ 
grammatically in natural languages. In English ten"sing 
takes on an adverbial construction whereas indexicals like 
'T' and 'here' appear to occupy singular term positions. 
One consequence of this, utilized fully in Section 4.3, is 
that the truth predicate is itself open for tensing. 
Dependent upon what sorts of constraints are to be put on 
semantic theories for natural languages this modest ex-
planation may be utilized in defence of the Lp analysis of 
tense, discussed in 3.6, an analysis based upon the works 
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of Prior. A person of a Frege-Russell bent may argue 
that ordinary language is 'misleading' in its bias to-
wards temporal expressions over spatial expression (see 
4.5) and furthermore may claim that tensing ought to be 
treated on a par semantically with spatial indexicals 
(in order to avoid certain philosophical pitfalls). 
It is this semantic ground that tensing and spatial in-
dexicals are semantically on a par which is presupposed 
by the Frege-Russell account of a statement. Consequently, 
a full blooded exp~nHtionof the naturalness of truth 
relativization would appeal not just to grammatical 
differences between tensing and indexicals but also to a 
semantic difference which would show that it is an error 
to treat tensing and indexicals semantically on a par. 
If there is this appeal to be made, an appeal denied by the 
LD theorist (see 3.7) then its ground will reside in some 
belief along the lines that space and time are importantly 
different. An attempt to give such a full-blooded ex-
planation is contained in Section 4.5. 
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3.2 Tenseless Verbs. 
Many theorists make use of tenseless verbs in their 
analysis of tensed sentences. However~ what is not so 
clear is precisely what is meant by 'tenseless' verb. And 
recently Mott has even expressed doubts about their 
intelligibility. He seems to be of the opinion that they 
are philosophers' inventions and not that of the grammarian. 
" ••• when a verb is said to be tenseless what sort of claim 
is being pressed? It may seem as if some syntactic or 
grammatical point is being made; as it would be if we 
said that the verb was in the perfect or imperfect tense. 
But there is no such grammatical point. In English there 
are verbs in the present tense, the perfect tense, there 
are verb phrases for the future, the continuous past and 
so on. But there are no verbs in the tenseless sense. 
The syntax of English does not include them." 
(J973 p. 74). 
Aristotle's distinction between names and verbs in 'De 
I~terpretatione' discussed in Section 1.3 was criticized 
in the seventeenth century by the Arnauld brothers. These 
criticisms when understood to be of a grammatical nature 
are valid. For, they claim that Aristotle was wrong to 
hold that time signification is essential to the verb. 
One strand of their argument consists in exhibiting certain 
complex uses of the copula which they claim do not signify 
with time. The uses they picked out were in sentences 
like 'Everybody is divisible' (1964 p. 107). Consequently, 
if there are such uses then, grammatically speaking, 
Aristotle was wrong to hold that time signification is 
essential to the verb. 
There is a much simpler and far less controversial route 
to the Arnaulds' grammatical thesis based upon the fact 
that notall languages inflect verbs in order to express 
tense distinctions. W. Bull writes 
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"It is traditional to assume that the structure of a tense 
system is revealed only by the morphemes affixed to the 
verb stern. There are nevertheless languages such as Zulu 
and Haitian French in which order morphenes are bound to 
the subject and still others such as YorubaHawaiin or 
Mandprin Chinese in which some order morphemes are free 
forms. " (1960 p. 20). 
This grammatically interesting fact which provides the 
basis for a vindication of the Arnaulds' position is of 
doubtful philosophical importance. It does not show as 
it used to be sometimes claimed that members of these 
societies have a different conception of time to us 
because of their wholly or partially different grammatical 
representation of temporal order. (A point made by Gale 
1968 p. 44ff). 
A ;erb need not introduce time determinations then and this 
may be utilized by constructing languages within which 
verbs do not signify with time but instead other expressions 
do. Adopting Quine's proposal (1953) of placing square 
brackets around a verb to indicate that it is tenseless then 
English sentences involving the simple pure tenses like 
'Socrates ran' 'Socrates runs' and 'Socrates will run' can 
be represented either by analogy with Zulu as 'Socrates-
tI : \" ',: f., "' .... 
PAST [runs]', 'Socrates-FUT [runs]' or by analogy with 
Yoruba as 'PAST Socrates [runs]' 'PRES Socrates [runs]' 
and 'FUT Socrates [runs]' where 'PAST', 'PRES' and 'FUT' 
are the simple order morphemes. Introducing these as 
free forms is preferable for the purposes undertaken here 
because of their neutrality between attachment to the 
verb and to the subject. Consequently, Mott's doubts 
about a syntactic or grammatical sense of tenseless verb 
depend upon paying too much attention to a single natural 
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language. 
The introduction of regimented languages constructed 
out of tenseless verbs (predicates) provides a useful 
background from which to assess the meritsof certain 
analyses of tense. First, it allows one to look at tense 
independently of its attachment to the verb. For it has 
been claimed by philosophers who reject the doctrine of 
'temporal becoming' - that is, the doctrine that there is 
content to the notion of 'the passage of time' - that this 
doctrine has a basis in the grammatical fact that tense 
forms in English are adverbial. A second point is that 
natural language tense forms serve other purposes than 
mere expression of temporal order. These include the 
expression of volition and of modality. On the basis 
of this grammarians bave even expressed doubts that a 
systematic account of ordinary language tense forms can 
be given (for example, Robins 1967 p. 30). Thus, 
grammatical tensing need not coincide with tensing in a 
regimented language. This is so even in cases where the 
ordinary language tense forms do express temporal order. 
For instance,in 'He runs tomorrow' the present tense ex-
presses futurity and in 'It is time he went to bed' the 
past tense expresses presentness. Consequently, because 
we want an account of how the morphemes 'PAST' 'PRES' 
'FUT', expressing temporal order only, contribute to the 
truth conditions of sentences containing them these 
morphemes are not be taken as automatic translations of 
grammatically past, present and future tenses. 
Although a clear sense has been provided to the notion of 
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'tenseless verb', a sense which is semantically 
onent ated little has really been done. For afterall 
the problem is how sentences of natural language are to 
be translated into a language involving such verbs. One 
natural question to ask is whether or not there are 
occurrences of tenseless verbs in English. The Arnaulds' 
method of isolating tenseless verbs was to seek them in 
the context of sentences which eschew temporal reference 
all together. However, this method, although suitable 
for their project, is of no use to theorists who wish to 
employ tenseless verbs in the analyses of sentences which 
do involve temporal reference. 
A distinction is sometimes made between 'tenseless' 
sentences and tensed sentences (For example, see Braude 
1973 p. 188). The former class of sentences is intended 
to include not only sentences like 'Two and two is four' 
but also those like 'There is a time at which Socrates 
sits'. The thought here seems to be that a tensed sentence 
contains tensed occurrences of verbs whereas a tenseless 
sentence contains tenseless occurrences. Consequently, if 
one can provide suitable criteria for distinguishing between 
these kinds of sentence one then also has a way of distin-
guishing tensed from tenseless uses of verbs. However, 
it is not clear that such criteria can be found which does 
not presuppose the tensedltenseless verb distinction. 
Braude's paper is a testimonial to this. After criticizing 
various versions of this distinction he gives as his own 
account 
"I shall say that a sentence S is tensed if and only if it 
is necessary that "for any two moments of time M and M' 
76. 
(where M f M') replicas of S produced at those times have 
different truth conditions. A sentence S will be tense-
less if and only if it is not tensed." 
(1973 p. 206 - 7) 
But, because he allows two replicas of a sentence to 
have different truth conditions even though it is 
(logically) impossible that they differ in truth 
value (ibid p. 209) his distinction here presupposes 
some means of identifying tensed components within a 
sentence. And, this is no easy matter. For instance, 
laws are often expressed as conditionals in which the 
consequent is in a grammatical future tense. So how 
is it to be determined whether or not it is necessary that 
two replicas of 'If copper is heated it will expand' 
have different truth conditions? 
One suggestion for isolating tenseless uses of 'is' is 
given by Gale. 
"The test for determining whether 'is' in some particular 
sentential context must function as tenseless rather than 
a tensed copula is as follows: if the context permits the 
substitution of 'was' or 'will be' for 'is' the copula is 
not of necessity tenseless; if not it is of necessity 
tenseless." (J968 p. 198 - 9). 
This test is dependent upon a rather unfortunate notion 
in the circumstances, namely correct usage (see comments 
above) . For how else is ' ... if the context permits the 
substitution of ... for 'is' ... ' to be understood? 
Appeal to correct usage is not only likely to ~)e unhelpful 
but also question begging in controversial cases. For 
instance, in a dispute as to whether or not the uses of 'is' 
in the sentences 'Socrates is identical to Socrates' or 
'Socrates is the same person as Socrates' are tenseless 
one side will claim that it is legitimate to substitute 
'was' here while the other side will merely deny this. 
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It has been argued by Mott (1973 p. 75) that Gale's 
test fails. One general class of sentence which is 
said to place doubt on it are those sentences in which 
there has to be compatibility between the tensing and 
other lexical items. For instance, in 'Socrates ran 
last week' the tense of 'runs' has to be compatible with 
the item 'last week' since it involves reference to the 
past. Buridan found such examples puzzling; 'Socrates 
will be running tomorrow' he claims is a sophism. 
"The sophism is clear positing that he will run tomorrow ..• 
[But] the opposite is argued, because if a proposition of 
the future is true, it is necessary ••• that in tr : future 
it should correspond to a true proposition of the present 
tense... But it will never be true to say 'Socrates is 
running tomorrow'... It is similar concerning the sophism 
'Socrates argued last year' because it was never true to 
say 'Socrates is arguing last year!" 
(1966 p. 111). 
Are there not instances where the present tense has to be 
used because of compatibility? It is for this reason that 
Mott claims that 'I'm ready now' is a counterexample since 
it appears that by Gale's test 'am' is necessarily tense-
less. However, in defence of Gale, Buridan pointed out 
that his sophism is true if ~omorrow~is understood as 
belonging with 'will be' but false if it belongs with 'run' 
(ibid p. 120). That is, the copula is there to be under-
stood as 'will tomorrow' which can be substituted for by 
'was' or 'is'. Likewise for the Mott counterexample if 
the copula is taken as 'is now' then it is substitutable 
for by 'was' or 'will be'. But Gale uses his test to claim 
that the copula in 'X is simultanecus with this token' is 
tenseless where 'this token' is token-reflexive. It is 
arguable, however, that the 'is' is not substitutable here 
because of the occurrence of 'this token' which implicitly 
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refers to the present time. 
It is assumed here that the question whether or not a 
verb use in English is tenseless or tensed is to be 
answered in the light of a certain amount of theory. 
In particular, in terms of whether any purported tensing 
does or does not contribute to truth conditions. In 
connection with this is Braude's claim that every sentence 
is either tensed or tenseless. (ibid p. 191). It 
isn't clear that this is true of English sentences. For 
instance, in the next Section attention is given to trans-
lating 'Caesar invaded Britain in 55 B.C.' into a regimented 
language. It is there claimed that there is not one 
correct translation only. Furthermore, there is a straight 
division in opinion as to whether or not sentences like 
'Seven is prime' involve tensed or tenseless uses of verbs 
For instance, Jespersen (1961 p. 17) and Reichenbach 
(1966 p. 292) claim that the 'is' is a tensed use whereas 
Strawson would claim it to be a tenseless use (1952 p. 150). 
This difference in opinion may depend upon whether or not 
tensing is treated from a grammatical or semantic pOint of 
view. In this essay the latter viewpoint is taken. 
Consequently, whether or not 'Seven is prime' is tensed 
depends upon what semantics are given for statements 
expressing number theory. Since standard semantics here 
do not involve temporal reference it may be claimed that 
the 'is' is tenseless. 
One essential condition, we believe, on any account of 
tenseless verbs is that a distinction must be made between 
a tenseless verb and what is here called a 'detensed verb'. 
Copi writes 
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"Here we shall follow the custom of ignoring the time 
factor and will use the verb' is' in the tenseless sense 
of 'is or will be or has been'." 
(J 968 p. 31 7) • 
This version of 'tenseless verb' is not unique to Copi, 
a pOint we note on later occasions. Gale does not 
distinguish between these two senses. He says that the 
'is' in 'Two plus two is four' is tenseless (1968 p. 50 
and p. 198) yet he also claims that the 'exists' in 
'There is a tiger' is tenseless when this sentence means 
'Either there did exist a tiger or there now exists a 
tiger or there will exist a tiger' (ibid p. 40). In 
order to distinguish these senses of 'tenseless verb' 
Copi's sense is called 'detensed' and represented by 
placing square brackets subscripted with a 'd' around the 
verb [ Jd. Unlike a sentence containing a tenseless verb, 
one containing a detensed verb, like 'Plato [walksJd is 
equivalent to a disjunction of simple tensed sentences, 
namely, 'PRES Plato [walks] or PAST Plato [walksJ or 
FUT Plato [walksJ'. So really the difference here is 
between a genuinely tenseless notion of verb like [walks] 
and a complexly tensed verb like [walksJd. Because of 
this we believe it to be a little misleading to call 
'detensed'verbs 'tenseless' as Copi and others do. For 
although they are not specifically present or past or future 
tensed they are nevertheless still tensed occurrences. 
Intuitively speaking, then, it appears that 'Plato [walksJ' 
is not a complete sentence unlike 'Seven [isJ prime'. On the 
other hand, 'Plato [walksJd' is acceptable whereas 'Seven 
[isJd prime' looks unacceptable. We believe that it is 
especially important to distinguish between these senses 
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in connection with the existential quantifier, a point 
we note in Chapter five (see 5.2ff). 
On the basis of the sense of 'tenseless verb' introduced 
in this Section an artificial language L is introduced 
whose primitive expressions consist of a set of n-place 
tenseless verbs V~( ... ) where ( ... ) marks the n-places 
together with a set ai of proper names (understood so as 
to include neither definite descriptions nor indexical 
expressions) . By a verb what is really meant is a predicate. 
The only formation rule for L is given by Definition L. 
Definition L. 
if V~( ... ) E V~( ... ) then V~(al ... a n ) is a formula of L J 1 J 
where al ... a n are any n occurrences of any m, msn, 
members of ai. 
Any formula of a language L is abbreviated to ~ W etc. 
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3.3 Preliminary Remarks on Tensed and Dated Sentences. 
Philosophical importance has been attached this century to 
two kinds of sentence which introduce time determinations. 
First, there are those sentences which only involve tenses 
like 'Caesar invaded Britain' and secondly there are those 
which also involve dates. One instance here, noted in 
3.1, was Russell's proposal that the implicit time reference 
in a use of 'Mrs Brown is not at home' be made explicit by 
introducing dating devices. In this Sertion some 
preliminary remarks are made concerning the relationship 
between these two kinds of sentence. 
Given the account of a tenseless verb introduced in the 
last Section tensed singular sentences involving pure tenses 
can be translated into a language which involves tenseless 
verbs. For instance, 'Caesar invaded Britain' becomes 
'PAST Caesar [invades] Britain'. Hence in order to take 
account of these sentences some language L needs to be ex-
tended to also include the tense morphemes in its primitive 
expressions. So let Ll be L u {PAST, PRES, FUT} where the 
only information rule for LI is given by Definition L I • 
Definition LI 
Suppose L is some tenseless language given by Definition L 
so that ~ is any formula of it. Then 'PAST ~' 'PRES~' 
and 'FUT ~' are formulas of L I • 
Language Ll is, then, ideally suited for capturing 
Aristotelian singular statements. 
But what about singular sentences involving dates? Let it 
be assumed that 'At tn' expressions where 'tn' is a date 
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~e free forms like the order morphemes. Consequently, 
is 'In 55 B.C. Caesar invaded Britain' to be translated 
as 'In 55 B.C. PAST Caesar [invadesJ Britain' (that is, 
in terms of a language which is an extension of Ll), 
'In 55 B.C. Casesar [invadesJ Britain' (that is, in terms 
of a language which is an extension of L but is neither 
contained in nor contains Ll) or as something else? Now, 
because the interest in setting up this translation is not 
for the purpose of looking at grammatical niceties but 
rather for assessing logical issues there appears to be a 
fairly clear criterion for deciding which is the most suit-
able translation in this particular case. 
The only difference between Ll sentences 'PRES Socrates 
[runsJ' and 'PAST Socrates [runsJ' which differ in their 
truth-at-a-time condition is in their tense morphemes and 
it is this wh1ch accounts for that difference. Consequently 
the translation of 'In 55 B.C. Caesar invaded Britain' into 
a language involving tenseless verbs depends upon whether 
or not occurrences of tense morphemes result in difference 
in truth conditions. If 'In 55 B.C. Caesar invades Britain' 
differs in truth condition from 'In 55 B.C. Caesar invaded 
Britain' then its translation will be into a language which 
is an extension of Ll. Appeal to ordinary usage in this 
case is not of much help. However, hardly any philosopher 
goes along with the proposal that there is a difference in 
truth-conditions in these examples, one exception being 
Braude 1973 p. 209. 
One reason for this is implicit reference to a distinction 
made by Rescher (1966) and Rescher and Urquhart (1971). 
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These authors contrast sentences like 'It rained in 
London yesterday' with one like 'It's raining on January 
1st 3000 A.D. is a fact'. The former are, they say, 
temporally indefinite whereas the latter are temporally 
definite (1971 p.25). The force of this is that the 
truth value of the former type of sentence unlike that of 
the latter is essentially bound up with their time of use. 
(This is then a particular subdivision of the tensedl 
tenseless sentence distinction mentioned in the last 
Section). Thus when a dated sentence is taken to be 
temporally definite its time of use is deemed irrelevant 
to the assessment of its truth value. On this basis then 
if someone now utters 'Caesar invades Britain in 55 B.C.' 
that person has not uttered something false (but has 
uttered something which is not 'correct' English). So for 
logical purposes the three sentences 'Caesar invadelinvadedl 
will invade Britain in 55 B.C.' are to be construed as 
having the same truth conditions. Alternatively expressed, 
the occurrence of a date in a sentence containing the simple 
tenses semantically overrides these tenses in such a way 
as to make them redundant. Let us call this 'The Semantic 
Primacy of Dates Assumption' which almost has the force of 
a convention amongst philosophers. 
Given this assumption then the sentence 'In 55 B.C. Caesar 
invaded Britain' can not be translated as 'In 55 B.C. PAST 
Caesar [invades] Britain' because it would have the wrong 
truth conditions. A natural suggestion, then, is to translate 
it as 'In 55 B.C. Caesar [invades] Britain'. Let us then 
introduce a language Ll which is L u {At ... til where the 
set ti consists of a (possibly) infinite set of date 
84. 
constants which represents a dating system based upon 
some unique event occurring at to. The only formation 
rule for Ll is given by Definition Ll. 
Definition Ll 
Suppose L is some tense less language then if ¢ is any 
formula of L At t ¢ is a formula of Ll for any tn £ t·. 
n 1 
Consequently Ll which is neither contained in nor contains 
Ll consists of temporally definite sentences. 
Although sentences of Ll and Ll have been constructed from 
underlying tenseless languages (which may be the same 
language) no account has been given of connecting them. 
It might be thought that this can easily be done by relating 
uses of Ll sentences on particular time occasions to those 
But, account needs also to be taken of sentences 
which not only involve dates but also tenses which do 
contribute to truth conditions. For instance, the English 
sentence 'In 56 B.C. Caesar was about to invade Britain' 
(Mott 1973 p. 78). Now such sentences have the character-
istic of involving complex tensing as well as dates. 
But The Semantic Primacy Assumption has only been considered 
in connection with those sentences which involve the simple 
tenses. What needs to be looked at is the interaction of 
dates with complex tenses and this, in turn, depends upon 
some account of complex tensing. 
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3.4 Tenses, Dates and Vectors. 
W. Bull in 1960 produced a framework within which to 
examine natural language tense systems. (His chief concern 
in that work was with the Spanish tense system). In 
this Section certain points are abstracted from his account 
of tense and dating systems. Fundamental to both a 
dating and a pure tense system are the occurrence of certain 
events which define what Bull calls 'axes of orientation'. 
In the case of tense systems the public event which is 
central is the act of speaking and it is this which defines 
the prime axis for all tense systems (1960 p. 7 - 8). 
Whereas Bull takes an axis to be an event we shall, instead, 
adopt the terminology that it is a moment of time for the 
sake of simplicity and generality. It is, however, im-
portant to realize that this change in terminology is not 
intended to be substantive in the sense that we are claiming 
that tense expressions 'refer' to time, a point which is 
of importance in connection with tense semantics. (For 
instance see 3.7). 
Bull claim8 that tense morphemes are 'vectorial' expressions. 
In order to understand what this means consider a use of 
an Ll sentence, 'PAST ~'; here the morpheme 'PAST' has 
the semantic role of directing us away from the prime axis 
(the time of use or the present time) towards the past. 
And it is this idea of 'directing towards the past' which 
underlies the suggestion that tenses are 'vectorial'. The, 
(indefinite) end pOint of this vector gives rise to a new 
axis which (in our terminology) is the time at which the 
purported event reported in '~' takes place. The expression 
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'PRES' is a O-vector which has the semantic role of 
directing from an axis back to it. 
Besides these vector expressions there are also 'scalar' 
expressions. Between any two events or pOints of time 
there is a definable 'distance' a time interval like 'one 
minute', 'ten days',' three centuries' etc ... The scalar 
expressions - so called because they are order indifferent -
can be added to vector formulas to yield the time between 
the prime axis and the subordinate axis. For instance, 
in 'Socrates ran three days ago' the scalar is three days 
and the direction is towards the past. 
A dating system like a tense system involves axes and 
vectorial expressions. The prime axis of such a system 
is the time of some unique event. Such a system, however, 
also includes scalars. Take, for instance, the standard 
Gregorian Calendar; in the expression 'In 55 B.C.' the 
prime axis is indicated by 'C' the order relation by 'B' 
and the scalar is '55 years'. (See Bull ibid p.12). 
In an abstract dating system like that introduced for 
language Ll by the set 'ti' the prime axis is indicated by 
'to', the order relation by the relation of the subscript 
'n' in 't ' to 0 and the central scalar unit by the distance 
n 
between any two consecutive dates. One central difference 
between the prime axis of a dating system and that of a 
tense system is that in the latter the axis 'moves' constantly 
through a series of intervals. Today will be yesterday 
tomorrow. Consequently, for human purposes a dating system 
is useless unless at any time we can know at which point we 
are on it. As Bull remarks 
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"Until we know the Gregorian calendar label for 'today' 
the public calendar is useless." (ibid p. 10). 
The Semantic Primacy of Dates Assumption can now be 
considered in more detail with respect to this framework. 
This assumes that the occurrence of a date in a sentence 
like 'World War II began in 1939 A.D.' semantically over-
rides the tensing of the verb 'begins' (see 3.3). That is, 
one merely drops out of consideration the tensing system 
whose prime axis is the time of use and concentrate'on the 
dating system when the sentence involved is to be assessed 
for its truth value. Such sentences are examples of those 
which introduce multiple axes. But they are special cases 
in that they involve two prime axes and it is because of this 
property that the assumption may gain a foothold here. 
In many sentences the introduced multiple axes are subord-
inate to the prime axis and, thus, depend on it for their 
existence. For instance, in 'John did it before Mary (did)' 
one can claim that there are three introduced axes, two 
of which are subordinate. First, the primary axis, the 
time of use, secondly an axis simultaneous with the purported 
event of Mary's doing it and finally one simultaneous with 
John's doing it. The two subordinate axes are subordinate 
here because they arise as end points of vectors introduced 
by uses of 'did' and 'before'. The second axis arises as 
the endpoint of the vector directed towards the past whose 
origin is the time of use and third as the end point of a 
vector whose origin is the second axis. This iteration of 
vectors and axes is most naturally represented by iterations 
of tense morphemes. The above example can then be re-
presented by (1). 
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(1) PAST (Mary [did] it A PAST John [did] it) 
where the latter occurrence of 'PAST' is within the scope 
of the former occurrence. 
logical limit. 
On this basis iteration has no 
Not only are there iterations of axes in the case of tensed 
sentences but also in dated sentences. If the tensing in 
'In 55 B.C. Caesar invaded Britain' is neglected two axes 
are still involved. First, the origin given by 0 B.C. and 
secondly the axis 55 B.C. which arises from the former. 
Here the subordinate axis unlike those in tensing examples 
is a definite time. However, the convention may be adopted 
that in such sentences the prime axis is 55 B.C. thus leaving 
as implicit the claim that the origin is 0 B.C. Given this 
convention then a dated sentence like 'After 1933 A.D. 
Germany went to war' involves two axes given by the dating 
system. First, the axis 1933 A.D. and secondly an axis 
which is the (indefinite) end point of the vector introduced 
by 'after'. A similar situation is to be found in the 
example 'In 56 B.C. Caesar was about to invade Britain'. 
In this case the purported event Caesar's invading Britain 
is said to be later than the axis 56 B.C. Assuming the 
Semantic Primacy Assumption the natural way to represent 
this sentence is as 'In 56 B.C. FUT Caesar [invades] Britain' 
where the morpheme 'FUT' introduces a vector whose origin 
is not the time or use but instead 'In 56 B.C.' (That is, 
tense morphemes may express temporal order in both tense 
and dating systems). So, formally the Semantic Primacy 
Assumption may be represented by (1). 
(1) PAST AT tn¢iffFUT At tn¢iff PRES At tn¢iff At t n¢. 
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If this assumption is rejected then all that holds is 
( 2 ) . 
(2) PRES At tn¢iff At t n¢. 
The framework here can be extended to take account of 
interval expressions. Also, it can be used to take 
account of a number of natural language expressions such 
as 'After the flood ... ', 'Before the last waltz ... " 
'At the time of the famine ... ' etc., expressions which 
Mott calls 'pseudo-dates' (1973 p. 82) after Rescher. 
But how does this framework fit in with the continuous and 
perfect tenses? 
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3.5 Tense and Natural Language. 
The tense morphemes 'PAST', 'PRES' and 'FUT introduced 
in Section 3.2 express temporal order only. And within 
the framework introduced in the last section this expression 
of temporal order is neatly captured via that notion of a 
'vectorial expression'. Moreover, it is because these 
morphemes' express temporal order only that we have called 
them 'pure tense forms'. The idea of a 'pure tense' is 
intended to be contrasted with that of an 'impure tense'. 
What then is an impure tense? At the level of natural 
language the impure tenses are the perfect tenses instanced 
in 'She had run', 'She has run' and 'She will have run', 
the continuous tenses 'She was running', 'She is running' 
and 'She will be running' together with combinations of 
these as in 'She will have been running'. Clearly, there 
are important differences between these impure tenses and 
those which involve only the pure morphemes. The question 
we want to briefly look at in this Section is how these 
differences should be accounted for. We shall start by 
considering the suggestion that the impure tenses should 
not be semantically distinguished from the pure tenses. 
Instead differences should be accounted for on pragmatic 
or conversational grounds. 
There is a close similarity in truth conditions between 
the present perfect and the past tense. (1) is generally 
true 
(1) Tr (a has ¢en English) iff Tr (a ¢ed English). 
This viewpoint is strengthened when backed up by the observatior 
that in English differences between uses of the perfect tense 
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as opposed to the simple past are generally based upon 
pragmatic or conversational grounds. Jespersen remarks 
that the perfect 
" looks upon the present state as a result of what has 
happened in the past." 
(J 961 p. 47). 
whereas, in contrast, the simple past tense directs us 
to the past without saying anything about the connection 
with the present. This idea of connection with the present 
can be expanded upon for there is a systematic use of the 
perfect tense where the grammatical subject refers to or 
applies to something of 'current relevance' within the 
speech situation. Now, this could be tightened in such a 
way as to produce a straightforwardly semantic notion of 
'perfect tense' whereby the subject term must apply to or 
refer to what exists at the time of use. (See 6.10 for a 
formalization of this). But this does not fit ordinary 
usage as is shown by the Jespersen example (2) 
(2) Newton has explained the movements of the planets 
as used in response to an assertion that no one has. 
As a backup to the argument here are the following two 
points. First, if the perfect tense were to be distinguishe, 
semantically from the simple past then the pluperfect 
sentence 'John had run' should be, at least, ambiguous 
between (3) and (4), if not also between (5) and (6) as well. 
(3) PAST PERF John [runs] 
(4) PAST PAST John [runs] 
(5) PERF PAST John [runs] 
(6) PERF PERF John [runs] . 
Secondly, a point about simplicity and generality: if the 
past and present perfect tenses are not semantically 
92. 
distinguished then the regimented form 'PAST¢' covers a 
wider range of natural language sentences. 
Because the perfect tense, unlike the past tense, is used 
in contexts where tne present state of affairs is to be 
seen as resulting from what is being said to have occurred, 
there are uses of this tense which appear to be semantically 
distinguishable from corresponding past tense uses. For 
instance, there appears to be a difference in truth condition~ 
between (7) and (8). 
(7) John has lived in York for three years. 
(8) John lived in York for three years. 
Unlike (8), (7) appears to carry the implication that John 
still lives in York. One could, of course, attempt to 
argue that the implication here is not semantic but instead 
a conventional conversational implicature. But the 
difference between (7) and (8) is connected with the point 
that (9) unlike (10) makes sense whereas (11) unlike (12) 
doesn't make sense. 
(9) I haven't seen her so far/this week. 
(10) * I didn't see her so far/this week. 
(11) * I haven't seen her yesterday/three weeks ago. 
(12) I didn't see her yesterday/three weeks ago. 
So, this way of distinguishing the past and the present 
perfect using the semantic/pragmatic distinction doesn't 
look very hopeful. What about the difference between the 
pure and the continuous tenses? 
Central to tense logics is that a formula have a truth value 
at a time instant (whatever it is that an instant is). 
Both 'Socrates is running' and 'Socrates runs' (when under-
stood to be non-frequentative) have truth values at an 
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instant. What, then, in general, is the difference 
between the continuous present and the simple present tense? 
Jespersen remarks that we wont go too far v'rong here i' 
the question is looked at in the light of a simple example 
like 'John is hunting' (1961 p. 1979). 
"The hunting is felt to be a kind of frame round something 
else; it is represented as lasting some time before and 
possibly (or probably) also some time after something else 
which mayor may not be expressly indicated." 
(ibid). 
And more generally 
"The essential thing is that the action or state denoted by 
the expanded [continuous] tense is'thought of as a temporal 
frame encompassing something else which as often is to be 
understood from the whole situation. The expanded tenses 
therefore call the attention more specifically to time than 
the simple tenses which speak of nothing but the action or 
state itself." 
(i bid p. 180). 
So a suggestion arising from this is that the difference 
between the present and the continuous present is not a 
semantic difference but a pragmatiC or conversational one. 
And that this difference resides in the point that the 
continuous present carries wi th it the presumption of truth 
at a time wi thin an interval. Although, this presum-
tion is in general clear it is not so clear how big an 
interval has to be, nor is it clear whether or not that at 
every moment within that interval 'a is ¢ing' is claimed 
to be true - for a distinction is needed between 'a is 
continually ¢ing' and 'a is continuously ¢ing' throughout 
an interval I. 
This way of dealing with the continuous tenses, however, 
is objectionable. For we have left out that element which 
is central to their use, as Jesperson points out, namely 
incompletion. This is tied up with a general point about 
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tensing in that it may be used to classify types of verbs. 
(Potts (1965 p. 75) says that this point was first made and 
used by Aristotle). Vendler, for instance in (1967), 
distinguishes between two sorts of verb phrases which do 
not admit of continuous tensing and two which do. In the 
former group are 'achievement' terms like' ... reaches 
the hilltop' or ' ... wins the race' which are true moment-
arily and 'state' terms like' ... loves Jane' or ' ... knows 
the plumber' which may be true of someone for a period of 
time. In the latter group are 'activity' terms like 
'running' or ' ... pushing a cart' and 'accomplishment' terms 
(which express what Kenny calls 'performances' (1963 p. 172» 
like' ... running a mile', ' ... drawing a circle' and 
' ... building a house'. 
Because of the difference between 'accomplishment' and 
'activity' terms it may be claimed that the present and 
continuous present must be semantically distinguished. 
An argument along these lines is based upon Kenny (1963 
p. 174). In standard tense logics it is assumed that (13) 
is valid 
(13) PRES ~ ~ FUT PAST ~ 
But one important difference between accomplishments and 
activities resides in connections between the continuous 
present and other tenses. When '~ing' is an activity term 
(14) holds 
(14) a is ~ing ~ FUT PAST a ~s. 
But when'~ing' is an accomplishment term this does not 
hold. 'Alf is walking to the Rose and Crown' does not 
imply 'Alf will have walked to the Rose and Crown'. 
Consequently, if the present and continuous present are not 
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semantically distinguished (13) would be false. On the 
other hand, if they are distinguished then both (13) and 
(15) hold 
(15) CaNT ¢ + FUT PAST CaNT ¢ 
where 'CaNT' is taken to be the continuous present morphAme. 
So on the basis of this it may be claimed that 'PRES ¢' 
and 'CaNT ¢' must be semantically distinguished since 
'PRES ¢' was true', unlike' 'CaNT ¢' was true', 
implies completion. 
The semanticlpragmatic or conversational distinction is, 
then, not too helpful for distinguishing between the pure 
and impure tenses. Thus, the contrast between 'pure' and 
'impure' is not simply accountable for in terms of semantic 
'purity'. However, despite this, it is reasonable to claim 
that the perfect tense, the past continuous and the past 
tense all do have the same tense in common namely the past. 
How can this be so? The answer lies in distinguishing tense 
from aspect. So, one interpretation of the pOints made 
above is that the tenselaspect distinction can not be 
accounted simply by the semantics I pragmatics distinction. 
It appears that aspect does contribute to truth conditions 
of sentences involving it. 
Aspect relates to the manner in which the events or actions 
talked about are regarded by providing a particular viewpoint 
upon those actions or events. It is because the perfect 
tense is used in contexts where the present time is seen 
as a result of what has happened, unlike the past tense, 
that the differences between (7) and (8), (9) and (10), and 
(11) and (12) arise. And, it is because the continuous 
tense indicates temporariness that an action or event is 
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occurring that the difference between the validity of 
(13) and (14) arises. Consequently, the purelimpure 
distinction relates to tense purity in contrast with a 
mixture of tense and aspect. The impure tense morphemes 
'PERF' and 'CONT' can therefore be introduced. But, 
what about their syntax and their semantics? In what 
follows we offer at best a tentative discussion. 
In the next Section, following our discussion in the last 
two Sections, it is claimed the 'PAST' is a sentence 
operator. Consequently, the sentence 'John ran' is best 
represented as 'PAST PRES John [runs]' rather than 'PAST 
John [runs]'. In the case of 'PERF' this can be introduced 
as an operator which only acts upon present (or present 
continuous) tensed sentences. Because the characteristic 
use of the perfect is in the context of looking at the 
present as a result of what happened it is difficult to see 
how the forms 'PERF PERF a', 'PAST PERF a', 'FUT PERF a'~ 'PERF 
FL; a' and 'PERF PAST a' can be different from 'PAST PAST a', 
'PAST PAST a' , 
respectively. 
'FUT PAST a' , 'PAST FUT a' and 'PAST PAST a' 
(In standard discussions of tense logics 
it is assumed that 'John will have run a mile' is to be 
represented on 'FUT PAST PRES John [runs] a mile'.) 
In this essay two types of semantics for logics employing 
tense operators are offered; first model theoretic and 
secondly homophonic semantics. Now, provided there are 
no objections to (16) or (17) 
(16) It is always the case that (PRES¢~PRES~)~ 
(PERF PRES¢~PERF PRES~) 
(17) PERF Tr (a L) iff Tr (PERFa L). 
(where 'Tr' is the tensed truth predicate) then homophonic 
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semantics for 'PERF' fit in with the account given in 
Section 4.3. Much more difficult is the question of 
model-theoretic semantics. However, one suggestion would 
be to impose upon the framework introduced into the last 
section an aspectual dimension. And in the case of the 
present perfect one could add an aspectual point upon this 
dimension. This point would be the time of use of the 
sentence involving 'PERF'. This idea is based upon 
Reichenbach's notion of reference time (1966). He dis-
tinguished the present perfect from the past tense by 
claiming that the reference time in the case of the past is 
(in our terms) the endpoint of the past vector whereas it 
is the present time or time of use in the case of the present 
perfect. Our account on the other hand does not introduce 
an aspectual point in the case of the past tense since it 
is representable using pure morphemes. This aspectual 
point can be straightforwardly utilized to account for the 
difference in truth conditions between (7) and (8). In 
the case of (7) one may claim that although the expression 
of pastness points to a three year period this period must 
contain the aspectual point whereas in the case of (8) there 
is simply a pointing to a three year period in the past. 
The hope is that the aspectual point will also be able to 
account for the differences between (9) and (10), and (11) 
and (12) although we can not see how this can be done in 
a generalizable way. The introduction of an aspectual 
point can be added to the select time semantics introduced 
in Section 4.1. 
It is not clear what the morpheme 'CONT' acts upon. 
One point, perhaps no more than an oddity, is that if 'CONT' 
~. 
is taken to be a sentence operator upon present tensed 
sentences then homophonic semantics for it should contain 
the clause, (18), where '¢' contains a verb open for 
continuous tensing, 
(18) CaNT Tr (PRES¢ L) iff Tr (CaNT PRES¢ L). 
(See section 4.3 for the standard tense clauses in a 
hc.nophonic semantics). The problem here is that it is 
not clear what is to be made of 'CaNT Tr ( ... )'. In 
Vendler's terminology the tensed truth predicate is a 
'state' term, not open for continuous tensing. (This is 
a feature of semantic predicates generally. However, one 
point to note is that although a singular term may refer 
to something where the use of 'refer' is not open for 
continuous tensing a person can be said to be referring to 
something in a particular situation). This point raises 
a general question about homophonic semantics. Should 
every line in a derivation of a T-sentence make sense? 
If so then much clearer examples than 'CaNT , are going to 
cause trouble if one treats certain adverbs, or uses of 
certain adverbs, as sentence operators (rather than, say, 
event predicates); for instance sense will have to be made 
of (19) 
(19) Carefully Tr (a L) iff Tr (Carefully a L). 
On the other hand, if the steps in the derivation don't 
have to make sense then what is the proof of aT-sentence 
a proof of? For it seems difficult to claim that the proof 
shows how the sense of the whole depends upon the senses 
of the parts. In the case of 'CaNT', one way out of having 
to propose (18) is to simply claim that there are two present 
morphemes, a pure and an impure one which are in contrast 
with each other. Consequently, only (20) is required and 
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not (18) 
(20) Tr (CONT~ L) iff CONT~ 
One is, then, accepting here that there are two basic 
verb forms, present tensed and present continuously tensed 
neither of which is syntactically derivable from the other. 
This proposal has the consequence that 'John is writing' 
is to be represented as 'CaNT John [writes]'. This point 
can be backed up by a consideration of the completion I 
incompletion distinction. If ~ contains an accomplishment 
term like' ... [builds] a house' then it appears that 'PRES ¢' 
itself involves completion. This is so because if we 
represent 'John was building a house' as 'PAST CaNT John 
[builds] a house' and 'John built a house' as 'PAST PRES 
John [builds] a house' then it can not be the morpheme 
'PAST' which introduces completion since this is common to 
both representations. Moreover 'John built a house' is 
true iff 'John builds a house' was true which seems to in-
dicate that 'PRES John [builds] a house' does involve 
completion. One could claim that 'John is building a house' 
should be represented as 'CaNT PRES John [builds] a house' 
but this means that somehow or other 'CaNT' 'undos' the 
completion element. It seems much more clear to claim 
that there are two basic or fundamental forms 'John builds 
a house' and 'John is building a house'. 
Model-theoretic semantics in the case of 'CaNT' are more 
straightforward; the aspectual point becomes an interval 
within which what is said to be occurring continues after 
the present moment (and was occurring before the present 
moment) no matter how small this interval is. Thus one 
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can speak of the present vector pointing to within that 
aspectual interval. As in the 'PERF' cas(, such an 
account can be an extension to the select time semantics 
proposed in 4.1. 
Some such framework as this can be extended to cover 
sentences like 'John has been building a house' which have 
the form 'PERF CONT John [builds] a house'. In the rest 
of t __ is essay, except for odd moments, our discussion is 
of the pure tenses only. This, in part, reflects the 
point that our discussion in this Section is very tentative 
indeed. 
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3.6 The Lp Analysis. 
We are now in a position to look at two frameworks within 
which tense can be analysed. These naturally arise out 
of the alternative stipulations of what a statement is as 
contained in Section 3.1. In this Section attention is 
given to the analysis based upon an Aristotelian singular 
statement, an analysis which Prior was the first to 
formalize in his 1957 work. 
Although language Ll is suitable for representing singular 
statements which involve the simple pure tenses the formatio 
rules need to be extended in order to take account of 
sentences involving iterations of tense. On the basis of 
what was said in the last two Sections 'John will have done 
it' can be represented as 'FUT PAST John [does] it' where 
'FUT' can be taken as an operator upon the sentence 'PAST 
John [does] it'. In a sentence 'FUT John [does] it' Prior 
contends that its role is also a tense operator on 
sentences. This sentence is to be represented as 'FUT PRES 
John [does] it'. One reason for this is that 'FUT~' is 
now true iff 'PRES¢' will be true. Asserting 'FUT~' then 
is tantamount to asserting 'It will be the case that PRES~' 
where 'FUT' can be said to be a sentence operator. This 
account is also justifiable on the basis of the discussion 
in Section 3.4. 'FUT John [does] it' introduces a 
vector defined from the prime axis to some indefinite time 
in the future which is the time purported to be simultaneous 
with John's doing it. And here the expression , . • •• IS 
simultaneous with ... ' introduces the O-vector. 
Although the morpheme 'PRES' is redundant in instances like 
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'PRES FUT¢' this is not the case in instances like 'FUT 
PRES¢', 'PAST ffiES¢' and 'PRES¢'. For otherwise '¢' and 
'PRES¢' would be equated and clearly from what has been 
said in this chapter that equivalence is unacceptable 
because '¢' is a formula of some tenseless language. For 
if there are sentences which do eschew time reference 
altogether then these need to be distinguished from present 
tensed sentences proper whose truth conditions do depend 
upon the morpheme involved. 
In natural languages especially in the case of indirect 
discourse iterations of tense are not as logically hygenic 
as proposed to be the case for regimented languages. 
Prior pOints our that we say 'He said he was sick' and not 
'He said he is sick' but what he said was 'I am sick' and 
not 'I was sick' thus hiding 
" ... the fact that it is the past presentness of his being 
ill not its past pastness." (1967 p. 14). 
L1 then needs to be given up in favour of a language whose 
atomic sentences consist of present tensed sentences like 
'PRES~' together with tensed sentence operators 'FUT' and 
'PAST' - which are Prior's F and P. Let us call this 
analysis of tensed statements or sentences the Lp analysis. 
Formally, the language Lp is set up as follows. A set of 
individual constants together with the morpheme 'PRES' and 
a set of n-place tenseless predicates are assumed. 
Definition Lp 1. 
An atomic Lp sentence consists of the morpheme 'PRES' any 
n-place tenseless predicate and n occurrences of any m 
constants, m ~ n. 
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Expressions and formulas for Lp are now defined 
where the notation is based upon Kamp (1971). 
Definition Lp 2. 
The set ~ of expressions for sentential Lp of the first 
level consists of the symbols (,), the set Q of atomic 
n n 
sentences and for some n E w,C
o 
C 1 ••• which are n-place 
connectives. 
The connectives Cl C2 Cl Cl are referred to as ~, A, G, H 
002 3 
respectively, 
Definition Lp 3. 
Formulas of Lp are defined as follows 
(i) qi E Q is a formula for any i 
(1'1') l'f cn ~ d f 1 th Cn, ( ) i E an a1 ... a nare ormu ae en 1 a1 ... a n 
is a formula. 
Instead of writing A(aS) (aAS) is written. Moreover (avS) 
is written for ~(~ a A ~ S), (a ~ S) for ~(a A ~ B), 
Pa for ~H~a, Fa for ~ G ~ a, Aa for a A 3a A Ha and 
finally Sa for ~A~a. Pan@ntheses are omitted wherever no 
confusion is possible. The intended readings of 'Ga' 
and 'Ha' are 'It will always be the case that a' and 'It 
was always the case that a' respectively. 'Aa' represents 
'It is always the case that a'. 
Attention is only given to the simplest standard sentential 
tense logics in this essay. Two such systems are Lemmon's 
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minimal system Kt and a system KL for l.near time which 
are axiomatizable as follows. 
System K t . 
Axioms 
Rules 
( 1 ) Any instance of an S.C. (sentential calculus) 
tautology. 
(2a) G(a~B) ~ (Fa~FB) 
(2b) H(a~B) ~ (Pa~PB) 
(3a) 
(3b) 
PGa 
FHa 
M.P. if ~a and ~a~B then 1- B. 
R.G. if ~a then ~Ga 
R.H. if ~a then ~Ha. 
Kt is a minimal system because it leaves open the possibility 
that time mayor may not be linear, dense, or infinite in 
both directions. For dense linear time the system KL is 
introduced which is Kt U {4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b} (See 
Prior 196.7 p. 176ff for a variety of tense systems). 
(4a) Ga ~ GGa 
(4b) Ha ~ HHa 
(5a) FaAFB ~ F(aAB) v F(aAFB) v F(FaAB) 
(5b) PaAPB ~ P(aAB) v P(aA B) v P(PaAB) 
(6a) Fa ~ FFa 
( 6b ) Pa ~ PPa. 
In Section 4.1 model theoretic semantics are given for Lp. 
Formally, they are very similar to modal semantics. One 
difference, however, is that unlike the set of possible 
worlds the set of times is ordered and it is this order 
which is central to the semantics of the tense constants. 
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However, tense systems only employing 'A' and'S' do 
not make use of this order. Prior call these 'modal 
fragments' of tense systems. These are isomorpilic to 
standard modal systems containing the operators Land M. 
For instance, the 'modal fragment' of Kt is the system B 
while that of KL is S5' 
How should sentences which involve dates be construed on 
the Lp analysis? Given the Semantic Primacy Assumption 
it was contended in Section 3.4 that 'In 56 B.C. 
Caesar was about to invade Britain' is to be translated as 
'In 56 B.C. FUT Caesar [invades] Britain'. Now, it was 
here argued that 'FUT Caesar [invades] Britain' is to be 
taken as 'FUT PRES Caesar [invades] Britain' having the 
form Fqm where qm is a present tensed sentence.'In 55 B.C. 
Caesar invaded Britain' then is best represented by 'In 
55 B.C. PRES Caesar [invades] Britain'. 
So one way of dealing with dated sentences under the Lp 
analysis is to extend language Lp to L; which is Lp U 
{At .. ti} where 'ti' is a dating system and 'At ... ' is a 
two place operator whose first place is only open for members 
of 'ti' and whose second place is only open for Lp sentences. 
Formulas of L; are defined as follows. 
Definition L+ 
-------p 
(i) if a is any Lp formula then it is an L; formula. 
( i i ) if a is any Lp formula and tn any member of ti then 
. L+ 1S an formula. p 
(iii) if a, Bare L; formulas then so are ~a, aA6, Ha, Ga. 
Defined in this way expressions like 'At tn At tm a' are not 
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+ L formulas. p System K~ is KL plus the following axioms. 
(Because K t need not involve linear time a more complex 
dating system is required in order to allow for the 
possibility of branching time, a possibility not considered 
in this essay). 
(7) ~ At tn a iff At tn ~ a. 
(8) At tn (aAS) iff At tn a A At tn S. 
(9) Aa 
The Semantic Primacy Assumption is enclosed in (10) and (11). 
(10) At tn a iff G At tn a, for any tn £ ti 
(11) At tn a iff H At tn a, for any tn £ t i . 
L+ may be extended to L++ to include time quantifiers and p p 
variables and where also it is assumed that the set 'til 
is a set of date constants which refer to time moments. 
In ~+ (12) is valid 
(12) Aa iff (t)(At t a) provided a£ Lp. 
An alternative way of dealing with dated sentences is to 
claim that they are really disguised metalanguage sentences 
for some matalanguage MLp which does not contain Lp -
that is, a metalanguage suitable for a non-homophonic 
semantics. In brief this proposal amounts to treating 
'In 55 B.C. Caesar was about to invade Britain' as 
'FUT PAST Caesar [invades] Britain is true in 55 B.C.' 
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In this Section analyses of tense are given which are based upon 
comments made in connection with the Frege-Russell account of a 
statement (see 3.1). There are two important theses involved in 
that discussion, (A) and (B). 
(A) A statement cannot vary in truth value over time. 
(B) Tense expressions are indexical. 
Let us first consider (B). This can be captured by the following 
three equivalences, where '>' is the 'later than' relation and 'now' 
is an indexical. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
PRES ¢ iff At now ~. 
PAST PRES ¢ iff (3t) (now> t A At t ~) 
FUT PRES ¢ iff (3t) (t > now A At t ¢). 
Thus to accept these is to accept the view that the variation in 
truth value over time of a tensed sentence is accountable simply 
in terms of the indexical element 'now'. 
One can hold the view that tense expressions are indexical without 
also holding the view that statements cannot vary in truth value 
over time. That is, one can accept (B) and, yet, reject (A). But, 
this is somewhat perverse, unless one also holds the view that state-
ments can vary in truth value from place to place, or from person to 
person, or from object to object. For (B) places tense expressions 
on a par syntactically with 'here' and 'there', 'I' and 'you', and 
with 'this' and 'that' etc .. ,. The Lp analysts on the other hand, 
because they reject (B), can hold the view that a statement 
(proposition) can vary in truth value over time without also holding 
the view that a statement can vary in truth value from place to place. 
This is because they analyse tense expressions adverbially, unlike 
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place expressions. Moreover, if one does accept (B) then this 
makes (A) much easier to formulate, as we show below. 
A Frege-Russell account of a statement is based upon (A). In 3.1 
it was suggested that such a statement can be identified as an 
ordered pair whose first place is filled by a sentence and whose 
second place is filled by a set of indexes which represent a possible 
occasion of use. NOW, it is very important to bear in mind that a 
statement is here being treated in terms of a (potential) use of 
some sentence upon some occasion (see 4.4). + Because Lp sentences 
introduced in the last Section contain no indexicals like 'I' or 
'here' etc., the statement expressed by a use of a tensed sentence at 
some time may be identified with the pair given by (4). 
+ (4) <Sentence ( Lp ' time of use> 
In the discussion above we noted that one could, but only with 
perversity, accept (B) but reject (A). Similarly, here, one can 
hold (A) without also holding (B). In this case it would mean that 
the ordered pair given in (4) is essential to this representation of 
a statement. Two uses of the same tensed sentence, such as 'It is 
raining', at different times would then express different statements 
because their time of use would differ. However, if besides holding 
(A) one also accepts (B) then one can give a representation of a 
statement which is not an ordered pair, but instead is more akin to 
an English sentence. 
Before we consider this it should be pointed out that the Semantic 
Primacy of Dates Assumption (see 3.3) is independent of both (A) and 
(B) . For this assumption is concerned with whether or not, for 
instance, we should say that a present use of the sentence 'Caesar 
will invade Britain in 55 B.C.' is false because 55 B.C. is not in 
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the future. Rejecting this assumption means that our example can 
be false in two ways; either because 55 B.C. is not a year when 
Caesar invaded Britain or because 55 B.C. is not a year which is 
future to the time of use. Acceptance of the assumption removes the 
latter as a condition for falsity; thus, in this case 'Caesar 
invaded/will invade/invades Britain in 55 B.C.' have the same 
falsity conditions. Hence, rejection of the assumption merely 
complicates the analysis of dated sentences, for then one has to 
treat them as tensed statements together with dating. For instance, 
if one accepts (B), and hence (1) to (3) above, and yet rejects the 
Primacy Assumption, then a present use of 'Caesar will invade 
Britain in 55 B.C.' is analysed by (5). 
(5) at) (t>now l\ t = 55 B.C. I\. At t Caesar [invades] Britain) 
If one holds the assumption, on the other hand, (5') is an analysis 
(5') At 55 B.C. Caesar [invades] Britain. 
Those theorists who argue for (A) are more likely to hold the 
Primacy Assumption. One important reason is that acceptance of the 
Assumption adds force to (A), in the sense that dated sentences can 
be treated as a paradigm case of sentences which do not differ in 
truth value over time, yet do deal with temporal realities. This 
then suggests that an analysis of tense should 'reduce' tensed 
sentences to dated sentences. Moreover, acceptance of the Assumption 
makes analyses of dated sentences simpler as the difference between 
(5) and (5') shows. 
So, strictly speaking, the question of whether or not one should 
allow a statement or a proposition to vary in truth value over time 
is independent of whether or not tense is treated indexically. And 
both of these issues are independent of the Semantic Primacy 
Assumption. But, as we noted, a theorist who holds (B) is more 
likely to hold (A). And, Similarly, if one holds (A) then one is 
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likely to hold (B). A theorist who analyses uses of tensed 
sentences into a language for which any sentence expresses the same 
statement irrespective of its time of use and who also holds that 
tenses are indexical is bere called an LD theorist. 
Given the Semantic primacy Assumption then the simplest LD theory 
is that which represents all uses of Lp sentences in terms of dated 
sentences. Using the ordered pair notation (4), then (6) appears to 
be valid. 
(6) (t. )(':.)(aE:L ) ~ t.> iff <At t.a t.». 
1 J P 1 1 J 
This amounts to the claim that any use of a tensed sentence expresses 
a statement which is also expressed by a dated sentence. Now 
because the time of use is irrelevant to the statement made by a use 
of a dated sentence, (6) can be amended to (6'), where the right hand 
side is no longer an ordered pair. 
(6' ) (aE:Lp ) (t.) «a t.> iff At t.a). 111 
In 3.4 we noted that all occurrences of tense morphemes within a 
dated formula take as their primary axis not the time of use but the 
date. Consequently, the following three hold, which are similar to 
(1) to (3) • 
(7) (t. ) (4)e:L) (At t. PRES 4> iff At t. 4» 
1 1 1 
(8) (t. ) (4)e:L) (At t. PAST PRES 4> iff (3t) (t.>t A At t 4» ) 1 1 1 
(9) (t. ) (4)e:L) (At t. FUT PRES 4> iff (3t) (t>t. A At t 4» ) 1 1 1 
How should 'At' be construed in 'At t </>'? The simplest method 
n 
of dealing with it here is to treat 'At ... Ij>' as an open sentence 
true of times which may be represented by a monadic predicate ~. 
Consequently, ~t is then a representation of a datp.d sentence. 
n 
What we have here is Russell's suggestion, noted in 3.1. For a use 
of the English tensed sentence 'Mrs. Brown will be at home' at t 
n 
is to be represented by the dated sentence (3t) (t>t A At t Mrs. Brown 
n 
[is] at home), which has the form (3t) (t>t A~t). 
n 
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Where Q then, is 
a set of atomic present tensed L sentences and where q is PRES ~ P n n 
then there is a corresponding set ~ of monadic predic~tes such that 
IjJ is At. .. cp • 
n n 
This analysis of tense is here called 'the LD 
analysis'. The language LD suitable for taking account of Russellian 
statements is a monadic predicate calculus with one dyadic operator 
'>', a set of time variables and time constants and quantifiers. In 
order to set up systems which express assumptions about time non-
logical aXLoms have to be introduced. If identity axioms are 
assumed than (10) expresses linearity whilst (11) expresses denseness. 
(10) (t. ) (t . ) (t. >t. v t. >t. v t. = t.) 
l.) 1) )11 J 
(11 ) (t.) (t.) (3tk ) (t.>t. -> t.>tk>t.). l. J 1J l. J 
One criticism which is often put against the Russellian analysis of 
tense is that it presupposes an ontology of times. In response to 
this it must be realized that the introduction of an ontology of 
times is not something which first occurs in the analysis of the 
tense morphemes as it would do if one held (B) without (A) and took 
(1) to (3) as the analysis of those morphemes. Instead the 
ontology is presupposed in the very data which is to be analysed, 
namely the use of a tensed sentence at some time. And once times are 
assumed then the analysis of tense morphemes in terms of 
quantifiers and the 'later than' relation is hardly objectionable 
(especially so given the framework of 3.4). 
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3.8 An Argument for LD: The UniversaJity of Logic. 
In 3.1 an argument against truth variability over time of 
a statement was rejected. In this Section an alternative 
argument is mentioned. Quine writes 
MLogical analysis is facilitated by requiring that each 
statement be true Once and for all independently of time." 
(1965 p.6). 
How is logical analysis 'facilitated' by only having truth 
and falsity simpliciter? In terms of complexity there is 
not much to choose between the Lp and the LD analyses. 
Certainly, the LD analysis has the advantage of keeping 
the form of uses of tensed sentences within standard first 
order theory but this is at the expense of having to analyse 
uses of ordinary language sentences rather than sentences 
and so presumes an ontology of times unlike the Lp analysis. 
Moreover, the Lp analysis may be treated as a sentential 
analysis quite independently of accounts of what a statement 
is. 
However, an important reason which may lie behind Quine's 
stricture here is a preservation of the universality of the 
standard statement calculus and, in particular, of providing 
a semantics for it. In a homophonic tensed semantics as 
given in Section 4.3 use is made of the tensed truth predicate, 
On the other hand in a Fregean semantics only one truth 
predicate, a tenseless one, is required. 
"Only a sentence supplemented by a time-indication and complete 
in every respect expresses a thought ••• [Thus a thought] if it 
is true is true not only today or tomorrow but timelessly. 
Thus the present tense in 'is true' does not refer to the 
speaker's present but is, if the expression be permitted, a 
tense of timelessness." (Frege 1967 p.37). 
So how does this affect the universality of the statement 
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calculus? Consider the statement calculus theorem (1). 
(1) (a A (a~8» ~ 8. 
D 
and its metalanguage reading according to an L and an Lp 
analysis respectively where 'Tr(Ci L)' says "a' [is] true 
in L and 'PRES Tr(aL)' says "a' is (now) true in L'. 
(2) if Tr (a L) and Tr (a~e L) then Tr (SL) 
(3) if PRES Tr (aL) and PRES Tr (a~6L) then PRES Tr (8L). 
But now consider the following apparent instance of (1), 
namely (4), as used on a time occa.sion tn. 
(4) (2+2=4 A (2+2=4 ~ PRES Socrates [sitsJ»~PRES 
Socrates [sits]. 
But is this an instance of (1)? According to the LD account 
it is to be treated as (4') 
(4') (2+2=4 A (2+2=4 ~ At tn Socrates [sitsJ» ~ At tn 
Socrates [sitsJ. 
which is then an instance of (1) and whose semantic clause 
is given by (2). On the other hand can (4) be an instance 
of (1) for the Lp theorist? It seems not unless sense can 
be made of the expression (5). 
(5) PRES Tr (2+2=4 English) 
Consequently, logical analysis is facilitated here simply 
because under the LD analysis a single tenseless truth 
predicate only is required. Note, that this problem is 
not a problem about the universal applicability, the context 
independence or topic neutrality, of the logical constants 
,~, and 'A' (This is pointed out because in first order 
theories the topjc neutrality of the quantifiers may be 
encroached upon - but see 7.5). 
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CHAPTER FOUR SELECT TIMES. 
4.1 Model Theoretic and Select Time Semantics for Lp. 
Two sorts of semantics are given for the Lp analysis in 
this essay, namely model theoretic and homophonic semantics. 
In this Section the former is dealt 'with whereas the latter is 
the subject matter of 4.3. The language Lp given in 
Section 3.6 is assumed. First, a set J is defined after 
Kamp (1971) p. 233. 
Definition 1. 
Specify a non-empty set T and a partial ordering (transitive 
and asymmetric) '>' on T. Let J = <T,>, >where T is the set 
of times and '>' is the 'later than' relation. 
Other conditions on J depend upon further assumptions made 
about time. These can include density and infinity condition~ 
Because Lp sentences are true at a time it is natural to 
consider semantic structures which specify a truth value to 
each formula at each time. Therefore, an interpretation is 
defined as follows. 
Definition 2. 
An interpretation I for Lp is a set <~f> that is <T,>,f> 
where f is a valuation function such that 
(i) the domain of f consists of Q1Q2 ••• EQ. 
(ii) for each i>o f(qi) is a function with domain T and 
range {O,l} (the truth values). 
Let I be a model for Lp' Then for any formula aELp the 
truth value of a at t under I (written as I(a)(t» is given 
as follows. 
Definition 3 
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(i) if a is atomic I (a) (t) = 1 iff f(a) (t) = 1 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
I (---a) (t) = 1 iff I (a) (t) = 0 
I (aAS) (t) = 1 iff I (a) (t) = 1 and 
1(B) (t) = 1. 
I (Ha) (t) = 1 iff I (a) (t') 
all t' s.t. t>t'. 
1, for 
I (Ga) (t) = 1 iff I (a) (t') = 1, for 
all t' s.t. t'>t. 
Because different formulas are validated according to assumptions 
made about the set J the notion of validity relative to J, after 
Kamp (ibid p.235) is appropriate here. 
Definition 4. 
A formula a € L is valid relative to J iff for every interpretation p 
I of the form <J,f> and all t € T I(a) (t) = 1. 
Any system validated by these caluses is called an ALp system. 
Of course dependence upon J results in there being a variety of such 
systems. A more general notion of validity can therefore be intro-
duced, validity relative to K (after Kamp 1971 p.235). 
Definition 5. 
Let K be a non-empty set of partial orderings then a formula a is K 
valid iff a is valid relative to every J~K. 
Definitions of semantic consequence relative to J (K) follow straight-
forwardly. 
An alternative semantics which has proved to be of great use (see 
next Section) can be introduced based upon Kripke's modal semantics 
(1963) . Instead of defining an interpretation I as <T,>,f> one 
defines it as <T,>,f,t > where t is a select member of the set of 
times T. 
n n 
This interpretation is written as 'It' and is called 'a 
n 
select time interpretation'. The semantic clauses are those given 
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in Definition 3 except I is replaced by It throughout. 
n 
differs, however, is the definition of validity. 
What 
Instead of Definition 4, Definition 6 is introduced where t E T. 
n 
Definition 6. 
A formula a ( Lp is tn valid relative to J iff for every inter-
pretation It of the form <J,f,t > I (a) (t ) = 1. 
n t n 
n n 
That is, validity is not defined in terms of truth at all times but 
instead in terms of truth at the select time t . 
n 
which these clauses hold is called a BLp system. 
Any system for 
In Kripke's modal 
semantics his select member of the set of possible worlds is the 
actual world. Naturally, then, the select member, t , can be 
n 
understood as the present moment. 
For some specific J what is the relationship between these two 
notions of validity? (Or assuming completeness what is the 
connection between ALp and BLp systems?) There are two ways of 
considering coincidence here which are of relevance for the next 
Section. First, it may be noted that under an interpretation It 
n 
the existence of tn £ It makes no difference to the valuation 
n 
functions f' nor to the semantic clauses for -,A,H and G. So 
letting It be IU{t }, (1) holds. n 
n 
(1) It (a) (t ) = 1 iff I (a) (t ) 1 n n 
n 
And furthermore (2) holds 
(2) I (a.) (t) = 1 iff I (a) (t) = 1 for any t. 
t 
n 
Consequently coincidence occurs here iff (3) holds 
(3 ) (I ) (I (a) (t ) = 1) iff (I ) (t) (I (a) (t) = 1) 
t tnt t 
n n n n 
Let this be called the strong sentential A = B thesis. 
and (2), (3) is equivalent to (4). 
(4) (I) (I (a) (t ) = 1) iff (I) (t) (I (a) (t) = 1) 
n 
Given (1) 
Here the difference between Definition 4 and 6 is being treated as 
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that between every time validity (relative to J) and t validity 
n 
(relative to J). Now since right to left holds of the biconditionals 
(3) and (4) by quantification theory AL systems are (at least) p 
contained in corresponding BL systems. p 
is left to right namely (5). 
So the interesting thesis 
(5) if (I)(I(ex)(t) = 1) then (I)(t)(I(ex)(t) = 1). 
n 
Acceptance of (5) amounts to rejection of any principle along the 
lines that tense logically speaking, times must be differentiated 
because what is tense logically valid at one time may not be so at 
another. (The rejection of any such principle is analogous to the 
acceptance by most scientists that scientifically speaking all times 
are the 'same' in t.he sense that laws are invariant with respect to 
them. ) 
The other way of considering coincidence is independent of (1) and 
(2) above. What t validity (relative to J) may be taken to amount 
n 
to is that of validity of a sentence at a time of (potential) use t . 
n 
So an alternative way of saying that tense logical truth is invariant 
with respect to time is to say that if a sentence is tense logically 
true when (potentially) used at some time it is tense logically 
true when (potentially) used at any time. 
is read as 'ex as (potentially) used at t 
n 
Thus, 'It (a) (t
n
) = l' 
n 
is then true under the 
interpretation (T,>,f,t >'. 
n 
Given that Itk/t is the select time 
n 
interpretation that results from substituting tk for t in I (that 
n t 
n 
is, <T,>,f,tk » then we may capture the idea that sentences are 
tense logically true (relative to J) at every time of potential use 
by (6) 
(6) (It) (t) (It Itn (ex) (t) = 1) 
n 
So coincidence may alternatively be captured by (7). 
(7) (It) (It (ex) (t
n
) = 1) iff (It) (t) (It /tn (ex) (t) = 1). 
n n n 
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Let us call this the weak sentential A = B thesis. Its acceptance 
amounts to the claim that the time it is makes no difference to what 
is then tense logically true. In the next Section we shall note 
that there are situations in which the weak thesis may hold without 
the strong thesis also holding. In this Section our discussion 
centres on the strong thesis. 
It is plain that standard accounts do not envisage the possibility 
that this thesis might fail to hold. One reason why is based upon 
the structure of the valuation functions f. For any atomic formula 
q. f is a total function from the set T into { 0, 1} • 
~ 
Consider now 
the partial functions f
t 
n 
which are the functions from t E: T into { 0, 1} 
n 
only and the partial functions f
t 
. 
m 
are isomorphic. Consequently, the 
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Clearly the sets f
t 
n 
valuation functions 
and f 
t 
m 
themselves do not differentiate one time from another. 
And for standard systems neither do the semantic clauses. 
So, it may be thought that this lies behind the acceptability 
of the A = B thesis. Let us pursue this line of thought 
by spelling out select time partial interpretations, f t . n 
Definition 7. 
A partial interpretation at a select time tn (written as f t ) n 
is the pair <tnj>. 
Definition 8. 
Let ftn be a partial interpretation for Lp. For some 
formulas aELp the truth value of a under fto (written as 
f t (a» is given as follows n' 
(i) if a is atomic then f tn (a) = 1 iff f(a)(t n ) = 
(ii) f t ('Va) = 1 iff f t (a) = O. n n 
(iii) f t ( a td3) = 1 iff f t (a) and n n 
( 8) = 1 . 
1. 
f~. 
ftn is, then, not defined for formulas of Lp which contain 
tense constants. The notion of tn validity which is in-
dependent of time's structure (that is, of any J) is given by 
Definition 9. 
Definition 9. 
A formula aELp is tn valid iff for every f' f'tn(a) = 1. 
Partial interpretations in the case of sentential logic are 
not as interesting as they are in the case of first order 
logic (see Section 6.2). What is of interest is the set 
of formulas which are t valid. 
n 
If pIP2 ... £ P is an 
atomic L language, closed under ''V' and 'A' such that there 
is a 1-1 function g from Pinto Q then there is a 1-1 function 
from the set C of classical valuations (for L) into the set 
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f't n ' Consequently, (8) holds, 
(8) If a is classically valid then a' is tn valid 
where a' is g( a), 
This sets up a connection between a (tenseless) language 
L and part of a tensed language Lp ' If tn is the present 
time then f t is defined only for present tensed sentences n 
What we have here is standard sentential calculus 
representing present tensed fragments of ordinary language. 
Consequently, 'a is tn valid' can be understood as 'a is 
a tn tautology'. Tn tautologies, then, are merely the 
standard tautologies for present tensed sentences and 
because the set ftn is isomorphic to ftm tn tautologies 
satisfy the A=B thesis. 
It is often claimed that a tensed sentence like qnv~qn 
(ELp) is 'timelessly true' but this use of 'timeless' is 
rather loose. What we have here is a characterization of 
tense logical truth which is independent of time's structure. 
On thisbasis a distinction can be made between two types of 
omnitemporal truth, one type dependent upon time's structure, 
the other independent. 
The partial interpretations f t however do not yield all n 
tn tautologies of Lp since there are substitution instances 
which involve tense operators like Fav~Fa which are un-
accounted for. Although these may be captured by partial 
interpretations which treat all formulas containing an outer-
most tense operator to be atomic this tactic will not capture 
all formulas which are valid independently of any J. That 
is, tn tautologyhood and validity independent of time's 
structure do not co-incide; an example which shows this is 
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G( a v'Va) . In connection with this is a claim made by 
Chadwick. 
"It will either rain or not rain tomorrow and it will either 
freeze or not freeze tomorrow' is not one of tt: contingent 
propositions belonging to natural science." 
(1927 p. 7). 
He goes on to claim that they are tautologous. Suppose 
Prior's metrical operators 'Fn' for 'It will be the case 
in n days time that ... ' are introduced then Chadwick's 
claim is that (9) is a tautology. 
(9) F1 (av'Va). 
Now, if (11) and (12) are tautologous then (9) is derivable 
from (10) 
(10) Fn a v 'V FDa 
(11) Fn(avB) iff Fn a v Fn8 
( 12) Fn'Va iff 'V Fn a 
However (12) is not a tautology since (13) is true iff 
there is a tomorrow. 
(13) 'VF1a ~ F1'Va. 
Ordinary language, it seems, does not distinguish between 
"'Fla and F1'Va. What this brings out is a difference 
between A and B validity. According to the notion of 
validity given by Definition 4 (14) 
( 14 ) F ( a v'Va ) 
is valid only if time is future infinite whereas according 
to validity as given by Definition 6 (14) is valid provided 
the select time tn is not the last moment of time. This 
point connects up with the claim that (15) represents time's 
future infinity. 
(15) Ga~Fa. 
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4.2 NOw, Two Dimensionality and Rigidity. 
In the last Section a strong A=B thesis, (1), was distinguished 
from a weaker version, (2). 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(It ) (It (a) (t
n
) 
n n 
(It ) (It (a) (t
n
) 
n n 
1) iff 
1) iff 
(It ) (t) (It (a) (t) = 1) 
n tn 
(I ) (t) (I It (a) (t) = 1). 
t n 
n 
For standard systems these theses coincide because the occurrence 
of the select time, t , makes no difference to the valuation 
n 
functions f' nor to the semantic clauses for ~,A, Hand G. 
Operators, however, can be introduced for which the select time is 
essential to their semantic clauses. In the main part of this 
Section attention is focused upon a single such operator 'now' as 
introduced by Kamp (1971). 
It appears that the function of the word 'now' is to make the 
clause to which it applies refer to the moment of utterance. 
Although in a present tensed sentence 'now' is redundant this is 
not always the case as Kamp's example (4) shows, with its difference 
from (3). 
(3) I learned last week that there would be an earthquake. 
(4) I learned last week that there would now be an earthquake. 
(4) unlike (3) involves the claim that what one learnt was that an 
earthquake would occur now. The occurrence of 'now' there is non-
vacuous unlike its occurrence in 'it's raining now'. It is 
because 'now' apparently refers to the moment of utterance that (5) 
is valid. 
(5) If I am now writing then it is always true that I am now 
writing. 
If 'now' is represented by a sentential operator 'N', then, in 
order to provide semantics for it one should 
" 'keep track' ... of the moment of utterance of the entire 
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expression. The concept we ought to analyse is not simply 
'The truth value of ¢ at t' but rather 'the truth value of 
<p at t' when part of an utterance made at t'." 
(Kamp 1971 p.238). 
Select time interpretations are ideally suited here. 
'I (a)(t)' may then be read as 'the truth value of a tn 
at t under the interpretation I~ when part of an utterance 
made at t n '. The semantic clause for 'N' namely (6), 
can be added to the select time semantics given in the 
previous Section. 
Because of the dependence of the clause for N upon two 
times it is an instance of what Segerberg calls a 'two 
dimensional operator' (1973). The dependence here upon 
the select time means that systems which involve 'N' may 
satisfy the weak A = B thesis (2) without satisfying the 
strong (1). An instance of this is the formula (7). 
(7) a iff Na. 
Other tense words which have this feature include 'last 
week', 'next year' and 'yesterday'. For instance 'Yesterday 
will always be remembered' brings this out. Interestingly, 
D. Lewis notes that the word 'actual' or 'actually' also 
has this feature in certain contexts. 
"We can distinguish primary and secondary senses of "actual" 
by asking what world "actual" refers to at a world w in a 
context in which some other world v is under consideration. 
In the primary sense, it still refers to w, as in 'If Max 
ate less, he would be thinner than he actually is'. In 
the secondary sense it shifts its reference to the world v 
under consideration as in 'If Max ate less, he would actually 
enjoy himself more." 
(1970 p.185). 
In the primary sense 'actually1is two dimensional and in 
the secondary sense one dimensional. If an Ss modal select 
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world interpretation Va is <W,f,a> where W is the set 
of possible worlds, a the select member, the actual world, 
and f a valuation function then where 'An' is the primary 
and As the secondary 'actually' their difference is that 
between (8) and (9). 
(8) Va (Apa)(wi) = 1 iff Ua (a) (a) = 1. 
(9) Ua (Asa)(wi) = iff Ua (a)(wi) = 1. 
Unlike Kamp many theorists (especially those who hold to 
an LD analysis) are of the opinion that 'now' is an indexical 
a temporal analogue of 'here' and not a sentence operator. 
So suppose 'now' is treated as an indexical then in what 
way does its two dimensionality manifest itself, if at all? 
This question appears not to be answerable in the context 
of the standard indexical accounts of 'now' because they go 
hand in hand, or rather as an integral part of, the analysis 
of tense in terms of quantifiers and the 'later than' 
relation - see 3.7. For the interesting feature of 'now' 
when construed as a sentence operator is when it lies within 
the scope of other tense operators. In order to consider 
this aspect when 'now' is construed as an indexical we may 
+ introduce it as a 'date' index into the language Lp u {now} 
+ (see 3.6 for Lp). Hence, expressions like 'At now a' and 
+ 
'F At now a' are formulas of this extension to Lp. 
Kamp represents the difference between (10) and (11) using 
the 'now' operator in a representation (11') for (11) and 
(10') for (10) 
(10) A child was born that would become ruler of the world. 
(11) A child was born that will become ruler of the world. 
(10') P(Jx)(x is born A F(x is ruler of the world». 
(11') p (3x)(x is born A NF ex is ruler of the world». 
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In the extension to L; introduced here (10) is still 
represented by (10') whereas (11 ) now becomes (11"). 
(11") P(3x)(x is born A At now F(x is ruler of the world». 
And just as (12) holds for the sentence operato~ (13) 
holds for the indexical 'now'. 
(12) Na iff GNa 
(13) At now a iff G At now a 
(13) is very similar to (14) which is L+ valid p 
(14) At tn a iff G At tn a. 
The formula 'At now a' is then rather strange. Like a 
temporally indefinite sentence it may differ in truth 
value on different occasions of ase. Yet on the other 
hand it is also like a temporally definite sentence of 
the form At tn a in that (13) holds for it. Note, further-
more that even if the Semantic Primacy Assumption is given 
up (and hence (14) would then be false) (13) would still 
hold. How is this 'strangeness' to be accounted for? 
We suggest that this is to be done in terms of tense 
logical rigidity. At any time of use 'now' is tense 
logically rigid in the sense that no matter which tense 
operator it occurs within its 'reference' is invariant. 
The simplest way to represent this is by adding 'now' as 
++ 
a date index to the language Lp U {=} which differs from 
L; in that it has quantifiers and time variables. The 
rigidity claim is then representable by (15) where 0 is any 
tense or iteration of tense operators. 
(15) (3t)(t = now A 0 At t a) iff 0 At now a. 
(The Semantic Primacy Assumption is assumed here). The 
notion of rigidity appealed to here is that of rigidity 
relative to a time of use, a notion which is expanded upon in 
4.5. 
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4.3 + Homophonic Sentential Lp and Lp Semantics. 
Davidson has proposed as an adequacy condition on semantic 
theories for the purpose of interpreting a language L that 
they be finite and entai~ all T-sentences of L. Accordingly, 
model theoretic semantics are not adequate for this purpose. 
So in this Section homophonic semantics which are adequate 
are given for sentential Lp and its extension L;. In a 
homophonic semantics for a language L all instances of (H) 
must be derivable. 
(H) Tr (a L) iff a 
where it is assumed that the metalanguage ML contains the 
object language L together with resources for forming canonica: 
descriptions of L sentences. In the schema (H) 'a' is 
assumed to be a canonical description in ML of 'a'EL and 
'a' its translation in ML given by the identity function. 
In the case of tensed homophonic semantics a doubt may be 
raised as to the coherence of instances of (H) like (1) for 
instance 
(1) Tr(John is ill English) iff John is ill. 
Many theorists may claim that there is a suppressed indexical 
'the present time' or 'now' which needs to be brought out 
here. It might even be claimed that (1) is as nonsensical 
as (2) or (3). 
(2) Tr(He is ill English) iff He is ill. 
(3) Tr(John is here English) iff John is here. 
But there is an important difference between (1) and the 
other two. In (1) the semantic predicate 'Tr' is itself 
understood to be tensed. Hence if (1) is written out using 
morphemes (see 3.2) (1') is obtained 
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(1') PRES Tr (PRES John [is] ill English) iff 
PRES John [is] ill. 
Consequently the standing of (1) is on a par with tense 
logical formulas of Lp like (4) which is (4') 
(4) ql iff q2 
(4') PRES¢l iff PRES¢2. 
Thus, this argument from indexicality in the case of the 
truth theory has the same standing as a similar argument 
against the Lp analysis (see 3.1). 
analysis is at least coherent. 
But, clearly that 
There are two immediate but closely connected problems for 
tense homophonic semantics. The first is b.,sed upon a 
point made by Buridan. The axiom for ,~, in a homophonic 
theory for L is given by (5) 
(5) Tr(~a L) iff ~Tr(a L). 
This suggests that for the tense operator F its natural 
axiom is (6) 
(6) Tr(Fa L) iff F Tr(a L). 
which says that a future tensed sentence is true in L iff 
the corresponding present tensed sentence will be true. 
But as Buridan points out in a sophism 'You will be an ass' 
"I prove this since tomorrow this will be true: 'You are an ass'. 
Therefore, today this is true: 'You will be an ass' ••• The 
antecedent of the first consequence is proved, positing the case 
that you and othemvoluntarily change your name, and impose on 
you the name "ass"... The opposite is argued .•• " 
(1966 p. 158). 
The problem is then that the sentence 'a' of L may change 
in meaning tomorrow so that although 'Fa' is now false in 
L 'a' may well become true in L because of this change. 
Buridan's solution is to note that 
" .•. it is impossible for the proposition 'A man is an ass' ••• 
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to be true, retaining 
it now has." 
just those significations which 
(1966 p. 159). 
In accordance with this is the suggestion that sentences 
of L ,retain their present meaning in the future. 
The second problem is that if (6) is the natural clause 
for F then (7) should be the derivable clause for the 
Operator A. 
(7) Tr(Aa L) iff A Tr(a L). 
What (7) says is that Aa is true in L iff a is always true 
in L. But this can only be the case if language L is 
omnitemporal. So in order to overcome these problems 
taken together it must be assumed that language L exists 
always and that its sentences always have the meaning they 
now have. (This will have the consequence that 'B. Russell 
will be born' had the meaning it now has before Russell 
was conceived - see 6.6 on this and Buridan (ibid p. 161). 
In the circumstances where L is a representation of tensed 
fragments of natural language this assumption is, to say 
the least, rather unfortunate. 
surely, though, the only committment that is wanted here is 
that there is now a language L whose sentences have some 
meaning now. Suppose, then, 'Tr(a L)' is r ad as (8) 
(8) a is true with the meaning it now has in L. 
Then 'P Tr(a L)' is to be read as (9) 
(9) pea is true with the meaning it now has in L). 
By invoking the two dimensionality (or tense logical rigidity 
of 'now') in ML (see last Section) (9) may be read as (9'). 
(9') a was true with the meaning it now has in L. 
Dealing with the jOint problem in this way (see 6.6 for a 
more interesting proposal) requires there to be only the 
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assumption that sentences of a language L have some meaning 
now (and whatever meaning they do have is what one wants 
to find out when Davidsonian semantics go empirical). A 
similar solution which makes use of Lewis's primary sense 
of 'actually' (see last Section) can be given for similar 
problems in modal homophonic semantics. 
The simplest way of giving homophonic semantics is to 
assume that the axioms are always true. One way of doing 
this is to invoke the A operator in the metalanguage and 
assume that all axioms are of the form A( ... ). (This avoids 
any worries about what may be substituted within tense 
operators in the metalanguage). But this way of giving 
homophonic semantics involves a certain loss of generality. 
As noted in the quantificational case in Section 6.1 it 
requires the validity of t'1e tensed Barcan formula and more 
to the point here it requires the validity of (10) 
( 10 ) Aa. -+ AAa. 
in the metalanguage in order to prove T- theorems which 
involve iterations of tense operators. But (10) is not a 
Kt theorem since it is derived from some of the linearity. 
axioms (namely Ga.-+GGa. and its mirror image). Yet all 
that is required is that no matter what the structure of 
time is, at all times a sentence is true iff its truth 
conditions hold given the meaning it now has. So instead 
of assuming the tense necessitations of all the axioms it 
is simpler to assume that if a. is a theorem of the truth 
theory for L now then it is always a theorem of the truth . 
no matter what the structure of time is. And this may be 
captured by the rule ITL a. ITL Ga. and its mirror image 
where '~La.' says that 'a.' is a theorem of the truth theory 
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for L no matter what the structure of time is. The 
homophonic theory for Lp is straightforward. 
TL1) Tr(qi L) iff qi 
TL2) Tr('Va L) iff 'VTr(a L) 
TL3) Tr(aAS L) iff Tr(a L) A Tr(S L). 
TL4) Tr(Ga L) iff G Tr(a L) 
TL5) Tr(Ha L) iff H Tr(a L) 
TL6) G(a-+-B) -+- (Fa-+-FB) 
TL7) H(a-+-B) -+- (Pa-+-PB) 
Rule TLG if ITL cp then 1- G cp TL 
Rule TLH if ITL cp then ITL H cp 
TL1) is an axiom schema where it is assumed that the set 
qi is finite. Rules TLG and TLH license substitution 
within tense operators in the metalanguage. It is not 
clear that a solution similar to the introduction of the 
rules TLG and TLH may be given for similar problems in 
homophonic modal semantics. One reason for this is that 
although 'always' is invariant in meaning this is not so 
for 'Necessarily'. For example, if a metaphysical notion 
of necessity occurs in the object language it isn't clear 
that the metalanguage 'necessarily' which obeys the rule 
if ITL a then ITL ACJ. can be said to be a metaphysical notion. 
In order to give a semantics for L+ it is assumed that tn p 
is the metalanguage canonical description of the object 
language 'tn' and 'tn' is its translation in the metalanguage. 
A finite set of dates only is assumed. The substitutional 
quantifier (a)(-a-) is introduced into the metalanguage 
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together with variables whose substitution set is the set 
't·' of dates. 1 Then homophonic semantics for L; are 
TL1) - 7),TLG,TLH together with the following 
TL8) Aa -+ (a)( A t a a ) 
TL9) (a)(Ataa -+ At t n a) for any tn E substitution set. 
TL10) Tr(At tna L) iff At tn Tr(ii L). 
TL11) At tn(a"S) iff At tn a " At tn S. 
TL12) 'VAt tna iff At tn 'V a. 
We now prove (11) 
(11) Tr(G At tn Fqn L) iff G At tn Fqxj . 
i) Tr(qn L) iff qn 
ii) G(Tr(qn L) 
iii) F Tr(qn L) 
iff ) qn 
iff Fq 
n 
TL1 
TLG 
TL6) 
iv) Tr(Fqn L) iff Fqn Derived from TL4) and TL2) 
v) A(Tr( Fq L) iff Fqn) From TLG and TLH. 
vi) (a)At a (Tr(Fqn L) iff Fqn) TL8) 
vii) At tn(Tr(Fqn L) iff Fqn) provided ~nE sub set TL9) 
viii) At tn Tr(Fqn L) iff At tn Fqn From TLll) and TL12) 
ix) Tr(At tn Fqn L) iff At tn Fqn TLIO) 
x) G(Tr(At tn Fqn L) iff At tn Fqn) TLG) 
xi) GTr(At tn Fqn L) iff G At tn Fqn 
xii) Tr(G At tn Fqn L) iff G At tn Fqn 
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From TL6) 
TL4) 
4.4 A Problem for the LD Analysis? 
According to the LD analysis a use at tn of the sentence 
D 
'John runs' is represented by the L sentence 'At tn John 
[runs]! Now it may be thought that there is something amiss 
here. For after all a person may assent to a use of 'John 
runs' at tn without assenting to the sentence 'At tn John 
[runs]' simply because he or she does not know what the presen 
time is in calendar or clock terms. This problem appears 
at its most unfortunate in the following situation. Someone 
asks what the time is and is told at to that it is t m. 
On the LD analysis this utterance is represented by an LD 
sentence of the form 'At tn' it (the time) [is] t m' (which 
is equivalent to 'At tn' tn [is] t m'). But a use of 'It is 
t m' at tn can inform (or misinform) in a way in which 'At 
tn it is t m ' can not. 
It is this problem which we take to be the acceptable core -
but only the core - of an argument by Gale in Chapter IV 
of his work (1968). He claims that there is a logical 
deficiency in what seemsto be the LD analysis, a deficiency 
which would show that analysis to be in error. If Gale 
were correct then his argument would have an important 
bearing on the distinction made in 3.1 between a modest and 
a full blooded explanation of the naturalness of truth 
relativization to time. 
Gale considers analyses of tensed 'sentences' (which he 
calls A-sentences after McTaggart's A-series) into 'sentences' 
which only express permanent relations between events (called 
B-sentences after McTaggart's B-series). Now, he objects 
to the token-reflexive analysis which analyses'S is now ~' 
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as 'S's being ~ is simultaneous with e' where 'e' is a 
d9scription of the token-event, the use of'S is now ~' 
(1968 p. 54). Furthermore, he believes his objection to 
hold for what appears to be the LD analysis. 
"The same considerations hold for the B-Theory's attempt to 
analyse an A-statement into a B-statement through the tense-
less ascription of dates e.g., 's is ~ at t7"" 
(ibid p. 55). 
His objection to these analyses is that they are not 
logically equivalent. For he says 
"The B-statements in the analysans of these ••• analyses do 
not entail the A-statement in the analysandum: that S's 
being ~ is simultaneous with theta ••. does not entail that 
S in now ~." (ibid p.55). 
And in the case of the analysis involving dates 
"The latter statement [i.e. that expressed by'S is ~ at t7' ] 
does not entail that S's being ~ at t7 is now present." 
(ibid). 
Consequently, he holds that there is a logical deficiency 
here. 
In this brief encounter with Gale's argument a move was 
made from the idea of mapping sentences into sentences to 
entailments between statements (where the latter terminology 
is Gale's own). But the problem is that Gale's specification 
of what an A-statement is leaves open the possibility that 
D he means an L or an Lp (or perhaps even some other type of) 
statement and this is disastrous for his argument. He 
writes 
"Any statement which is not necessarily true (false) is an 
A-statement if, and only if, it is made through the use of a 
sentence for which it is possible that it is now used to make 
a true (false) statement and some past or future use of it 
makes a false (true) statement, even if both statements refer 
to the same things and the same places." (ibid p. 49). 
Gale does not, however, give identity conditions for an 
A-statement other than that one is made by a use of a 
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(non-necessary) sentence which can vary in truth value 
over time. But without these conditions and, in partic-
ular, without answering the question whether or not time 
of use is essential to the identity of an A-statement it 
is impossible to know what is meant by entailment between 
an A and a B statement. Clearly the (type) sentence'S 
is ¢ at t7' neither materially implies nor entails the 
(type) sentence'S is now ¢'; 
does not hold 
(1) At t7 a iff a. 
that is, in terms of L+ (1) 
P 
So presumably, Gale does not mean by 'A-statement' what 
we mean by ~ristotelian statement' (see 3.1) otherwise Gale's 
argument amounts to the trivial thesis that (1) is not 
valid which is no wayan argument against the LD theorist 
since his account of a statement is based upon uses of 
sentences. On the other hand, if we understand 'A-statement' 
in the Frege-Russell sense then it is a use of a tensed 
sentence on a time occasion which expresses an A-statement. 
That is, it is not the sentence'S is now ¢' which expresses 
an A-statement. That is)it is not the sentence'S is now ¢' 
which expresses a statement but instead a use of that sentence 
on some occasion. Consequently, treating a statement as an 
ordered pair then it is difficult to see what 'logical' 
deficiency there is in (2) 
(2) <S is now ¢ t7> iff <At t7 A [isJ ¢ > 
Moreover consider the following re-construal of Gale's 
account of an A-statement. 
"Any statement which is not necessarily true (false) is an 
X-statement/Y-statement if, and only if, it is made through 
the use of a sentence for which it is possible that it is 
used by me/here to make a true (false) statement and some 
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other use of it by someone else/elsewhere makes a false 
(true) statement even if both statements refer to the same 
places and the same times/the same times anr. the same things." 
Then, whatever Gale's argument is it could be used to show 
that the X-statement expressed by 'I am ill' by utterer 
p or the Y-statement 'The well is here' uttered at place n 
are not entailed by the statements expressed by 'p is ill' 
or 'The well is at place n' respectively. And this is 
unfortunate because Gale uses his argument to show that the 
A-series is not reducible to the B-series account of 
time - an issue which appears to depend upon showing that 
temporal expressions are importantly different from spatial 
expressions, (and other indexical expressions). 
Our account of what we take to be the acceptable core of 
Gale's argument at the start of this Section is merely an 
instance of a more general problem which also occurs in the 
case of other indexicals. This is the problem that although 
the same statement may be identified from uses of different 
sentences these sentences inuse may differ in potential 
information content. Since there is nothing speCial about 
this problem for tense analyses and also because we believe 
it only becomes a problem in intentional contexts we shall 
not consider it further in this essay. 
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4.5 Rigidity, Now and Actualality. 
In 3.1 a distinction was made between a modest and full-
bloodea explanation of the naturalness of truth relativ-
ization to time. The modest explanation given there was 
at the grammatical leve whereas a full-blooded explanation, 
if there is one, is to be based upon semantic considerations. 
In this Section an attempt is made to show that there is 
some point to the belief that there is a full-blooded 
explanation to be had, an attempt which is based upon an 
argument by Romney (1978). 
An argument in favour of the view that full blooded ex-
planation is not forthcoming can be built around Peacocke's cIa: 
(1975) that 'now' like 'I' and 'here' etc., are xigid relative 
to an occasion of utterance. In 4.2 it was argued that 
'now' when treated as a date index is tense logically rigid 
relative to time of use and this was taken to be the index-
ical analogue of the two dimensionality of 'now' when treated 
as a sentence operator. Clearly, both '1' and 'here' are 
also tense rigid. Peacocke's claim, however, is much more 
general since he holds that indexicals are rigid relative 
to an occasion of utterance with respect to any context 
including intentional contexts. 
In order to represent this rigidity claim we make use of 
those ordered pairs (see 3.7) which represent a use of a 
sentence on some occasion. Where 0 is any operator (or 
iteration of operators) a is some person, p some place and 
tn some time then the rigidity claims are representable by 
(1) to (3) for 'I', 'here' and 'now' respectively. 
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(1) «3x)(x=I A O(-x-» a> iff <0(-1-) a> 
(2) «3x)(x=here A O(-x-» p> iff <O(-here-) p> 
(3) «3x)(x=now A O(-x-» t n > iff <O(-now-) t n> 
(2) is to be read as follows; a (potential) use of 
'(~x)(x=here A O(-x-»' at place p is true iff a (potential) 
use of 'O(-here-)' at p is also true. (The 'iff' may be 
strengthened to ' ... is the same statement as ... ' if so 
desired) . As an example of his rigidity thesis Peacocke 
claims that (4) and (5) have the same truth conditions 
(1975 p. 119) 
(4) It is possible that : it rained yesterday 
(5) Yesterday is a day such that: 
that it rained on that day. 
it is possible 
If Peacocke's thesis is correct then treating tense expressions 
semantically on a par with indexicals is to a large extent 
vindicated. And, this treatment may be backed up by a 
general philosophical argument which is summarized by Romney. 
"It is because we have a point of view on Space that we can 
distinguish this place, 'here', from others; we speak of 
places, and the place (perhaps very roughly) indicated as 
'here' is the place where we are speaking. Similarly, it 
is suggested, we have a point of view on Time, we speak or 
think at times and tense modifications and temporal adverbs 
like 'now' and 'long ago' indicate temporal locations in 
relation to the time of speaking." () 978 p. 237). 
This general argument is implicit or explicit in a large 
number of twentieth century philosophical writings. For 
surely it is on this basis that Quine says 
"Our ordinary language shows a tiresome bias in the treatment 
of time. Relations of date are exalted grammatically as 
relations of position, weight and colour are not. The bias 
is of itself an inelegance or breach of theoretical simplicity. 
However, the form that it takes - that of requiring that every 
verb form show a tense - is peculiarly productive of needless 
complications since it demands lip service to time even when 
time is farthest from our thoughts. Hence in fashioning 
canonical notations it is useful to drop tense distinctions." 
(1960 p. ) 70) • 
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This view about time then has consequences concerning 
the importance of tense within logic. One example already 
noted in 2.5 is the Kneale~ attitute towards the Medieval 
notion of appellation which they find 'curious'. Another 
example is Williams (1967) who claims that (6) 
(6) A sea fight not present in time nevertheless exists 
is no more contradictory than (7) 
(7) A sea fight not present in space nevertheless exists. 
This appears not to be the case because there happens to be 
a temporal reference (namely tensing) built into verbs 
rather than spatial reference (1967 p. 101). Consequently, 
none of these theorists would offer much weight behind the 
modest explanation of truth relativization to time. 
One particular problem here is that tostrike a blow at this 
general account of 'now' is to strike a blow at the standard 
interpretation of special relativity. For one consequence 
of special relativity appear to be that now is relative to 
a point of view because temporal distances between happenings 
are not invariant under Lorentz transformations. When the 
interval given by OS2, which is invariant (and equal to 
ox 2 + oy2 + oZ2 - c20t2) between two events is space.like 
(greater than zero), so that there can not be a direct 
causal connection between the events then there are dis-
agreements between different observers as to whether one 
of the events occurred before, after or at the same time 
as the other event. Now, the natural interpretation of this 
result is not just that now is relative to a point of view 
which could have been argued for given classical assumptions 
but also the much stronger point that there is no unique 
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course of cosmological events. Instead there are only 
courses of events relative to temporal points of view. 
Despite this, however, an argument by Romney seems to 
create a difficulty for the belief that the meaning of 
'now' is to be given in terms of (potential) time of use. 
In the version we put forward of Romney's argument we 
attempt to show that there are grounds for claiming that 
'now' unlike 'here' is not rigid relative to an occasion 
of use. That is, although (2) is true (3) is false. 
For it may be maintained that an instance of the right hand 
of (3), namely (8) is true without the left hand side of 
this instance, namely (9) also being true 
(8) <I wish that now were tm where tm ~ tn t n > 
(9) «3x)(x=now A I wish that x were tm where t m+ t n ) to>. 
Romney points out that there is a sense in which 'I wish 
that it were next month' can be true without there being 
an analogous sense of 'I wish that Jerusalem were here instead 
of York' which is also true unless absolute places are 
assumed. For one may understand 'I wish that it were next 
month' 
" ..• as a wish that present events, including my present wish 
were past instead of present and later events were present 
instead whe~e this would involve no difference in the 
temporal order of events." (p. 24 1). 
But there is not a sense in which 'I wish that Jerusalem 
were here instead of York' can be true without there being 
also a difference in spatial order of things. She writes 
"What does not seem to make sense is the wish just that 
another place were here, instead of the place which is 
in fact here where this would not involve any difference 
in the spatial order of things (and therefore in the 
relation of people who distinguish them)." 
(p. 141-2). 
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Consequently, llnless this wish about next month is 
illusory then (8) can be true without it also being the 
case that (9) is true and also without there being an 
analogous instance for 'here'. 
And the reason why 'now' isn't rigid here whereas 'here' 
is is based upon the point that there are no select places 
whereas there are select times namely the present which is 
to be understood in terms of what is actual. A place is 
distinguishable by someone as here because that person is 
there whereas a time is distinguishable as the present 
because that is the actual time. 
actually the 
was (is no 
"What is the case at present is just what is 
case: this distinguishes it from what only 
longer) or will be (is not yet) the case. 
account could be given of the distinction 
here and elsewhere." 
No parallel 
between what is 
(p. 240). 
Romney's argument then when understood in the way we ha\-e 
taken it namely as an argument which shows that 'now' 
is not indexical can then be utilized to provide a full-
blooded explanation of the naturalness of truth relativiz-
ation. But this argument requires there to be a notion 
of actuality which goes beyond 'relative to this temporal 
perspective' . And this goes against that conclusion 
based upon special relativity that there is no unique 
course of events. As a final word on this is Prior's 
reply here to this difficulty 
"What the relativistic physicists cannot calculate from how 
the course of events appears from certain points of view is 
how, in all its details, the course of events actually is. 
It is not clear to me that there is anything surprising or 
unacceptable in this conclusion or that we should be driven 
by it to renounce the use of forms like 'It appears from such-
and-such a point of view that p' which assumes that there is 
also a plain p which is or is not the case." 
(1968 p. 133). 
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PART THREE 
TENSE EXISTENCE AND FIRST - ORDER LOGIC 
CHAPTER FIVE; FIRST ORDER LD THEORIES. 
5.1 Quine's Thesis. 
In this final part of the essay we examine tensed first 
order theories. In this chapter our concern is with LD 
theories and in the next chapter Lp first order theories. 
Central to our discussion in these chapters are issues 
about tensed existence; issues which connect up with the 
earlier discussion of the Ancients and Medievals. So 
the final chapter is a more general discussion about 
existence and in particular, about tensed existence. 
Aristotle, as noted in 1.2, undertook the study of the 
syllogism as a stage on the way to the study of scientific 
methodology. Because of this tense considerations do 
not loom very large in his formal writings and when they 
do appear they occur as a hindrance to valid inference. 
This view was and still is a common view. For instance, 
Bosanquet writing at the end of the last century claims 
that when concerned with the operation of formal logic it 
is important to 
" get rid of tenses which do not belong to scientific judgenent 
and are very troublesome in formal inference." 
(1895 p. 98). 
Like Aristotle, Quine influenced by science and mathematics, 
sees his role as a logician being to provide a canonical 
notation adequate for just these disciplines. Moreover, 
he also sees this in terms of the philosophical quest for 
what is ultimately 'real', a quest which shows that his 
prejudices lie almost entirely with physics. He writes 
"The quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical 
notation is not to be distinguished from a quest of ultimate 
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categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality. 
(1960 p. 161). 
This canonical notation which has little of the expressive 
power of ordinar~ language turns out to be suitable for 
capturing a large variety of inferences. He-says 
"When our objective is an austere canonical form for the 
system of the world we are not to rest with the re-
nunciation of propositional altitudes and the subjective 
conditional: we must renounce also the indicator words 
and other sources of truth value fluctuation." 
(1960 p. 228). 
Quine intends that his canonical scheme represent the 
four dimensional framework. Now it may be thought that 
this is a consequence of his predilections for physics or, 
more to the point, for the Minkowski interpretation of 
special relativity. Geach, for instance, questions this 
aspect of Quine's thought when he writes 
"nor ought any logician to try to accommodate his doctrines 
to demands made in the name of contemporary physics." 
(1972 p. 304). 
However, the impetus for Quine's adherence to the four 
dimensional framework is not just based upon scientific 
grounds but also and more importantly, for our purposes, 
upon logical grounds. For central to Quine's canonical 
notation is standard first order logic which first arose 
out of representation of mathematical inference, (unlike 
Medieval logic which grappled with inference in a more 
general way). Now, it is the assumption that standard 
first order logic is not only applicable to mathematics 
but also to empirical matters which is the important logical 
factor in Quine's adoption of the four dimensional view. 
He writes 
"The 4-dimensional view of space-time is part and parcel of 
the use of modern formal logic and in particular the use 
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of quantification theory in application to temporal matters." 
(1953 p. 442). 
That is, he claims that variables are open only for four-
dimensional objects when fi~st order theory is used for 
representing temporal realities. It is this thesis -
which to our knowledge Quine no where argues for in detail 
- which is the central concern of this chapter. 
Because this thesis was put forward before the introduction 
of tense logics it is best assessed within the context of 
the LD analysis. In the circumstances it is a surprising 
claim since Quine is denying the intuitively most plausible 
way of understanding the structure of LD sentences. For 
D the most natural parsing of the L sentence 'At tn Socrates 
[sits]' is as 'Socrates [sits]-at t ' where ' ... [sits]-at ... ' 
n 
is a two place predicate and where 'Socrates' stands for 
the continuant Socrates. This analysis, the L~ analysis 
(see 5.3), is here, then, rejected by Quine. 
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5.2 From Tenseless Truth to Tenseless Existence? 
Although Quine's thesis is best taken within the context 
of LD analyses he does, it seem~,intend his thesis to be 
wider ranging. As we shall note in 5.5,central to his 
framework is that quantification be tenseless in all 
contexts. And, in connection with this he claims 
"It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of recognising 
the tenselessness of quantification over temporal entities. 
I see no reason to expect a coherent application of quanti-
fication theory to temporal matters on any other basis." 
(1953 p. 442-3). 
This claim is disputed in the next chapter, the central 
chapter of the essay where tensed quantification theories 
employing tensed quantifiers are looked at. 
A motivation behind preserving tenseless quantifiers 
when they are used in connection with the analysis of 
tensed discourse rather than mathematical discourse is 
to preserve a single notion of existence, namely tenseless 
existence. But is a tenseless reading of the quantifiers 
forced upon one as a consequence of the LD analysis? 
For once it is stipulated that statements are true or false 
simpliciter (or in Frege's words 'timelessly' true or false -
see 3.8) then constraints are placed upon accounts of their 
structure and their semantics. For instance, there 
appears to be a straightforward connection between tenseless 
truth and tenseless satisfaction which is noted below. 
But is there also such a connection between tenseless truth 
and teBseless existence? 
The move from tenseless truth to tenseless satisfaction 
is somewhat straightforward. A sentence, say '7 [isJ 
prime' belonging to some language L is true iff the pred-
icate, in this case' ... [isJ prime' is true of the logical 
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subjects. Here it is clear that the semantic relation 
' ... is true of ... ' is to be taken as tenseless not on 
the grounds that 7 is 'timeless' but simply because of its 
connection with the tenseless truth predicate. And, it 
is this semantic relation which is the foundation stone 
for ' ... [satisfies] ... '. 
Any presumed connection between tenseless truth and tense-
less existence is mediated by consideration of the 'exist-
ential' quantifier '(3x)(-x-)'. Russell's own introduction 
of the quantifier in his classic work of 1905 connects it 
with the 'true of' relation. He there writes that 'C 
(Something)' means 'C(x)' is true for at least one value 
of the variable. And in 'Principia' he and Whitehead stay 
with this account. 
"In addition to the proposition that a function ¢x is 'always 
true' (i.e. (x)¢x) we need also the proposition that ¢x is 
'sometimes true' i.e. true for at least one value of x. 
This we denote by '(3x)¢x'." 
(1910 Introduction p. xxi). 
Effectively, we have here that '(3x)¢x' is true iff 
something satisfies '¢x'. However, the authors equate 
this with 'There exists an x which satisfies '¢x'. 
"The symbol '(x)¢x' may be read '¢x always' or '¢x is always 
true' or '¢x is true for all possible values of x'. The 
symbol' (3x)¢x' may be read 'there exists an x for which ¢x 
is true' or 'there exists an x satisfying ¢~' and this conforms 
to the natural form of the expression of thought." 
(1910 p. 15). 
The purported connection between tenseless truth and 
tenseless existence depends upon the Russellian under-
standing of the 'some' quantifier to express existence. 
If this reading is not accepted (as for instance when read 
substitutionally) then there is not this foothold for the 
thesis. However, putting this to one side it can still 
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be argued that from the assumption of tCl1seless truth 
there is nothing in the brief sketch of Russell's intro-
duction of the quantifier which forces one to treat 'exists' 
as tenseless unless extra assumptions are added. 
Certainly, under the LD analysis if (3x)~x is a sentence 
then it can not be read as 'There (now) exists an x such 
that it ~s'. But this does not mean that it 'must' be 
read tenselessly in all its uses. For instance, one line 
of thought which is found in Russell is that what dis-
tinguishes apples, say, from numbers is that the former 
unlike the latter are time bound and that this distinction 
is fundamental. (see Russell 1912 p. 57). Now one way 
this distinction can be represented is by introducing two 
sorts of existential quantifier, a tenseless one 'There 
[exists] an x such that it ... ' and a detensed one 'There 
[exists]d an x such that it ... ' (see 3.2 for the distinction 
between tenseless and detensed). 
On what grounds could this duality of quantifiers be 
rejected? It might be contended that the quantifiers ought 
to be unrestricted and thus range only over a single set 
of objects on grounds of simplicity. Two quantifiers here 
demand two types of variables. (See 6.1 for a brief 
account of two sortal satisfaction). But this contention 
needs to be backed up either with an argument that despite 
appearances using only a single tenseless existential 
quantifier one can still bring out the Russellian distinction' 
(see next Section) or alternatively it may be backed up 
by an argument which rejects that there is a fundamental 
distinction here. 
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A simpler argument to show that there isn't a connection 
between tenseless truth and tenseless existence unless 
extra assumptions are added depends upon treating a 
Frege - Russell statement as an ordered pair (1) (see 
the discussion 3.7). 
(1) <Sentence E Lp time of use> 
Satisfaction is tenseless under this proposal when treated 
in terms of possible uses of a predicate at a time. Now, 
in the next chapter (see 6.3ff), under the Lp analysis, 
consideration is given to tensed quantification theory 
employing tensed quantifiers. Consequently although (2) 
(2) «3x)</lx t n > 
is tenselessly true or false the quantifier may here be 
read to be tensed. 
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5.3 The L~ Analysis. 
Atomic sentences of LD like 'At tn Socrates [walksJ' 
were treated as predicates with an argument place for 
time and written as '~tn' (see 3.7).W is a predicate of 
the form 
as some sentence of a tenseless language L. Given this, 
the natural analysis of wtn is ¢n+l (tna 1 ••• an) where 
the tn occupies an argument place in the same way that 
This analysis which appears to be the 
natural interpretation of Russell's analysis of tense (see 
3.1) has the consequence that the statement expressed by 
an English tensed sentence is to be represented as having 
one more argument place than surface structure reveals. 
For instance, in 'Socrates walks' 'walks' appears to be a 
monadic predicate. However, in this analysis corresponding 
to this predicate is ' ... [walksJ~at ... '. 
This analysis of tensed discourse involves what is probably 
the least amount of 'theoretical effort' in that it is 
assumed that the resources of standard quantification theory 
(with the addition of non-logical axioms for the later than 
relation '>') is adequate for representing uses of tensed 
sentences. We call this analysis the L~ analysis and the 
D language LA is then standard first order logic. 
One important feature of L~ is that a tenseless language 
L can be taken as a proper subset of it. Consequently L~ 
can both represent tenseless sentences like those of 
arithmetic as well as uses of tensed sentences. This 
feature is connected with the thesis that in some sense, 
logic is universal (see 3.8 for instance). Given this then 
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the natural interpretation of the single existential 
quantifier of L~ is the tenseless reading. In the last 
Section, however, a certain worry was expressed. Apples, 
it was said, do not [exist] but [exist]d unlike numbers. 
So the worry is that the tenseless quantifier does not 
connect up with existence in the way required in the case 
of time dependent individuals. 
D However, the LA theorist may claim that this worry is 
averted here. The existential quantifier is existential 
because by asserting '(3x)¢x' one is asserting that the 
predicate '¢' [has] instances. But, it is not the predicate 
' ... [is] an apple' which [has] instances; instead, it 
is, for instance, the predicate' ... [is]-an-apple-at t n '. 
Consequently, it may be claimed that the thought that there 
is a distinction to be made between apples and numbers is 
well taken under this analysis. For they are distinguish-
able in terms of the non-logical predicates which [are] 
true of them. Only predicates with an argument place for 
a time can be true of time bound objects whereas in the 
case of 'abstract' objects it is predicates which have no 
place for time variables. Thus the general statements (1) 
and (2) are representable by (1') and (2') respectively. 
(1) There [are] prime numbers 
(2) There [areJ d people 
(1') (3x)(x [is] a prime number) 
(2') (3x)(3t)(x [is] a person-at t) 
If Quine's thesis is correct (see 5.1) then this analysis 
is not a going concern. Let us then look at certain 
difficulties with it concerning existence. 
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5.4 Predicates and Tense. 
The existential quantifier is a second level predicate 
and it is this which is taken to underly the claim that 
'exists' is second-order. (See 7.3 for a criticism of 
this view). This prompts the following general question; 
although the L~ analysis is only described in terms of a 
first order theory how should second order predicates in 
the context of tensed sentences be considered in the spirit 
of this analysis? 
The 'eternalized' sentences (1) and (2) 
(1) At tn diamonds [are] rare 
(2) At tn pigeons [are] numerous 
are second order since they contain the predicates' ... is 
rare' and ' ... is numerous' respectively. Now, given the 
L~ analysis one may claim that the time determination belongs 
either to the first order or to the second order or to both 
predicates. Does it matter which? 
Suppose we allow it to belong to the second order predicate 
(1) is then taken as (1') 
(1') Diamonds [are] rare-at tn. 
(This will mean that ' ..• [is] ... ' takes first and zero order 
arguments). Taking (1) in the style of (1') has the 
consequence that first order predicates are tenseless. 
But this will then mean that there are two different accounts 
of first order 
objects. For 
predicates which can be true of time bound 
under the L~ analysis (3) becomes (3') 
while under the present proposal (4) becomes (4'). 
(3) At tn Socrates [is] a philosopher. 
(4) At tn Philosophers [are] rare. 
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(3') Socrates [isJ-a-philosopher-at tn 
(4') Philosophers [areJ-rare-at tn' 
And in (3') unlike (4') the first order predicate carries 
a time argument. This unsatisfactory situation of re-
quiring two accounts of a first order predicate is repeat-
able at every order if it is the higher order predicate 
which carries the time determination. This view also 
results in a certain difficulty of how to construe the 
statement made by a use of (5), 
(5) Socrates was a philosopher at a time when they 
were rare. 
Not only this but also there is a certain loss of generality 
in analysing (1) as (1') while treating (6) as (6'). 
(6) At tn diamonds [existJ. 
(6') Diamonds-at tn [existJ. 
This stimulates the question what is so special about 
'exists', if understood to be second order, which prevents 
it from being treated here like other second order predicates' 
The view that all second order predicates are tenseless 
therefore dispels the oddity of claiming that 'exists' is. 
Moreover, this view means that only a single account of 
first order predicates true of time bound objects has to 
be given. Consequently, (1) is taken as (1") 
(1") Diamonds-at tn [areJ rare. 
But this prompts the question of what is so special about 
first order predicates that only they take time determination: 
Anyway, this view is objectionable if an account is to be 
given of tensed sentences which involve a second order 
predicate falling within a third order predicate. Besides 
this there is also the difficulty of dealing with sentences 
involving more than one time determination as in (7). 
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(7) Men who fought in World War I are now rare. 
What this suggests is that a predicate of any order dealing 
with temporal realities is open for tensing. But, it is 
this which is denied by the L~ theorist who claims that 
there is one second order predicate, namely 'exists' used 
in connection with temporal matters but which is not open 
for tensing. This does not just result in mere eccentricity 
on the part of the L~ theorist for it has consequences 
and, in particular, it results in there being general 
difficulties about representation of existence claims. 
In the last Section it was noted that the L~ theorist can 
distinguish between certain claims about the existence of 
time bound and abstract objects through the difference of 
the predicates which fall under the second order 'exists'. 
In the case of time bound objects they satisfy predicates 
which involve an argument place for a time. Hence, a use 
of 'There were dinosaurs' at tn is represented by (8) 
(8) (3x)(3t)(tn> t A x [isJa-dinosaur-at t) 
Tensed existence, then, is here being treated as parastic 
upon the tensing of the predicates that are within the 
scope of the quantifier. 
a use of (8') at tn 
For what (8) really states is 
(8') There [is] something which was a dinosaur. 
But this parasitic account of tensed general existence 
comes into difficulty in certain cases. 
The first problem occurs if the predicate which lies within 
the scope of the quantifier is ampliating (see 1.5 and 2.3), 
for it may be argued that using the parasitic account yields 
incorrect representations. Take, for instance, a use of 
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(9) at tn and its representation (9') 
(9) There is (now) something which is famous. 
(9') (3x)(x[isJfamous-at t n ) 
But, arguably unlike (9), (9') can be true if nothing 
existent at tn is then famous. This is because the 
extension of ' ... [isJ-famous-at tn' need not include 
existents at tn' 
This problem is generalized when contexts involving 
negation are considered. For instance (10) 
(10) There are things which are not living 
or more colloqually 'Not everything is alive' as used at 
tn is misrepresented by (10') 
(10') (3x)~(x [isJ-alive-at t n ) 
And this is because (10') can be true if everything is 
living at tn although some things which lived, like 
Socrates, are no longer alive at tn' 
The third type of problem occurs in cases where the 
'there is' tensing does not coincide with the tensing of 
the predicates that follow it. An example is that of 
(11) and its contrast with (12) as used at tn 
(11) There is something which will fly to Pluto 
(12) There will be something which flies to Pluto. 
The difference here appears to be an instance of the 
dividedlcompounded distinction discussed in Sections 2.3 
and 2.4. But this difference as it stands can not be 
accounted for in terms of the parasitic tensing account 
unless an extra predicate is added to (11), a predicate 
which agrees in tense with the quantifier expression. 
These problems of representation bring out that the 
153. 
parasitic tensing view ~s not only inadequate as it stands 
but also an unnatural account of the 'There is ... ' locution. 
More generally the arguments put forward in this Section 
support the view that like any other second order predicate 
which is used in connection with temporal matters 
'There . , 1S ••• , understood as expressing existence,is 
tensed in its own right. 
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5.5 L~ and Individual Existence. 
Closely connected to difficulties for the L: theorist 
of representing certain general existence claims are 
difficulties of representation of individual existence 
claims. The first pOint is that just as there may be 
doubts about whether or not 'People [existJ' as opposed 
to 'Numbers [evistJ, is a sentence (see 5.2) then similarly 
there are doubts as to whether 'Socrates [existsJ' as 
opposed to '7 [existsJ' is a sentence. For in 3.2 it was 
questioned whether or not 'Plato [thinksJ' is a sentence. 
(If no distinction is made between tenseless and de tensed 
verbs then there is no problem here. For instance, Woods 
suggests that IX exists (tenseless) = df (3t)(x exists at t)' 
may be utilized for time bound individuals - 1976 p.251). 
Secondly, and more to the point here is the question of how 
singular tensed attributions are to be represented, sentences 
like (1) 
(1) Geach exists but Prior no longer does. 
For it is not only general existence claims which are open 
for tensing but also individual existence claims. Now if 
the latter problem is solved then problems connected with 
general existence representation will also be solved under 
the L: analysis. The converse of this can also be true 
as is now shown. 
The arguments of the last Section may be taken as a defence 
of the view that the 'There is ... ' locution should be 
represented by a quantifier which makes allowance for 
the fact that it is open for tensing. So 
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suppose we introduce '(Ex)(-x-)' which is to be read as 
the tensed 'There is (now) an x such that it ... '. Suppose, 
furthermore, we ident~y an LD sentence in terms of an 
,: 
ordered pair (see 3.7). Then a use of (2) at tn 
(2) There are people 
may be represented by (2') 
(2') «Ex)(x-[is]-a-person-at t n ) t n> 
This use of the ordered pair notation utilizes the place 
for the time of use as the time at which the 'There is ... ' 
locution applies. Consequently, uses of (3) and (4) at 
tn may be represented by (3') and (4') respectively. 
(3) There is (now) something which will fly to Pluto. 
(4) There will be something which flies to Pluto. 
(3') «Ex)(3t)(t>t n A x [fliesJ-to-Pluto-at t) t n > 
(4') (3t)«t>tn A (Ex)(x[flies]-to-Pluto-at t», t> 
According to this LD account because it introduces more 
than one place for a time the problematic general existence 
claims can be represented. Not only this, however, but 
also the individual existence problem is overcome. 
In first order theory the standard way of representing the 
tenseless individual existence claim (5) 
(5) 7 [exists] 
is by (5') 
(5') (:!x)(x=7) 
which is to be understood as 'There [is] an x such that 
it [is] identical to 7', where both the quantifier ex-
pression and the identity predicate are tenseless. Thus, 
given the tensed quantifier a use of (1) at tn is represent-
able by (1'). 
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(1') «Ex)(x = Geach) A ~ (Ex)(x = Prior) tn> 
Although this is an LD solution here the use of the ordered 
pair notation is essential to it. But the L~ analysis 
is intended to be given in terms of sentences which on 
all occasions of use express the same statement. And the 
way this was done in the case of tensed first order 
predicates was by introducing an extra place for time into 
those predicates. Consequentl~ it would be natural to do 
this for the second order tensed 'There is ... ' predicate. 
This may be done by introducing the expression '(3x at t) 
(-x-)' where t is a free variable which may be bound from 
the outside. So (6) 
(6) (3t)(3x at t)(-x-) 
is a representation of the detensed quantifier 'There [isJd 
an x such that it ... ' which is to be contrasted with the 
tenseless quantifier. 
Consequently, this L~ solution to the problems of represent-
ation consists in a total rejection of the parasitic tensing 
view. For now uses of sentences (1) (2) (3) and (4) at 
tn are represented by (1") (2") (3") and (4"), respectively. 
( 1" ) (!Ix at tn)(x = Geach) A ~ (!x at t n ) (x = Prior) 
(2") (3x at tn )(x [isJ-a-person-at tn) 
( 3" ) (3t)(3x at tn)(t>t n A x [fliesJ-to-Pluto-at t) 
(4") (3t)(t>tn A (3x at t)(x [fliesJ-to-Pluto-at t» 
But how does this L~ analysis stand in the light of Quine's 
Thesis (see 5.1)? The main point is that we no longer have· 
standard quantification theory for representing temporal 
realities; instead, we have something more awkward. 
Moreover, Quine takes great exception to the belief that 
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'There is ... ' is ambiguous between temporal and non-
temporal realities as instanced in 1960 p. 241-2. (This 
point may be connected with the belief that 'There is ... ' 
should be universally applicable, a logical constant -
see 3.8). 
The alternative solutions briefly mentioned here to the 
representation problems tackle the individual problem and 
then utilize that solution for solving the general problems. 
The first of these starts from the point that' 7 [existsJ' 
is represented in first order theory using the tenseless 
identity predicate. Now, if a tensed identity predicate 
were to be introduced then (1) can be represented. For 
instance, if t ••• =t n= ... ' is introduced to mean t ••• [isJ 
identical-at tn to ... ' then a use of (1) at tn is represented 
by (1''') 
(1"') (3x)(x =tn= Geach) A '" (3x)(x =tn= Prior) 
where the tenseless quantifier is used. Given this, then, 
the general problems are solved. For instance uses of 
(3) and (4) at tn are represented by (3"') and 4"'). 
(3"') (3t)(3x)(t>t n A x=tn-x A x [fliesJ-to-Pluto-at t) 
(4"') (3t)(3x)(t>tn A x=t=x A x [fliesJ-to-Pluto-at t) 
One particular worry about this solution is voiced by Woods. 
" ... it is doubtful how far such a two-term relation, variable 
over time deserves to be called identity, and in so far as 
it is not rightly so regarded its capacity for illuminating 
tensed assertions and denials of existence is limited." 
(1976 p. 251). 
Finally, a solution is forthcoming if the L~ analysis is 
couched within a first order language containing a two 
place existence predicate for representing tensed existence. 
A use of (1) at tn is then represented by (1"") and uses 
of (3) and (4) by (3"") and (4"") 
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(1'''') E! Geach tn 1\ '\, E! Prior tn 
(3"") (3t)(3x)( t>t n " x [flies]-to-Pluto-at t I\E!xtn) 
(4"") (~t)(3x)( t>t n 1\ E!xt " x [flies]-to-Pluto-at t) 
Both these latter solutions, the introduction of tensed 
identity or an existence predicate are compatible with or 
instances of the parasitic tensing account. For under 
these analyses 'There will be an x s.t. it ... ' is to be 
treated as 'There [is] an x which will exist and such that 
it ... '. And in the case of the latter of these two it 
must be maintained that there are at least two senses of 
'exists', a second order sense given by the quantifier and 
a first-order sense given by the existence predicate, a 
view which is argued against in Chapter 7. Moreover, if 
a use of 'Socrates exists' at tn is to be represented by 
'E! Socrates tn' then surely '7 [exists]' should be re-
presented as 'E!7' which seems to imply that there are three 
accounts of 'exist' to be given. 
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5.6 The LD Analysis. B 
Under the LD 
A analysis ( 1 ) 
(1 ) At tn Socrates [walks] 
becomes (1 ' ) 
( 1 ' ) Socrates [walks]-at tn 
An alternative structural analysis here is (1") 
(1") Socrates-at-tn [walks] 
where the logical subject is 'Socrates-at-t n ' which is to 
be understood as referring to a temporal slice of a four 
dimensional object which will be written here as 'Socrates~-
at-t n ' • This analysis referred to here as the L~ analysis 
features in Quine's writings. He writes 
"A drastic departure from English is required in the matter of 
tense. The view to adopt is the Minkowski one which sees 
time as a 4-th dimension on a par with 3-dimensions of space." 
(1952 p. 166). 
This analysis of uses of tensed sentences is not just 
motivated by scientific principles according to Quine. 
For as noted in 5.1,he claims that the application of 
standard quantification theory to temporal matters depends 
upon assuming that four-dimensional objects are values of 
the variables. So the best way of looking at the matter 
" ... is to recognise both in the four dimensional approach with 
its notable technical advantages and in quantification theory 
with its notable technical advantages two interrelated con-
tributions to scientific method." 
(1953 p. 442). 
The four dimensional view requires us to indulge in some 
intellectual gymnastics. Time is just another dimension 
in which bodies~are extended and it is this which here 
makes it space like. Photographs of a person taken at 
different times represent three-dimensional cross sections. 
Thus, the concepts of object and property are displaced 
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by that of a process-thing; for now, my walking to the 
Rose and Crown last night is just a part of me~. 
Under this conception all predicates are tenseless. Some 
of these will only be true of the four-dimensional object 
as a whole like, perhaps, ' ... [isJ a person~'. Others 
may be true of an object~ as a sum of its temporal parts 
or of the parts themselves, namely temporal slices like 
' ... [isJ heavy' (We may compare here ' ... is wide' said of 
a road). And certain predicates may just be true of 
temporal slices of objects; for instance, the predicate 
' ... is old' in three dimensional talk becomes something 
like ' ... [isJ a long way down it~s world line'. For 
many predicates, especially intentional predicates (see 
Geach 1965), it is not clear that they can go over into 
a Quinean language. Now, as noted in 5.1 this does not 
bother Quine since his canonical scheme is inspired not 
only by a very limited part of our ordinary conceptual 
scheme but also by a very limited part of twentieth century 
science. And the sorts of predicates which are relevant 
here, particularly classificatory predicates (see 1.2) do 
go over into a four-dimensional language. 
What then is the logical basis for Quine's Thesis? 
Consider the following three theses about canonical notations 
built upon first order theories. 
(A) The existential quantifier must always be read 
tenselessly 
(B) Thereis only one sense of 'exists', a tenseless 
sense represented by this quantifier. 
(C) The canonical notation should be able to represent 
uses of tensed sentences involving tensed existence 
claims. (see 5.4 and 5.5). 
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Under the L~ analysis not all three of these theses can 
be maintained together as we saw in the last two Sections. 
(C) doesn't hold if (A) and (B) are held. And the 
strategies utilized to bring about (C) we have looked at 
amount either to a rejection of (A) (defended by Quine -
see, for instance, 1952 p. 166) or a rejection of (B) 
(again defended by QUine - see, for instance, 1960 p. 131). 
Despite the very limited aims of L~ representability the 
three theses (A) to (C) do hold for this analysis. 
Consider first individual objects4. Socrates4, a process-
thing, is unchangeable having atemporal existence. Thus 
just as '7 [existsJ' is acceptable then so is 'Socrates4 
[existsJ'. The difference between 7 and Socrates4 resides 
in the pOint that the latter unlike the former has spatio-
temporal parts. 
But what about representations of tensed existence claims; 
for instance, a representation of 'Socrates no longer exists' 
as used at t n? According to the L~ theorist this claim 
must be understood relative to a particular dating system 
which encompasses a particular temporal point of view. 
For what he takes as real is just the four dimensional 
manifold. Relative to our dating system it is now true 
to say that Socrates no longer exists. This claim can be 
coped with on the L~ analysis by introducing the operator 
' ... at ... ' which is the intersection of a world line with 
a date belonging to some dating system. Consequently, 
when tn is the present time 'Socrates4-at-t n ' is the present 
temporal slice of Socrates4 which is the null element. 
Thus, introducing the null element A, a use of 'Socrates 
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no longer exists' at tn is representable by (2) 
(2) Socrates 4-at-tn = A. 
Al ternatively, we can introduce the predicate' ... R ••• ' 
for' ... [is] a (proper) part of ... ' then instead of (2) 
we have (2 I ) 
(2') ~(3x)(x-at-tn R Socrates4) 
What we are doing is making use of set theory which as 
we shall note below may be used to overcome problems of 
higher-order predication. 
General tensed existence claims can now be dealt with. 
A use of (3) at tn 
(3) 'There were dinosaurs' 
is repr~sented by (3') 
(3') (3t)(!x)(t<t n ~ x-at-t + A A x [is] a dinosaur4) 
And uses of (4) and (5) at tn 
(4) There is something now which will fly. 
(5) There will be something which flies. 
becomes representable by (4') and (5') where the predicate 
[flies] unlike ' ... [is]a dinosaur4' is taken to be true 
of temporal parts 
(4') (Jt)(lx)(x-at-t n + A A t>t n A x-at-t [flies]) 
(5') (3t)(~x)(t>tn A x-at-t [flies]) 
Because all predicates are tenseless on this approach 
then it looks to be problematic how a use of a sentence 
like (6) can be represented 
(6) Poverty is less rare today than 10 years ago. 
However, Quine lets the 'at ... ' operator be extended for 
sets 
"We easily extend 'at' to classes. Where z is mankind, z 
at t may be explained as the class } (!x)(y~(x at t) and 
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x E z) of appropriate man stages." 
(1960 p. 173). 
So when (6) is used at tn and where tm is 10 years 
before and Z is the class of poor people (6) is represented 
by (6') according to this proposal. 
(6') ~(3x)(y=(x-at-tn)AXEZ) is larger than ~(3x)(y= 
(x-at-tm)AXEZ) 
But Quine's proposal here not only allows temporal slices 
to be values of a variable (rather than the complete 4-
dimensional object) but also presupposes that sets can only 
be defined for non-ampliating predicates. For instance, 
if Z is the set of famous people4 then Z at t would be, 
according to Quine (7) 
(7) ;(3x)(y=(X at t) and x E the set of famous people4) 
but Socrates4 may be a member of the set of famous people~ 
at tn without there being a temporal slice Socrates4-at-tn. 
The L~ analysis requires not only a large amount of un-
natural paraphrase to fit fragments of our ordinary tensed 
discourse into the four-dimensional framework but also a 
certain amount of set theory. Moreover, in the next two 
chapters we shall argue that both (A) and (B) are to be 
rejected. 
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CHAPTER SIX FIRST ORDER Lp THEORIES 
6.1 The Language Qp and the Systems QK. 
This chapter is about first-order Lp systems. Because 
similar problems occur for quantified modal logic as they 
do for quantified tense logic more attention than in 
previous chapters is given to modal questions. First, 
the language Qp is introduced. In Section 3.6, it was 
assumed that an atomic Lp sentence is formed out of an 
n-place tenseless predicate together with n-occurrences 
of any m individual constants, msn and the morpheme 
'PRES' . In the case of Qp it is taken that atomic pre-
dicates are present tensed. That is, the Lp atomic 
sentence 'PRES Socrates [sitsJ' is analysed as 'Socrates 
PRES-[sitsJ' . It is being assumed, then, that logically 
speaking tensed predication is fundamental to tensed 
languages however it may be grammatically, (see 1.3 and 
3.2) . Definition Qp1 introduces atomic Qp predicates. 
Defini tion Qpl. 
An n-place atomic predicate is given by the ordered pair 
<PRES n-place tenseless predicate>. All atomic predicates 
of Qp are assumed to be of this form, and the resulting 
set is n Q .. 
~ 
Definition Qp2. 
The set EQ of expressions for Qp consists of the symbols 
(,), the set C~ of connectives, a denumerable set of symbols 
1 
VOv} ... called individual variables, a set ai of individual 
constants, the set Q~ of atomic predicates and finally the 
1 
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Formulas of Qp are now defined. 
Definition Qp3. 
Atomic Qp formulas are first defined 
(i) if Q~ £ Q~ and uI,o,un are each either a variable 
or a constant then Q~(u ... u n ) is an atomic formula. 1 I 
formulas are now defined 
Any atomic formula is a formula. (ii) 
(iii) n n n If Cj £ Ci and 0l ••• a n are formulas then Cj(OI"'On) 
is a formula. 
(iv) If ° is a formula containing vi free then so is (ivi)a 
The connectivesC l C1 C 1 C2 
o 1 2 3 are ~, G, H A respectively. 
And it is assumed that the standard rewrite rules apply 
to Qp formulas together with the standard definitions of 
closed and open formulas. The language Q; is Qpu {=} 
where '=' is intended to be identity. However '=' is an 
unusual Qp predicate in that it is tenseless, (see 5.5). 
In this chapter two sorts of Lp system are considered. 
In one type, the quantifier (3v)(-v-) is taken to be the 
standard tenseless (or, perhaps, the detensed) quantifier 
whereas in the other type it is understood to be tensed. 
On the latter reading '(~v)(-v-)' says 'There is (now) 
something s.t.it ... '. Besides this divergence in quanti-
ficational tense systems there is still, of course, that 
divergence which is due to different assumptionsbeing made 
about time's structure. In this Section attention is 
given to the former more standard type of tense system 
involving the standard quantifiers. 
The systems which result from the addition of standard 
quantification theory to Kt and KL (see 3.5) are called 
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QK t and QKL respectively. QKL, then, is quantified 
tense logic for linear dense time. The interesting 
theorems of these systems are those which involve the 
interconnection of tense operators with the quantifiers. 
In both systems the following six theorems together with 
their mi~r images are provable. 
(1 ) G(x)a -+ {x)Ga 
(2) (3 x )Fa -+ F(3x)a 
(3) (3 x )Ga -+ G(3x)a 
(4) F(x)a -+ (x)Fa 
(5) (x)Ga -+ G(x)a 
(6) F(3x)a -+ (3x )Fa 
(2) is equivalent to (1), (3) to (4) and (5) to (6) in 
standard systems. The modal fragments of QK t and QKL are 
standard quantified Band S5 respectively. Hence, 
corresponding to (1) to (6) (and their mirror images) are 
the modal formulas (1') to (6'). 
( 1 ' ) A(x)a -+ (x)Aa 
(2' ) (3x)Sa -+ S(jx)a 
(3' ) (3x)Aa -+ A(3x)a 
(4' ) S(x)a -+ (x)Sa 
(5' ) (x)Aa -+ A(x)a 
(6' ) S(3x)a -+ (~x)Sa 
(5' ) and (6') are the Barcan formulas whereas (1') and 
(2') are their converses. Because of this (5) and (6) 
are here called the tensed versions of the Barcan formula. 
(4') and it s equivalent are called the 'Buridan formulas' 
after Prior's observation that Buridan objected to a modal 
reading of (4') (Prior 1967 p. 138). 
Language Q+ is Qp together with p 
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(i) set of time variables UOU1'" 
(ii) set ti of individual time constants. 
(iii) the At .... operator 
(iv) the quantifier (3ui)(-ui-)' for any ui' where 
ui is a set of time variables. 
+ + Formation rules for Qp are given by Definition Qp ' 
Definition Q+. p 
(i) if a is a Qp formula then it is + a Q formula. p 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
if a is any Qp formula and sk is tm or un for 
any m,n then At sk a is a Q; formula. 
if a,8 are any Q; formulas then so are ~a, a A 8, Ha, G8. 
if a is a Q; formula of the form (-At ui-) then 
so is (3 U i)(-At ui-)' 
if a is a Q+ formula of the form (-vi-) then so is p 
( 3vi)(-vi-)' 
System QKZ is QKL together with (7) to (12). 
(7) ~ At ui a iff At ui~a 
(8) At ui (a A8) iff At ui a A At ui 8. 
(9) Aa iff (ui)mt ui ~provided aE Qp ' 
(10) (vi)At ui(-vi-) iff At ui(vi)(-vi-)' 
(it) (-H-)At ui a iff (-)At ui a. 
(12) (-G-)At ui a iff (-)At ui a. 
(11) and (12) are the quantified tense logic versions of 
the Semantic Primacy of Dates Assumption. (see 3.3 and 3.6). 
Homophonic Semantics are now given for Qp ' We ass~e that 
the set of atomic Qp predicates consists of a single two 
place predicate ~ and the set of individual constants of a 
single constant a. The metalanguage contains the object 
language together with elementary arithmetic and the 
following 
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(i) A two place predicate 'Closed' such that 'Closed (a L)' says that 'a' is a canonical description 
of the closed formula a of L. 
(ii) A two place function symbol 'Val' such that 'Val 
(is)' says 'the ith member of the sequence s'. 
(iii) A three place predicate 'Sats' such that 'Sats 
(s a L)' says that's satisfies a in L'. 
(Note 'Sats' is a tensed predicate). 
(iv) A two place function 'Ref' such that 'Ref (ai L)' 
says 'the reference of ai in L'. 
The truth predicate and 's'~s' are assumed as usual. 
1 
The homophonic system is called HQ where it is assumed that 
the language L is Qp ' 
HQ1) Sats (s fViVjL) iff IPval(is} val(js) 
HQ2} Sats (s <pa vi L) iff IPref(aL}val(is}. 
HQ3} Sats (8 <pvia L) iff IPval(is}ref(aL}. 
HQ4) Ref (a L) = a. 
HQ5) Sats (s ~a L) 
HQ6) Sats (s aA8 L) 
iff rvSats(saL} 
HQ7) 
HQ8} 
iff Sats(saL}ASats(sSL) 
Sats (s (Ivi}a L) iff 
Sats (s Ga L) iff 
(3s' }(s'~S A Sats(s'aL)}. 
i 
G Sats(s~L} 
HQ9} Sats (s Ha L) iff H Sats(saL} 
HQ10) 
HQll} 
HQ12} 
rv (x)(Js'}(s'rvs A x = val(is')} 
i 
G(a~e} ~ {Fa ~ Fe} 
H(a~e) ~ (Pa ~ pe) 
HQ13} Tr(aL) = df (s)(Sats(saL) A Closed (aL» 
RHQG 
RHQH 
1- HQ <p therefore 
1- HQ <p therefore 
Alternatively, HQ may be set up without the rules RHQG and 
RHQH where HQ1) to HQ13) are prefaced by the 'always' 
operator A. But setting it up in this way not only requires 
the theorem Aa~ AAa (see 4.3) but also the theses PGa~a 
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and FHa-+-a. These latter two are required since they 
are necessary for the proof of the Barcan formula which 
is need to prove strF ghtforward T-sentences. This is 
shown below by giving a proof of (13) 
(13) Tr(G(3x)H<j>xa L) iff G(3x)H<j>xa. 
(i) Sats(s <j>via L) iff <j>val(is)ref(a L) HQ3) 
(ii) Sats(s <j>via L) iff <j>val(is)a HQ4) 
(iii) H(Sats(s <j>via L) iff <j>val(is)a) RHQH 
(iv) HSats(s <j>via L) iff H<j>val(is)a from HQI2) 
(v) Sats(s H<j>via L) iff H<j>val(is)a HQ9) 
(vi) 'VSats(s H<j>via L) iff 'VH<j>val(is)a Q-Theory. 
(vii) (sl)(sl1'.s-+- 'VSats(s 
l. 
H<j>vi a L) iff s~~s -+- 'V H<j>val(is 1 )a) Q-Theory. 
l. 
(viii) (Sl)(sl~s ~ 'V Sats(sl H<j>v i a L» iff (sl)(sl~s -+- 'V H<j>val(is1)a) 
l. Q-Theory. l. 
(ix) 'V (3s1)(sl~s A Sats (s 'V H<j>v i a L» iff (~sl)(sl~s A H<j>val(is1)a) 
l. 1. Q-Theory. 
.ex) Sats(s (3vi)H<j>via L) 
(xi) Sats (s (!vi)H<j>vi a L) iff (!x)H<j>xa HQIO) 
(xii) G(Sats(s (]vi)H<j>via L) iff (:Jx)H<j>xa) 
(xiii) GSats(s (3vi)H<j>via L) iff G(ix)H<j>xa 
(xiv) Sats(s G(!vi)H<j>via L) iff G(3x)H<j>xa 
(xv) (s) (Sats (s G(3vi)H<j>vi a L) iff G(3x)H<j>xa) 
(xvii) 
RHQG 
from HQll) 
HQ8) 
Q-Theory 
HQI3) 
On the alternative HQ set up this proof will consist in 
the tense necessitations of i) to vi). However, (vii') 
will then be of the form (sl)A(-Sl_) whereas what is wanted 
is A(Sl)(_Sl_) which requires the theoremhood of the Barcan 
formula. 
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Quantifiers of QKL may be understood either as tenseless 
or as detensed. Perhaps one way of distinguishing these 
readings depends upon how one sets up the homophonic 
semantics of Q+. If read tenselessly then the time p 
variables, lUi' and time constants 'til may be taken as 
subsets of 'v· ' 1 and 'a· , 1 respectively. Thus, the sequence 
set will involve times as members as well as individuals. 
The homophonic development is straightforward, utilizing (14). 
(14) (~£ MQp)(A~ ~ (t)(At t ~». 
On the other hand if (3Vi)(-vi-) is understood as detensed 
and it is assumed that times are atemporal then one can 
introduce a two sortal satisfaction theory based upon a 
four place satisfaction predicate SATS such that SATS 
(s s* ~ L) where s is a sequence for Qp and s* a sequence 
consisting of times only. The development is straight-
forward. (15) holds for every ~ £ Qp . 
(15) SATS (s s* ~ L) iff sats (s ~ L). 
And truth is defined by (16) 
(16) Tr(~ L) iff (s)(s*)(s s* ~ L) " Closed (~ L) . 
Two versions of HQ7) and HQI0) are required together with 
clauses for 'At' (see 4.3) and reference clauses for the 
set 't·'. 1 
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_6_._2 ____ M_o_d_a _ l __ T~h~e~o~r~e~t~i~c~S~e~m=a=n~t~i~c~s~f~o~r~Qp_and Partial Interpretations. 
'In this section model theoretic semantics are given for standard 
first order tense systems (as introduced in the previous Section). 
The discussion here follows closely Section 4.1 where sentential 
semantics were given. There discussion centred on semantic 
structures which specify a truth value to each formula at each time. 
The natural extension of this for first order theories is to 
consider semantic structures which specify a truth value to each 
formula at each time relative to a sequence. So first a 
quantificational interpretation U is defined. (Language Q is p 
assumed - see last Section.) 
Definition 1. 
A quantificational interpretation is a set U = <T,>,D,g> where 
(i) <T,» is as J in Definition 1 of 4.1; 
(ii) D is a non-empty set (called the domain of individuals of U); 
and 
(iii) g is a valuation function satisfying the conditions: 
(iii.a) if u is an individual constant then g(u) E 0 
(iii.b) if Q~ is an n-place predicate constant then g(Q~) E ) ) 
Where D is any set we understand by L(D) the set of all denumerable 
sequences of members of D. If U is a quantificational interpretation 
L(U) is to denote the set L(D ), where D is the domain of 
u u 
individuals of U. 
Definition 2. 
Let U = <J,D,g> be a quantificational interpretation and 
s E L(U). The value g;(u) of a singular term u of Qp in U 
relative to S is defined by: 
fg(U) if u is an individual constant g*(u) = s val(i,s) if u is the variable v,. 
~ 
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We now define the truth value U (a) (t) of a formula a in an 
s 
interpretation U at a time t E T and relative to a sequence 
u 
s (: L(U). 
Definition 3. 
(i) if a is Q~(Ul"'u ) then U (a) (t) 
J n s 
n 1 iff <g*(u1 ) ... g*(u »E g(Q.) (t) s s n ) 
(ii) U (""CL) (t) = 1 iff U (a) (t) = 0 
s s 
( ii i ) U ( a 1\ (3) (t) = 1 iff U ( a) (t) = 1 and U (~,: (t) = 1 
s s s 
(iv) U «::3v. )a) (t) = 1 iff (3s' E L) (5' ;:;:: 5 1\ U ,(cd (t) 1) 
5 ~ ~ S 
(v) U (Ha) (t) = 1 iff (t') (t>t' -> U (a) (t') 1) 
s s 
(vi) U (Ga) (t) = 1 iff (t') (t' >t -> U (a) (t') = 1) 
s s 
Definition 4. 
A formula a is true at t under U(U(a) (t) = 1) iff for all s E L(U) 
U (a) (t) = 1. 
s 
A formula a is false at t under U(U(a) (t) = 0) iff for no s, s E L(U) 
U (a) (t) = 1. 
s 
That is, UI _ike the homophonic case we allow open formulas to be 
true as well as closed formulas. Validity is defined along the 
lines of Definition 4 of Section 4.1: A formula a E Qp is valid 
relative to J iff for every interpretation U of the form <J,D,g> 
and all t E T Uta) (t) = 1. Systems validated by the above clauses 
are called AQp systems - compare ALp systems of 4.1. 
S~ct time interpretations can be introduced for quantificational 
logic in a similar fashion to their introduction for sentential 
logic. Ut is the set <T1,>,D,g,tn > where t ( T is 
a select time. 
n 
n 
Validity is then defined for BQp systems analogous to Definition 6 
of 4.1~ A formula Q E: Qp is t valid relative to J iff for every n 
interpretation U , of the form <T,D,g,t >, U (a) (t ) = 1. 
tn n 
n n 
One can ask what the relationship is between these two notions of 
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validity and arrive at theses for the strong and weak first order 
A = B thesis, namely (1) and (2) respectively, 
(1) CUt ) CUt (a) (t) = 1) iff 
n n 
(U
t 
) (t) (U
t 
(a) (t) = 1) 
n n 
iff (U ) (t (Ut It (a) (t) = 1) (2) 
tn n 
where 
CUt ) CUt (a) (t
n
) = 1) 
t n n 
U It is a model of the form <J,O,g,t> formed by substituting 
n 
t for t in <J,O,g,t >. 
n n 
Of more interest in the quantificational than in the sentential case 
is that of a partial interpretation at a select time. There are two 
important features of these in the sentential case (see 4.1). First, 
they exhibit a way of treating standard sentential logic as a 
representation of present tensed fragments of natural language and 
secondly the set of partial interpretations at the time tare 
n 
isomorphic with those at t . 
m 
It is this latter feature which accounts 
for them being somewhat uninteresting. In the quantificational case, 
however, there are two ways of defining partial interpretations, one 
of which need not satisfy the isomorphism feature. 
The first way of defining them is as the triple <O,t ,g> which we 
t n 
m 
write as Mt . 
n 
Consequently M It is the partial interpretation 
n 
<0, t I g>. 
m 
The alternative way of defining them provides a basis for 
a more complex semantics for tense systems. However, this latter 
way is best considered when a certain assumption is made. 
Fundamental to partial interpretation clauses is the following (3). 
(3 ) 'f . n E n h ') 1 ~ a ~s Q. Q. t en Ms t \a = iff 
J ~ n 
<g*(u1) ••• g*(u » E g(Q~) (t ) s s n J n 
Suppose the following assumption (4) is made. 
(4 ) Let 
U
t 
n 
Ut 
n 
be the intended interpretation of Qp (at t n ) where 
is <T,>,D,g,t > then 
n 
for any atomic predicate Q~ 
J 
if U
st 
n (Q. u l •. u ) (t) = 1 then g* (u l ) ••• g* (u ) all exist at t. J n s s n 
That is, it is assumed that the atomic predicates given their intended 
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meaning are I1on-ampliating - for their extension at a time consists 
in their 'appellation', namely existents then (see 1.5 and 2.3). 
This assumption may be strengthened is model theoretic semantics. 
(5) Let U
t 
be any interpretation of Qp 
n 
then for any atomic 
predicate Q~, if Us t (Q;u 1 •• u n ) (t) 
n 
= 1 then g*(u
1
) •• g*(u ) 
s s n 
all exist at t relative to U
t 
n 
What is assumed here is that under any interpretation the atomic 
predicates are satisfied at a time only by exislents then (under that 
intt..rpretation) . This, then, is a much stronger assumption amounting 
to the claim that, in some sense, it is necessary that the extension 
of an atomic predicate at a time consist in existents then. Let us 
call this assumption the 'atomic predicate non-ampliating assumption' 
or APNA for short. 
Given this assumption partial interpretations at a select time may 
be constructed in a different way than from above. Let M~ be 
n 
<D ,t ,g> where D 
n n n 
is an arbitrary set of individuals for which it is 
assumed that under M' they then exist. 
t 
n 
Not only do these partial interpretations 
Also let M
t
' be <D ,t ,g>. 
m m 
m 
represent certain present 
tensed fragments of natural language but also they exhibit a way of 
letting the existential quantifier represent the present tensed 'there 
is' locution. These partial interpretations may be spelt out in such 
a way as to allow for truth value gaps. 
sequences defined over D E M' . 
n t 
n 
Definition 7. 
We let r be the set of 
n 
A partial interpretation at a select time t is the triple <0 ,t ,g> 
n n n 
where 9 is the following function 
(i) if u. E a. and g(u.) ~ D then g(u.) is not defined. 
1 1 1 n 1 
(E) if u. is v. then g(u.) 
1 1 1 
(iii) if Q~ E Q~ then g(Q~) ) ) J 
= val (is) . 
m CD. 
n 
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The semantic clauses are straightforward requiring sub-clauses for 
undefined formulas. 
The important difference, then, between the two kinds of partial 
interpretation introduced i~ this Section resides in their inter-
pretation of the quantifiers. In the former type unlike the latter 
(6) is valid 
(6) <j>a -+ (3x) <j>x 
for any predicate </> which does not involve a tense operator. For 
instance, under the intended partial interpretation at the present 
time (7) is not valid. 
(7) Socrates is not a man -+ (3x) (x is not a man) . 
(This connects up with the discussion in 2.4.) The systems QK
t 
and 
QK are effectively systems which are formed by extension of the first 
L 
kind of partial interpretation. So the question is what kinds of 
system are formed by extension of the latter kind of partial inter-
pretation involving tensed quantifiers and are there such systems 
which are two valued? 
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6.3 Kripkean Semantics for Tensed Quantifier Systems. 
Our aim is to provide tensed first order systems which involve tensed 
quantifiers. NOw, one natural way to provide their semantics is by 
extending the partial interpretations at a select time given in the 
last Section. But there is one important disadvantage with these 
and that is that tensed bivalence doesnot hold for them. However, 
semantics can be given which not only allow for variable domains over 
time but also for which tensed bivalence holds. Such semantics are 
based upon Kripke's modal semantics (1963) where domains differ from 
possible world to possible world. 
Definition 1. 
A Kripkean tense model is a set U
t 
n 
t 
n 
are as before, and 
<T,>,~,D,g,t > where T,>,D and 
n 
(i) ~ is a function from T into ~ s.t. ~(t ) = D C D~ 
m m-
(ii) 9 is a valuation function satisfying the conditions: 
(iia) if u is an individual constant then g(u) E D 
(iib) if Q~ is an n-place 
) 
n 
such that g(Q.) (t ) ) m 
The definition of g*(u) is as in Definition 2 of the previous section. 
s 
Semantic clauses are those of Definition 3 of the previous section 
but with Us t replacing Us throughout and more importantly, the 
n 
quantifier clause differs. 
Definition 2. 
(i) - (iii) and (v), (vi) as in Definition 3 Section 6.2. 
"" (iv) Us t «]vi)Cl) (t) = 1 iff (3s') (s' is'' val(i,s') E ~(t) 1\ 
n 
Us't (a) (t) = 1) 
n 
Truth is defined as in Definition 4. 6.2 except that U is replaced 
by Ut . Validity is defined as t validity, similar to Definition 6 n 
n 
of Section 4.1: A formula a E Qp is t Kripke valid relative to J n 
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iff for every interpretation U of Lhe form <J,D, ,g,t > 
tn n 
Ut (a~(tn) = 1. 
n 
Kripke does not in his modal semantics explicitly adopt the modal 
APNA assumption; that is, the assumption that an atomic predicate 
can only be true with respect to a possible world of objects which 
exist with respect to it. (He does mention the assumption in foot-
note (1) p.86 of that work.) Also he does not include clauses for 
individual constants as we have done. NOw, the semantics satisfy 
bivalence because formulas are assigned a truth value at a time (for 
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Kripke, with respect to a possible world) relative to a 
sequence even though the relevant members of that sequence 
do not then exist (or exist with respect to that world). 
The consequence of having these semantics is that mixing 
formulas which were valid under the semantics of the last 
Section are not Kripke valid. Consider QKL , for instance, 
whose modal fragment is Ss then according to Kripkean 
semantics none of (1) to (6), nor their modal counterparts 
(1') to (6') of 6.1. that is, the tensed Barcan formulas, 
their converses and the Buridan formulas are valid. As 
far as we know it was Prior who first pointed out that 
mixing formulas of standard tense systems are unaccept~ble 
when understood to involve tensed quantifiers (see 6.5). 
But, there is an asymmetry in unacceptability between these 
formulas. For, clearly, (2) to (5) are intuitively un-
acceptable 
(2) F(3x)a ~ (3x)Fa 
(S) (x)Ga ~ G(x)a 
(4) 
(5) 
F(x)a 
G(x)a 
~ (x)Fa 
~ (x)Ga 
On the other hand (6) and (7) are not intuitively speaking, 
as unacceptable even though they are equivalent to (4) and 
(5) respectively. 
(6) (3x)Ga + G(3x)a 
(7) (3x)Fa + F(~x)a 
It is noted in 6.5 that both these formulas are valid in 
Prior's system Q (although their standard equivalents are 
not). Moreover, this asymmetry in unacceptability is 
further noted in the construction of more complex tense 
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systems (see 6.7 to 6.11). 
Systems, then, which employ tensed quantifiers are more 
sensitive to scope distinctions than those employing tense-
less (or detensed) quantifiers. One advantage, then, is 
that the compounded I divided distinction as instanced in 
(8) and (9) respectively 
(8) It will be the case that something flys. 
(9) Something now will fly. 
is straightforwardly representable by (8') and (9') 
(8') F(3x)(x flys) 
(9') (3x)F(x flys) 
And tensed individual existence can be represented simply 
by using the tensed quantifier and the tenseless identity 
predicate; (10) is represented by (10'). 
(10) Quine exists but Prior no longer does. 
(10') (3x)(x = Quine) A ~ (3x)(x = Prior). 
Consequently, an analysis of tensed discourse which makes 
use of tensed quantifiers is not open to the problems of 
representation of existence claims which beset the L~ 
account (see 5.4) and which are also a feature of those 
systems introduced in 6.1. That is, by accepting tensed 
quantifiers the parasitic tensing account (see 5.4) is 
rejected. (This point connects up with the discussion in 
2.5 where it was claimed that a historical legacy of 
appellation theory is the suggestion that representation 
of tensed discourse should be based upon a tensed quantifier 
quantification theory). 
But this advantage of sensitivity to scope distinctions 
becomes a problem when confronted with the question of which 
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tense systems are satisfied by the Kripkean clauses. For 
instance, in the case of the modalized tense systems both 
the converse Barcan formulas «1') and (2') of 6.1) and the 
Buridan formulas « 3') and (4') of 6.1) are provable in the 
weakest standard modal logic Lemmon's SO.S(provided a 
contains no modal operators) when added to standard quanti-
fication theory, yet these formulas are Kripke invalid. 
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6.4 Kripke Systems. 
In this Section attention is given to Kripke's solution 
to the problem of finding formal systems which are validated 
by his modal semantics and to how this solution provides 
us with tense systems. In the proofs of the Barcan formulas, 
their converses and the Buridan formulas the following step 
is made. 
(1 ) 
(2) 
(x)a 
A( (x)a 
(In their tensed counterparts Rule G or H is used). 
Kripke objects that this move from (1) to (2), itself, 
Now, 
presupposes the Kripke invalid converse Barcan formula. 
"In a formula like (1) we give the free variables the generality 
interpretation. When (1) is asserted as a theorem it abbreviates 
assertions of its ordinary universal closure ••• " 
So (1) is really (1') 
(1 ' ) (y)( (x)a -+ a y/ ) 
x 
(1963 p. 88-9). 
which by necessitation gives (3) 
(3 ) A(y)( (x)a -+ a 
whereas (2) really asserts (2') 
(2' ) (y)A( (x)a -+ a Y/ ). 
x 
And the move from (3) to (2') is merely an instance of 
the Conv( 'se Barcan formula. (And using the argument in 
the tense case, one assumes the move G(y)(-y-) to (y)G(-y-) 
or its mirror image). 
On the basis of this, Kripke suggests that one should seek 
closed modal systems. In the case of tense systems, 
following Kripke's modal system (ibid p. 89) we may define 
the system CQKL as the closures of the following where 
the closure of a formula a is the resulting formulas which 
arise by prefixing universal quantifiers and the tense 
183. 
operators G and H in any order to a. 
CQKL1 ) Any valid S.C. instance 
CQKL2) G(a-+8) -+ (Fa-+F8) 
CQKL3 ) H(a-+S) -+ (Pa-+PS) 
CQKL4) Ga-+GGa 
CQKL5) Ha-+HHa 
CQKL6) PGa-+a 
CQKL7) FHa-+a 
CQKL8) FaAFS -+ F(aAS) v F(aAFS) v F(FaAS) 
CQKL9) PaAPS -+ P(aAS) v pea PS) v P(PaAS) 
CQKL10) (x)(a-+S) -+ «x)a-+(x)S) 
CQKL11) (y)( (x)a-+a Y/ ) x 
Rules M.P. 
The system CQKL then, has no valid mixing formulas since 
all of (1) to (6) of 6.1 are Kripke invalid. However, if 
an open formula is valid, say (-x-) then so are (x)G(-x-). 
G(x)(-x-) and G(x)G(-x-) by the closure condition. For 
example, ~x-+~x is an instance of CQKL1); hence all of (4) 
to (6) hold 
(4) (x)A (~x-+~x) 
(5) A(x)(~x-+~x) 
(6) A(x)A(~x-+~x). 
An alternative approach to finding systems which satisfy 
the Kripke clauses is to place all the blame as it were upon 
( 1 ) 
(1 ) (x)a -+ a Y, 
x 
and not upon the move from (1) to (2). For it can be said 
that the problem is that (1) is invalid. A sequence may 
satisfy the antecedent without satisfying the consequent. 
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For instance if a is ~vi where ~ is an atomic predicate 
then a sequence with a presently non-existent in the ith 
place may satisfy the antecedent without satisfying the 
consequent. On the basis of this, one might suggest that 
what is needed is an amendment to quantification theory 
of the sort argued for by free logicians (Kripke notes this 
solution p. 89 footnote (1». 
will be an axiom 
(7) ( x ) a -+ (E! y -+ a Y,- ) 
x 
Hence, instead of (1), (7) 
And the 'closest' one gets to the converse Barcan formula 
is (8). 
(8) A ( x) a -+ (y) A (E ! y -+ a YI. ) X 
Thomason proposed this solution in (1969) which is considered 
here via a different more complex route. 
Date axioms can be added to CQKL but they are somewhat 
complex because the Semantic Primacy Assumption in the form 
of (11) and (12) of Section 6.1 have to be changed (and also 
(10) has to be rejected). Because of this we shall not 
consider the date extension to CQKL • 
Homophonic semantics for Kripkean systems follow very 
closely those given in 4.1 provided certain assumptions are 
made about sequences. For given the tensed reading of the 
quantifiers in Kripke systems how is (9) to be read? 
(9) (3s)(-s-) 
For it may be read either as 'There is now a sequence such 
that it ... ' or if two sorted quantification theory is 
allowed in the metalanguage as 'There [isJ a sequence such 
that it ... ' One general point relevant here is that Kripke 
systems become provably equivalent to BQp systems if every-
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thing exists at all times. Consequently, if it is 
assumed that at all times anything can be a member of a 
sequence whether existent or not then, then it does not 
matter how (9) i~ read. This assumption is made here. 
Consequently, pure sequence formulas satisfy the mixing 
formulas of 6.1. On the basis of this a homophonic 
semantic theory can be given for Kripke systems, one which 
is the Kripke closures of HQ1) to HQ13) of 6.1 except for 
sequence places which may remain open. One important change 
though is the quantifier clause. Instead of HQ7) one has 
HQ7') . 
HQ7') Sats(s (jvi)~ L) iff (Is')(s'~s A (3x)(x=val(is') 
1 
A Sats(s' ~ L». 
Thus, in order to prove (13) of 4.1 one proceeds as far as 
step (vi) but replace steps (vii) to (xi) by the following 
(vii)' to (xi)'. 
vi) ~Sats(s H~via L) iff ~H~val(is)a 
vii)' (s')(x)(s'i:s A x=val(is')~~Sats(s' H~via L) iff 
1 
viii) , 
ix) , 
(s' )(x) 
(s')(x) 
«s'~s) A x=val(is')~~H¢val(is')a» 
1 
(s'%s 
1 
A x=val(is')~~Sats(s' H¢vi a 
(s':ts 
1 
A x=val(is' )~~H~val(is' )a). 
(3s ' )(:lx)( s ' ~s A x=val(is') A Sats(s' H~via 
1 
(3s')(3x)(s'~s A x=val(is') A H~val(is' )a) 
1 
L) iff 
L) iff 
x) , (~s' )(s'~S A (3x)(x=val(is') A Sats(s'H~via L) iff 
1 
(3x)H~xa 
xi)' Sats(s (!Vi)H~via L) iff (ix)H~x a 
And then continue as before. 
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6.5 Prior's System Q. 
Prior's system Q, first d;scussed in his 'John Locke 
Lectures' (1957), arose as a result of the problems created 
by some of those mixing formulas which are Kripke invalid. 
In this Section the philosophical basis for Q is considered. 
Now, unlike Kripke systems Q does not satisfy tensed 
bivalence. However, this disadvantage is somewhat balanced 
by its containing mixing formulas which are theorems. 
Prior's rejection of bivalence is essentially bound up with 
his demonstrative view of free variables. And this, in 
turn, is bound up with a generalized version of the non-
ampliating assumption. Let us look at this first. He 
writes 
"where x stands for a proper name it seems to me that the 
form 'x exists' must be logically equivalent to and definable 
as 'There are facts about x' <3¢)¢x. If there are facts 
about x I can not see what further fact about x would consist 
in its existing. And when x no longer exists or does not 
exist but there are nevertheless facts about x now I do not 
know what the present facts about x would be." 
(1957 p. 31). 
Prior claims that (1) holds. 
(1) (3¢)¢x iff x exists. 
That is, it is not only atomic predicates but also any 
predicate which is to be non-ampliating, a view similar 
to that held by the Stoics (see 1.4). 
Closely connected to this view is that the Russellian 
quantifiers are to be given a tensed reading in the sort 
of way outlined in the last three sections. For free 
variables, he assumes, are only open at a time for what 
is then demonstrable. 
(2) (x) ~ ~ ~ ~ 
x 
In (2) 
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'y' is only replaceable by a logically proper name -
that is, a proper name which is replaceable by a demon-
strative. Thus, what we have here is the demonstrative 
(as opposed to the pronoun) account of free variables 
which connects up intimately with his generalized non-
ampliating assumption. 
Because this is the only account of quantifiers and free 
variable Prior considers it becomes somewhat urgent for 
him to provide a tensed quantification theory. 
(BQp ) systems validated by the semantics in 6.2 and their 
L~ equivalents, he believes, are objectionable not on the 
ground noted in 5.4 but because they presuppose that all 
individuals are sempi ternal. This, he takes as showing 
that there is a clear dispute between himself and those 
theorists who accept as valid the Barcan formula and its 
converse (or their L~ equivalents) in the form of (3). 
(3) (x)Aa iff A(x)a. 
It would be better, however, to see the difference as that 
between two different accounts of quantifiers and free 
variables. 
Unlike Kripke or a 'free logican' Prior does not believe 
that tensed quantification theory employing tensed qUantifierJ 
needs to be amended. To the claim that (4) 
(4) 
is invalid because substitution instances like (5) appear 
to be counterexamples 
(5) PaY/ ~ (:ix)Pa 
x 
as in 'If Alexander rode Bucephalus' then 'there exists an 
object which Alexander rode' he writes 
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"This objection can be met by saying that since Alexander's 
horse has ceased to exist the word 'Bucephalus' can no 
longer count as a logically proper name - that is it can 
not in principle be replaceable by a demonstrative - and 
so is not substitutable for 'y' in (4)." 
(1957 p. 33). 
'Bucephalus' (and 'Alexander'), then, are to be construed 
as definite descriptions in the Russellian way and, 
consequently, the purported counter-example is not an 
instance of (4) at all for it states 
"1f it has been the case that this a's there is something of 
which it has been the case that it a's." 
(ibid). 
Th~s has the consequence that ordinary proper names of 
past existents are to be construed as definite descriptions 
a view, not unsurprizingly, Prior is uncomfortable with. 
(His attitude to 'names' of future existents is noted in 
the next Section). 
Although he believes that standard quantification theory 
does not need to be amended he claims that the problem of 
the invalidity of the mixing formulas lies in the assumption 
that standard sentential logic satisfies tensed bivalence. 
His argument for this is as follows. The expression 
'(3¢)¢x' not only states that there are facts about x but 
also that there are statements about x. Thus, the sentence 
'Alexander rode Bucephalus' does not now express a statement 
which is either about Alexander or about Bucephalus. Prior, 
then, holds (A) 
(A) x exists iff there are statements about x. 
Now, fundamental to tense logic is the assumption (B) 
together with its mirror image 
(B) 'Pa' is now true iff 'a' was true. 
Now, Prior claims that (A) and (B) are in conflict with (C). 
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(C) At every time, each statement is true or false. 
The problem is that a sentence like 'this does not exist' 
can never express a false statement. Moreover, nor can 
'P(this does not exist)' or 'F(this does not exist)'. 
(We may compare the Stoic notion of 'axioma' here briefly 
outlined in Section 1.1). For by (B) 'P(this does not 
exist)' is true if and only if at some moment of past time 
the statement (then) expressed by 'this does not exist' 
(where 'this' refers to this) is true which clearly it can 
not be. 
But what happens when one considers, say the truth value 
of'Pn (This does not exist)' where 'Pn' is the metric 
operator 'It was the case 100 years ago'? By (B) this is 
true iff 'this does not exist' said in 1879 where 'this' 
demonstrates this, expresses a true statement. But, 
suppose there was no this at that time then by (A) there 
were no statements about this. And this includes state-
ments about this which deny its existence then. Thus, 
(C) is false. For the statement expressed now by 'this 
does not exist' itself did not exist in 1879. 
Although Prior holds that 'Pn ~ (x exists)' can never be 
true he claims that its equivalent in standard metric 
logiC ,~ Pn (x exists)' can be true. 
"On the other hand a statement of the form ~Pnti~)~x 'It was not 
the case n days ago that x exists' may very well be true, on 
the assumption that there are non-sempiternal individuals. 
For example, it was not the case JOO years ago that I existed; 
there were, I would contend, no facts about me then - not even 
this fact of there being no facts about me at that time; 
though it is now a fact that there are no facts about me then." 
(J957 p. 34). 
So although at any time at which a statement exists it is 
either true or false there are times when it is undefined. 
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Consequently, in order to preserve (C) one requires the 
assumption that everything issempiternal since then there 
would always be statements about everything. Rejecting 
tensed bivalence means that a statement may not always be 
true and yet never be false. 
true 
For instance (5) is not 
(5) A (this is ~ ~ this is ~) 
for almost all uses of 'this '. Consequently, (6) holds 
(6) ~ A (this is ~ ~ this is ~) 
On the other hand (7) is never true 
\7) S ~ (this is ~ ~ this is ~) 
So (8) holds 
(8) ~ S~ (this is ~ ~ this is ~) 
Thus, in a modal or tense system when bivalence does not 
hold the standard relationship between the operators does 
not hold. (This feature is considered by Bell and Humber-
stone in connection with logics for strict presupposition 
(1977». What does hold, however,are both (9) and (10), 
for tense operators 
(9) Ga ~ ~F~a 
(10) Fa ~ ~~a 
The difference in semantic content between 'Ga' and '~F~a' 
is that the former expresses that 'a' will always be true 
whereas the latter expresses that 'a' will never be false. 
Now, if validity is defined in terms of truth then we here 
have an example of the breakdown of the sentential A=B 
thesis. For instance, 'a v ~ a' can be tn valid without 
being tm valid. Prior, however, introduces a weaker notion 
of validity defined in terms of a formula not being false 
which does satisfy the equivalence thesis. (This weaker 
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notion of validity does create difficulties as to what 
precisely the rule of detachment is). 
Because a valid formula may not always be true the rules 
RG and RH have to be given up. But because a valid formula 
is never false instead of RG one may introduce the rule R~F~ 
and its mirror image. Semantics can be given for Q. 
Although neither of the tensed Barcan formulas turn out to 
be valid both (11) and (12) do 
(11) (3x)Fa ~ F(3x)a 
(12) (3x)Ga ~ G(3x)a 
(11) is one version of the tensed converse Barcan formula 
whereas (12) is one version of the tensed Buridan formula. 
It is these formulas which in 6.4 were claimed to be intuit-
ively acceptable. In Prior's tensed Q because of the 
breakdown between the operators their standard equivalents 
are not provable. Instead both (13) and (14) are 
(13) G(x)a ~ (x)~F~ 
(14) F(x)a ~ (x)~~a 
In 6.10 formulas which are similar to (11) to (14) turn 
out to be valid in a semantics for which bivalence holds. 
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6.6 Time's Asymmetry and System Q. 
Prior's system Q, as a tense system, has some rather 
unfortunate consequences. First, on certain occasions 
it may be unclear which statement is made by the use of a 
sentence. This is because a sentence like 'Prior was 
born in New Zealand' when used in the 1960's expressed a 
different statement than when now used, not on Frege-
Russell ground (see 3.1) but on the grounds that Prior no 
longer exists. Thus, ordinary proper names of continuants 
change their status once the bearer passes away. Connected 
here is the point that predicates like 'vi will be a Prime 
Minister', 'vi no longer exists', 'vi is not a person', 
'vi invaded Britain' etc., are not now defined for objects 
which do not now exist. And this is so despite the fact 
corresponding predicates 'vi invades Britain', 'vi is a 
Prime Minister' etc., were or will be defined for tho~objects. 
On the one hand it seems acceptable to claim that 'vi is 
a horse' is not defined for Pegasus but on the other hand 
to say that 'vi was a logician of some repute' isn't now 
defined for Prior appears unacceptable. For the past is 
not quite as non-existent as Prior make out. Moreover 
how is it that we can speak about the past on Prior's account? 
His answer here is that past is spoken about through the 
use of definite descriptions but this gives it a generality 
it often lacks. (This generality is manifested in that 
a formula 'P(3x)~x' may now be true without it also being 
the case that a formula of the form 'P~a' is also true even 
if everything has an ordinary proper name). 
Another consequence of Prior's arguments which underly Q 
193. 
is that the past and the future are equally 'indiscernible'. 
Yet this fits ill with another view he argues for, namely 
that one can not name future objects (see 1967 p. 138 ff 
for a clear statement). But the grounds for this do not 
hold in the case of past objects. 
"Things that have existed do seem to be individually identifiable 
and discussable in a way in which things that don't yet exist 
are not (the dead are metaphysically less frightening than 
the unborn) . " (ibid p.l71). 
That is, the pOint is that future objects unlike past 
objects can not be individuated which has the consequence 
that there is a generality about the future which does not 
also hold in the case of the past. There are, of course, 
different versions of this asymmetry dependent upon what 
force 'can' has in 'one can not name future objects'. 
Let us not pursue this but merely note that the asymmetry 
involved is squarely based upon the fact that although there 
are proper names of past objects (in one good sense of 
'proper name') this not true for future objects. Now this 
asymmetry can not come out in Q because according to that 
representation of tensed discourse one can neither name 
past not future existents. Instead since all proper names 
of past objects are to be construed as descriptions this 
puts them on a par with future descriptions. 
As noted in the last Section Prior distinguishes between 
'~Pn(x exists)' and 'Pn~(x exists)' where the former unlike 
the latter can be true. The difference is between: 'It 
now is not the case thatx's existence was the case nago' 
and 's's existence was not the case nago'. Given Prior's 
asymmetry argument it seems that there is such a distinction 
to be made even after rejecting Prior's demonstrative account 
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of free variables. For instance, it is now true that it 
was the case in 1865 that Russell will be born although in 
1865 no such sentence as 'Russell will be born' could be 
true. And this difference is based upon the fact that in 
1865 there was no proper name 'Russell' (referring to the 
philosopher). That is, there is a difference between the 
way we now can Speak about the past and the way it could 
then be spoken about. 
This difference may be captured by utilizing the point that 
as time passes the set of individual constants increases and 
at any moment a member of that set refers to a past or to 
a present existent. This means that (A) and its mirror 
image have to be rejected. 
(A) 'Pa' is now true iff 'a' was true. 
What hold instead are (B) and (C) 
(B) if 'a' was true then 'Pa' is now true. 
(C) if 'Fa' is now true then 'a' will be true. 
This amounts to rejection of the A=B theses. 
However, as noted in 4.3, (A) is objectionable when under-
stood as (A') (and it is this understanding of A which Prior 
uses in his argument for Q - see last section). 
(AI) the statement expressed by 'Pa' is now true iff at 
some time in the past the statement expressed by 
'a' then is true. 
For this commits one to very strong assumptions about 
languages namely that they always exist and that their 
sentences always have the meaning they now have. In 4.3 
then we suggested that (1) 
(1) Tr(Pa L) iff P Tr(a L) 
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be understood as "Pa' is true with the meaning it now 
has in L iff 'a' was true with the meaning it now has'. 
However, the discussion here suggests an alternative account. 
And this is not to invoke the two dimensionality of 'now' 
but instead to claim that the operators 'P' and 'F' are 
themselves two-dimensional where the select time is to be 
treated as a perspective from which to assess truth values. 
That is, the operator 'P' is to be understood as 'It was 
the case (relative to this perspective) that ... I where 
'this perspective' is given by the select time. Consequently 
where Utn is a Kripkean select time interpretation (2) 
may hold without (3)'s holding. 
(2) Us lo (Fa)(t) = 1 
(3) Us tj tn (Fa)( t ) = 1. 
For instance, suppose Ut is the intended select time n 
interpretation and 'Fa' is 'Russell will be born', tn is 
the present time and t is 1865. Then (2) is true whereas 
(3) is false. For (2) is (2') and (3) is (3') 
(2') 'It will be the case (relative to this perspective) 
that Russell is born' is true in 1865. 
(3') 'It will be the case (relative to a perspective in 
1865) that Russell is born' is true in 1865. 
For in 1865 there was no proper name 'Russell' referring to 
the philosopher. Provided it is tn validity which is 
invoked then Kripkean systems will be valid under this 
conception. However, time'sasymmetry is to be explained 
in terms of the fact that a formula which is tm valid need 
not be tn valid. More, specifically, time's asymmetry is 
expressible by (4) and (5). 
(4) where t<tn Us t (a)(t) = 1 
n 
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(5) where t>t n Us t (a)(t) = 1 n U tj (a )( t) = 1. s tn 
We also have the basis here for an argument which claims 
that our temporal perspective is essential to our description 
of Reality. And that there can not be a complete des-
cription of Reality (except at the last moment of time). 
Thus, this amounts to an objection to the four dimensional 
'model' of Reality. 
(An alternative approach to a conclusion along these lines 
is found in Durrmett (1960». 
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6.7 Scope Distinctions an~.Predicate Modifers. 
Prior's system Q fares better as a modal system than as 
a tense system. For it is more acceptable to hold that 
predlcates are not defined with respect to a possible world 
for objects which do not exist there than it is to hold 
that they are not defined at a time for objects which no 
longer exist then. (There is an asymmetry here between 
the acceptability of this for past and for future objects). 
On the basis of this, it may be said that Kripke systems 
fare better as tense systems than as modal systems. 
Moreover we shall now attempt to argue that Kripke modal 
systems are defective in a more complex way. 
In Prior's modal systerr Q both (1) and (2) are provable 
even though their standard equivalents (1') and (2') are 
not because of the breakdown between A and S. 
( 1 ) (3x )S<px -+ S(3x)<px 
(2) (3x)A<px -+ A(3x)<px 
(1') A(x)<px -+ (x)A<px 
(2' ) S(x)<px -+ (x)S<px 
Understood modally (1) states that 'It is possible that 
something is <P' follows from 'There is actually something 
which possibly is <p'. This formula is Kripke invalid 
which seems to be counter intuitive. For instance, from 
the claim that something actual, say Tony Benn, possibly is 
prime minister it does seem to follow, in possible world 
talk, that there is a possible world in which he and hence 
something is prime minister. 
Kripke invalid? 
Why then is this formula 
On the surface it appearnto be a result of two points; first, 
not all objects are necessary beings and secondly Kripke 
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systems satisfy bivalence. Consequently, a sentence like 
'There is something (say, Socrates) who is possibly not a 
person' can be true simply because Socrates doesn't exist 
in every possible world. For in a world in which he does 
not exist the sentence 'Socrates is not a person' is true 
and this is so even though in that world the sentence 
'Something is not a person' may well be false. 
But beneath the surface here of this counter-example to (1) 
there lurks an essentialist claim. ~or the situation depended 
upon the truth of the claim that Socrates is a person in all 
worlds in which he figures. But this is tantamount to 
the claim that Socrates is necessarily a person; where 
'necessarily' is to be understood as expressing that notion 
of necessity which applies to non-necessary beings. This 
is a philosophically well entrenched although somewhat 
controversial sense of 'necessarily' which is more or less 
captured by Kripke's later notion of weak necessity. 
"Let us interpret necessity here weakly. We count statements 
as necessary if whenever the objects mentioned therein exist 
the statement would be true." (]97] p. ]37). 
If one wanted to formally capture this notion then surely 
Kripke style semantics which allow for domains to vary from 
possible world to possible world is the obvious candidate. 
But the only necessary qua essentialist type truths capturable 
in Kripke systems are 'negative' ones like 'Necessarily, 
Socrates is not a mouse'. For in no possible world whether 
Socrates figures there or not is the sentence 'Socrates is 
not a mouse' false. But the reason one would maintain that 
essentialist claim is because it is true that Socrates is 
necessarily a person a truth which is uncapturable here ) 
unless Socrates exists in every possible world (in which case 
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formulas like (1) and (2) would turn out to be valid if 
all objects were necessary). 
Is there an analogous sense of 'always' which applies to 
non-sempiternal beings? Jespersen pOints out that 'always' 
is often used with the import of 'at all times we are just 
now concerned with' (1961 p. 191). Consequently, we may 
introduce tensed analogues of weak necessity. For instance, 
it may be claimed that there is a sense in which (3) is true 
(3) Socrates was always a person. 
In what follows an attempt is made to represent these senses 
of necessity and omnitemporality partly as an end in itself 
but much more importantly, for the purposes undertaken here, 
as a purported contribution to the discussion of the problem 
of founding tensed or modal quantification systems which 
employ quantifiers in the Kripkean manner. What is wanted 
are systems for which bivalence holds yet in which formulas 
like (1) and (2) are provable, that is systems which have 
the advantages of Prior'S Q and Kripke systems without 
having their disadvantages. Very briefly, our strategy 
for the rest of this chapter is to argue that an operator 
when understood as a predicate modifier may have different 
logical powers than when construed as a sentence operator. 
In order to make good this claim we must, of course, dis-
tinguish between predicate modifiers and sentence operators. 
As a point of entry into some of the problems involved we 
shall briefly look at Wiggins' proposal (1976 A 1976 B ) 
that A abstraction may be utilized in distinguishing between 
sentence operators and predicate modifiers. 
Stalnacker and Thomason (1968 A) use A abstraction to mark 
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scope differences in order to distin 'uish between sentences 
. .> 
like (4) and (5). 
(4) Necessarily, the President of the U.S. is a 
citizen of the U.S. 
(5) The President of the U.S. is necessarily a 
citizen of the U.S. 
In more standard discussion these are distinguished via the 
use of Russellian description theory, as in Smullyan (1948). 
However, both authors reject this method on the grounds 
that definite descriptions are primitive singular terms. 
Instead they distinguish between (4) and (5) using A 
abstraction as in (4') and (5'). 
(4') A (Ay)[<PyJ( ('Ix)(ljix) )_ 
(5') ().y)A [<PyJ( (1X)(ljiX) ) 
Semantically, the difference is that (4') is true iff 
whatever is the President of the U.S. with respect to any 
possible world is also a citizen there whereas (5') is true 
iff whatever is the President in the actual world is a 
citizen of the U.S. in every possible world. 
This use of A abstraction is not one with which we are 
concerned since we believe the Smullyan analysis to be more 
perspicuous. What does interest us, however, is a more 
general claim made by these authors in (1968 B). They say 
there that ). abstraction may be used to distinguish de re 
from de dicto claims when any singular term, including proper 
names, is involved. If D is an operator then (6) is a de 
dicto claim 
because it is equivalent to (7). 
(7) D<pa 
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where a is the singular term involved. On the other hand 
" ... (Ay)D[¢y] (a) is a de re formula since in it the modal operator 
is used to construct a predicate (Ay)D[¢y] ( ... ) which is applied 
to a singular term; such a formula represents the ascription of 
a modal property to a thing." 
(1968 B p.364). 
Expressed here is the view that an operator can ma~ predicates into 
predicates which intuitively appears to be the view that in de re 
formulas operators act as predicate modifiers (as opposed to sentence 
operators) . Furthermore, the authors believe that in the de re case 
substitutivity holds; that is (8) holds 
(8) a = b -+ ( (Ay)D[</>y] (a) iff (Ay)D[</>y] (b) 
However if the only operators we are dealing with are modal or tense 
operators and individual terms are both tense and modally rigid then 
t.his distinction using A abstraction has no semantic content as it 
stands. (If D is, say, an epistemic operator then it may have content.) 
Wiggins, however, in (1976 A,B) believes that there is a de re/de 
dicto distinction to be captured using A abstraction. In the case 
of necessity he claims, that this distinction is between weak and 
strong Kripkean necessity 
"I am not sure but the change [Kripke's change from strong to 
weak necessity in 1971] mcy reve been made in order to distinguish 
clearly the de re from the de dicto occurrence of 'necessarily' ... " 
(1967 A p.108) . 
He takes weak necessity to be represented by a predicate modifier 
which is to be distinguished from sentential necessity using A 
abstraction. His use of A abstraction, which we shall follow, is 
technically different from Stalnacker and Thomason's. 
Provided not all objects necessarily exist then Wiggins claims that 
there is a semantic difference between (9), which is true, and (10) 
which is false. 
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(9) (A[ (Ax) [x is a person]], [Socrates]) 
(10) A( [(Ax) [x is a person]], [Socrates]) 
In (9) A is to be understood as a predicate modifier modifying the 
predicate construct [(Ax) [x is a person]]. The use of ',' and 
scope distinguishes this example from (10) where A operates upon a 
sentence, albeit one containing a predicate construct. This 
notation separates a predicate from its arguments, by treating a 
sentence as a complex ordered pair. Thus, it allows us to 
distinguish clearly between open sentence operators and predicate 
modifiers. Unlike Wiggins, Stalnacker and Thomason introduce A 
distinctions using quantifier sentences as their paradigm. Thus 
their distinction is based upon that between, for example, (~x)D~x 
and D(3x)~x. Wiggins, on the other hand, introduces A abstraction 
as a way of filtering out predicate expressions unambiguously. 
(In the next Section we provide full syntax rules for A abstraction.) 
However, Wiggins does not to our knowledge, clearly argue for either 
of the two theses 
(A) Weak necessity should be represented by a predicate modifier. 
(B) Necessity when represented by a predicate modifier is weak 
necessity. 
For suppose (A) is true but (B) is false. That would then mean 
that although weak necessity is to be represented by a predicate 
modifier this is not the only sense of necessity which can be 
represented in this way. (It is more or less this which is argued 
for in 6.9.) But what about (A)? Davies (1978), partly because 
he finds the de re/de dicto distinction confusing, has claimed that 
(A) is false; instead he holds that weak necessity is to be 
captured using a sentence operator. On the other hand, it seems 
to us that, at least intuitively speaking (A), is true (although in 
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one good sense of 'predicate modifier' (B) is false). 
Certainly if (11) is a weak necessity claim and (12) a strong 
necessity claim 
(11) Socrates is necessarily a person 
(12) Necessarily Socrates is a person 
then not only is 'necessarily' a semantic unit of both these 
sentences but so also are 'Socrates' and 'is a. person', as is 
brought out in (9) and (10). And, clearly, the semantics for both 
these sentences are tied up with that for (13) 
(13) Socrates is a person. 
But there is a difference. Semantics for sentences of type (11) 
(unlike those for (12» must make an appeal to the fact that 
sentences of type (13) have particular kinds of semantic units. 
That is, in giving semantic. clauses for weak 'necessarily' one must 
have recourse to the structure of the sentence containing it in a 
way which is not necessarily required when semantics for strong 
'necessarily' are given. (Because this difference is rejected by 
Davies it means that for him 'A(3x)¢x', where ¢ is monadic, is 
ambiguous as between A's being a weak or strong necessity even 
though semantically, unlike the case of 'A~a', there is no difference. 
On the other hand if weak 'necessarily' is a predicate modifier and 
hence syntactically like 'large' then 'A(3x)¢x' is not ambiguous.) 
An attempt to make good the claim that (A) is true, namely that 
weak necessity should be represented by a predicate modifier, is 
based upon the claim that there are properties. A distinction can 
then be made between 'real' and 'apparent' predicates. For, 
unlike the latter, the former are taken to express properties, and 
one may use A abstraction to represent 'real' predicates. 
can be argued, as Prior does, that to exist now is to have 
properties now. This can be expressed by (14) ~ 
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And, it 
(14) y exists (now iff ([ (Ax) [<px)), [y'; . 
Now, given (14) even though a sentence like 'Socrates is not a 
person' may now be true it is counter intuitive to claim that this 
expresses that Socrates now has or lacks properties. (And this is 
really the point that underlies Prior's criticisms of AQp (BQp) 
systems - see 6.5). Similarly, with respect to a possible world in 
which Socrates does not exist, it is counter intuitive to claim that 
Socrates has or lacks properties there. (Consider Cerberus and the 
actual world.) On the basis of this, it is useful to distinguish 
in tense and modal logics between senses of negation which may be 
represented by A abstraction as in (15) and (16) 
(15) ("'[ (Ax) [~x]] , [a]) 
(16) '" ( [ (AX) [¢x] ] , [a) ) 
By appealing to that use of A abstraction for representing a real 
predicate then (15) says that an existent a has a certain negative 
property where the occurrence of the negation sign is essential to 
the expression of that property - and so is essentially predicative. 
On the other hand (16) merely denies that a has a certain property. 
Thus these differ semantically in tense and modal systems provided 
objects are not all omnitemporal or necessary respectively. (What 
we have here is that idea suggested in 1.4 that a predicate negation 
may map non-ampliating predicates into non-ampliating predicates.) 
And as a reply then to Davies (1978 p.415-6) we here have that 
'Socrates is not a person' is ambiguous as to the role of 'not' 
without denying that in both its readings 'Socrates' and 'is a 
person' are semantic constituents. 
Similarly one may distinguish (17) and (18) 
(17) (A[(AX)[¢x)),[a)) 
(18) A( [(Ax) [¢xJ J, [aJ) 
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(18) can be understood as claiming that in all possible worlds a 
has the property expressed by (AY) [¢y] whereas (17) can be under-
stood as claiming that a has a necessary property. But because it 
has been assumed that an object can only have properties when it 
exists a natural way of understanding 'a has the necessary -,roperty 
expressed by A[(AX) [¢x]]' is as 'whenever a exists, a has the property 
expressed by [(Ax) [¢x] ] , . Thus (17) and (18) would then differ 
semantically provided that not all objects are necessary or omnitemporal. 
This argument for the claim that weak necessity or rather essentialist 
necessity (see 6.9 for their difference) is to be represented by a 
predicate modifier depends upon two points. First, that essentialist 
necessity claims are to be construed in terms of objects having 
necessary properties and secondly that for something to have a 
necessary property is for it to have a property whenever it exists. 
The first point is open to the objection that an ontology of 
properties is presupposed and the second point is open to the 
objection that one is not compelled to understand 'a has a necessary 
property' in the way suggested. However, the distinction between 
the formulas containing negation «15 and (16» is only open to the 
first kind of objection. And, as we shall attempt to argue it is 
distinctions amo~stnegations which hold the key to a representation 
of weak necessity. 
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6.8 The Language AQp. 
In this Section we introduce a language, AQp, an extension of Qp, 
containing A abstraction and predicate modifiers. The central 
feature of Wiggins' notation is that it treats a A formula as an 
ordered pair. And this allows one to distinguish clearly between 
predicate modifiers and (open) sentence operators. 
AQp is then to be an extension of Qp, the standard first order 
language introduced in Section 6.1. The vocabulary of AQp is that 
of Qp together with 
i) a denumerable set of (new) variables xl, •. x
n
' .. 
ii) the symbol A 
iii) a set ~ of predicate modifiers. 
The set xl .. x
n 
.. is for exclusive use within A constructs. 
We assume that A-formulas arise as the result of transformations on 
formulas. That is, we do not assume that a A-construct is separable 
syntactically from a A-formula. The rule for A-formulas is now given. 
A) Suppose ~ is a formula of AQp, that zl, ••• ,zn are all its free 
variables, that 0 is a (possibly empty) finite string of members 
of~, and that ul ..• u
n 
are singular terms (variables or individual 
constants) of Qp. Then 
xl xn 
(0 [(Ax l ) ..• (Axn ) [~ /zl··· /zn))' [u l '·· ,un) ) 
is a formula of \Qp. 
xl x 
The part 0[Ax 1 ) ••• (AXn ) [a /zl ... n/ zn)) of this formula will be 
called a A-construct, and in that part, as well as in the formula 
xl xn 
containing the part, [~ /z1 ... /zn) will be the scope of each of 
the variable binders (Ax.) l<i<n. 
l 
The definition of the formulas of AQp is obtained by adding A) to 
the formation rules given in Definition Qp3, 6.1. 
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We have followed Wiggins' restriction on A-constructs, that they can 
not contain free variables. Thus one cannot quantify into the scope 
of a A operator. So for example (y) ((Ax l ) (Ax2 ) [¢x l x2y]], [ul,u21) is 
not a formula. The restriction on individual constants disallows A 
abstraction upon a constant within the scope of a A operator. So, 
«(AX3)[([(Axl)(Ax2)[¢xlx2x3]1,[ulu2])],[a]) is not a formula. 
On the other hand, one can iterate A abstraction. 
formula is a AQp formula 
Thus the following 
1) ([(AX4 ) (AXS) [(y) ([(AX l ) (Ax2 ) (Ax3 ) [¢x l x2x3]], [x4x SY])]]' [ula]) 
A) allows us, for instance, to immediately transform a AQp formula 
¢vlab into the A-formulas 
2) ( [ (Ax 1 ) [ljJx 1 ab 1 ] , [v 1 ] ) 
3) ([ (AX l ) (AX2 ) [</>x l x2b]], [vla]) 
4) ([(Axl)(AX2)[ljJxlax21],[vlb]) 
5) ([ (Ax l ) (Ax2 ) O.x3 ) [</>x l x2x 3]], [vlabl) 
The interest, for us, in having such a rich syntax arises when we 
consider predicate modification. For one can introduce modifiers 
such that the semantics for the same modification of the four above 
formulas turns out to be different. (The * operator introduced in 
the next Section is an example of this. 
Thus, our aim in introducing A abstraction in the style of Wiggins 
is not to commit ourselves to an ontology of properties. (For 
instance, one might introduce A abstraction to capture syntactically 
a traditional semantic view that a sentence is true iff the subject 
(or rather arguments) 'participate in' the predicate). Instead, it 
is to be able to have a sufficiently rich language for distinguishing 
between predicate modifiers and sentence operators. 
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In the next Section we offer semantics for a AQp language. We 
assume that a formula which is transformed into a A formula without 
the addition of predicate modifiers has equivalent clauses to its 
transform. (Thus, formulas 2), 3), 4), 5) and ¢v
1
ab are always true 
under the same conditions.) We assume that a A-construct is a 
semantic ~nit in the same way that standard semantics assumes that 
atomic predicates are, viz. we give extension functions for both. 
However, in the A-construct case, the extension is determined from 
the satisfaction conditions of the reverse transform. 
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6.9 Semantics for the langu_age AQp and the * Operator 
Let us assume from now on that the set 6 of predicate modifiers 
consists of the five operators' , *,H, G,A. P,P,S will be abbrev-
iations for' H" .,G"'f, "'fA., respectively. The models for AQp are 
simply the Kripkean models <T,>,~,D,g,t > defined in Section 6.3. 
n 
Definition 1. 
The value of a singular term of AQp in a model U relative to a 
sequence s ( [(U), g*(u), is defined as before: 
s 
g*(u) 
s { 
9 (u) if u is a constant 
val(i,s) if u is the variable v .• 
~ 
To state the definition of truth for AQp it will be convenient to 
define by simultaneous recursion the truth values of formulas and the 
extensions of A-constructs. To assign extensions to these A-terms 
is, it should be kept in mind, only a matter of technical convenience 
and should not be construed as a slightly dishonest way of retro-
actively conferring upon these terms the independent status which we 
took pains to deny them in the formulation of the syntax. It is 
easy enough to eliminate the reference to extensions of A-constructs 
from the truth definition, but the definition thereby becomes a great 
deal more clumsy and less perspicuous. Where Utn is a model for AQp 
we shall denote the extension of the A-construct 
xl x 
y =0 [( AX l ) ••• (Axn ) [a /zl'" n/zn]] in Utn at t as hu (y) (t) . (We tn 
use this notation rather than that used so far to denote truth values, 
i.e. U t (y) (t), to convey that the extension function is an 
s n 
auxiliary to the truth value assignment, which applies to genuine 
syntactic units.) Where no danger of ambiguity exists we shall drop 
the subscript U , thus writing h(y) (t). tn (Note that since A-constructs 
do not contain free variables their extensions never depend upon 
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assignment sequences.) 
Definition 2. 
Let U be a model for AQp, s E t(U ), t,t E T , the truth value of tn tn n u 
a formula a of AQp in lItn at t relative to s, Us tn(a) (t), and the 
extension of a A-construct y of AQp in U
tn 
at t, h(y) (t), are defined 
by simultaneous recursion via the following clauses: 
i) U t (Q~ul" u ) (t) = 1 iff <g* (u l ) ... g* (u ) > E 9 (Q~) (t)f;[tiJ (t)] n sn~ n s sn ~ 
ii) Us tn ("'(X) (t) = 1 iff Us tn (a) (t) = 0 
iii) U t (al\B) (t) = 1 iff U (a) (t) = land U tn{B) (t) 
s n 5 tn' 5 1 
iv) U t ({ 3v . ) a) (t) = 1 iff 
s n ~ 
(3s' E 1:(0 » (s' ~ s 1\ val{i,s) E 1li(t) 1\ U • t (a) (t) = 1) tn 1 s n 
v) if a is of the form (y, [u 1 •• un ]) where y is a A-construct then 
U t (a) (t) :: 1 iff <g*(u 1) •• g*(u » E h(y) (t) s n s s n 
vi) 
Then h (y) (t) = {<e
1 
•• e
n
>: (3v ..•. v. )(3s' E 1:{U»{v ... v. do not 
J 1 I n J 1 I n 
occur in a for l~k~n, val(jk's') :: e k 
v. v. 
and Us' tn (a 'l/Zl··· I n/ zn ) (t) :: l} 
xl xn 
Suppose y is a A-construct of the form O[Ax1··Axn[a /Zl··· /zn]] vii) 
then h h y) (t) = Dn - hu (y) (t) 
Utn tn 
Similarly 
viii) h (*y) (t) [1li (t) ] n - h (y) (t) 
ix) h (Gy) (t) = {<e 1 ··en>: (t') (t'>t -> <e l' .en> E h{y) (t')} 
x) h (Hy) (t) {<e 1 · .en>: (t') (t'<t -> <e 1 •• e n> E h (y) (t' ) } 
xi) h (Ay) (t) {<e 1 ··en>: (t') «e1 .• e n> E h{y) (t')} 
xii) U ( Ga) (t) :: 1 iff (t') (t' > t - > U ( a) (t') = l) 
s tn s tn 
xiii) Us (Hai (t) :: 1 iff (t') (t' <t -> Us tn (a) (t') = l). 
The definition of truth is that of Definition 4 of Section 6.2 and 
validity is t validity as in Section 6.3. 
n 
h(,H,AB) (t), viz. h(PAB) (t), is as expected 
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n 
_ yn where n E n D e Y iff 
(t')(t>t' n E h(""f)..S) (t'» -> e 
n n 
e
n( Y iff = D - Y where 
(t') (t>t' n E (On _ h()"S)(t'») -> e 
and so 
enEh(-rH')"S)(t) iff (3t') (t>t' I\en £ (Dn-h(AS)(t'») 
iff (3t') (t>t' 1\ en E hUS) (t'». 
Although syntactically and semantically"H,G,A are predicate 
modifiers on the basis of criteria given in the last Section they 
nevertheless do perform very much like ~,G,H,A. For instance the 
A-sentence (,[(Ax1 ) [~xl]]' [a]) can only be true in the same circum-
stances as ~a. Thus, the distinction between, and - connects up 
with the earlier discussion of Aristotle's account of indefinite 
verbs in 1.4. For it was there conjectured that Aristotle may have 
held that a sentence like 'Socrates does not recover' may be analysed 
both as 'It is not the case that Socrates recovers' and as 'Socrates 
does not recover' where the verb is ' ... does not recover'. It is 
the latter analysis which is relevant to his notion of indefinite verb. 
A second point to note is that although A is a predicate modifier it 
does not when understood modally express weak necessity. This means 
then that the distinction between predicate modifier and sentence 
operator, in the case of necessity does not correspond simply to the de 
re/de dicto distinction. In connection with this latter point it 
is interesting to note that none of the modifiers ',H,G,A 
exclusively map atomic predicates into non-ampliating predicates 
(unlike *). (Consequently, our use of A abstraction is not 
intended to underly that view expressed in Section 6.7 that there are 
properties. For instance, ('[()..x 1) [~xl]]' [a]) can be true at a 
time even if a does not then exist.) 
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Because of clauses (v)' and (vi) of Definition 2, any A formula which 
does not contain predicate modifiers is equivalent to a A free formula. 
Suppose a is the A formula ([(Ax1) .. (Ax
n
) [{3x 1 ... xn]],[u l .. un ]) then (1) 
holds 
(1) aiff~u1 ... un 
And clearly (1) holds for a when it is a subformula of a formula also 
containing quantifiers and connectives. 
Some terminology is useful here. We call a formula which contains no 
predicate modifiers a normal formula, and if a formula containing 
predicate modifiers is equivalent to a normal formula we say that it 
is reduci~ie to normal form. NOW, the semantics for AQp are an 
extension of Kripke's, given in Section 6.3. For A-free formulas 
the semantics are identical. Moreover, the semantics for a A-normal 
formula are equivalent to those for A-free formulas, given (1) above. 
So, it is the addition of predicate modifiers which makes AQp more than 
a syntactic variant of a Kripkean language. 
However, A-formulas which do not contain * are reducible to normal 
form. Suppose a is of the form (OAB, [ul •.• u
n
]), where AB is a 
A-construct, and 0 is any set of predicate modifiers (including *) 
then the following hold 
(2 ) (.,OA8, [u 1 ·• .un ]) iff ""'a 
(3 ) (HOAB, [u l ·· .un ]) iff Ha 
(4 ) (GO AS, [u 1 •• un] iff Ga 
(5 ) (AOAB, [u l ·· .un ]) iff Aa. 
(See (vii), (ix), (x), (xi) and (ii), (xii), (xiii) of Definition 2 
and the definition of A. For instance, the proof of (2) is 
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Us tn (rvo) (t) 1 iff U tn (a) (t) = 0 s 
iff <g(u 1)···g(un » ~ h(OAS) (t) 
iff <g (u 1 ) ••• g (un) > E D
n 
- h(O AS> (t) 
iff <g(u 1)···g(un»E h (,0 AS> (t) 
iff U t (, 0 A S, [u 1 • . u 1) ) . 
s n n 
The interesting modifier then is *. 
then (6) holds, where 0 is any set of predicate modifiers, 
(6) h (* AS) (t) C [Ij! (t) ] n • 
If Ij! is an atomic predicate and 0 is empty then (7) holds 
This is a consequence of (8) and the APNA assumption (see Definition2 (i» 
(8) h (AS) (t) = g (~) (t) • 
Moreover in this case (9) holds 
(9) h(**AS) (t) = h(AS) (t) = g(~) (t). 
We also have that (10) and (11) hold for any predicate construct AS 
which is O[ (Ax 1). •• (Axn ) [~Xl •• x n ]], and variables v 1 •• .vn • 
(10) (v1 ) •.. (Vn )(*AS,[v1 ••• vn ) iff (v1)···(vn ),.... (AS,[v1 ... vn ) 
(11) (3 v1 )···(3vn ) (*AS,[v1 ···vn ) iff (3v1)···(]vn ),.... (AS, [v1 ··vn ) 
These hold because of the clauses for the restricted quantifiers. 
(Note that these are closed formulas where the term set [v1 ••• vn ) only 
contains variables and not individual constants as well.) 
We now argue that * is useful for representing weak necessity. From 
(10) and (11) we know that (12) and (13) hold 
(12) (z)(*[e,x)[~x)],[z) iff ,....(3z)([(Ax)[~x]],[z]) 
(13) (3z)(*[(Ax)[~x]1,[z) iff ""'(z) ([<Ax)[~x)],[z]). 
We show that (14) does not hold. 
(14) (z)A([CA.x)[~x]],[z) iff (z),..., S(*[<Ax)[~xl],[z]). 
That is, * does not perform with the tense operators (or modifiers) in 
the same sort of way that it does with the quantifiers in (12) and 
(13) . The way we show (14) to be invalid is to show that it does 
not hold for atomic ~. 
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Because of the APNA assumption (15) is valid for any monadic 
atomic predicate 0. 
(15) (3y)S ([ (Ax) [0x]], [y]) -> S (3y) ([ (Ax) (fax]], [y]) 
Furthermore because of the clause for * (16) holds 
(16) (:Jy)S (* [(Ax) [0x]] , [y]) -> A(3y) (* [(AX) [0x]] , [y]) 
(16) is equivalent to (17), as we have seen. 
(17) (:3y)S(*[(Ax) [0x]],[y]) -> S(3y) rOoJ ([(Ax) [(3x]],[y]). 
From (17) we deduce (19) as follows 
(18) ~ (Jy) '" ([ (Ax) [0x]] , [y]) -> ,...(3y) S (* [(AX) [0x]] , [y] ) 
by s.c. on 11. 
(19) A(Y)([(Ax)[0x]],[y]) -> (y)"-'S(*[(Ax) [0x]],[y]) 
by Definition of A and (y) 
which is reducible to the normal form, (20) if (14) is valid. 
(20) A(y) ([ (Ax) [{3x]], [y]) -> (y)A( [(Ax) [0x]], [y]). 
But (20) only holds if everything is omnitemporal. 
not valid. 
Thus (14) is 
What then are the truth conditions of (Y)"-'S(*[(Ax) [0x]], [y]) when 
understood as a modal formula? 
formula, namely (21), 
Let us take an instance of this 
(21) ~(*[(Ax) [x is a person]], [Socrates]) 
to bring out the semantic force of the iteration of modifiers. 
This formula is true iff it is not possible that 
(* [ (Ax) [x is a person]], [Socrates] ) • That is, in no possible world 
is (*[(Ax) [x is a person]], [Socrates]) true. But * [(Ax) [x is a person]] 
only holds of Socrates with respect to a possible iff Socrates exists 
there and is not a person there. Thus, (21) is true iff in no world 
in which Socrates exists is he not a person. That is (21) is a weak 
necessity claim. Or, alternatively, the .itEration,'S*, of predicate 
modifiers appears to express weak necessity. 
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Up to now we have not distinguished between weak necessity claims 
and essentialist claims. Accordingly to Wiggins' account an 
essentialist claim can only be true of an object which actually exists. 
Hence (22) 
(22) (,S* [(Ax) [x is a dog]] , [Cerberus]) 
is not a true essentialist claim, even though it might be claimed to 
be a true weak necessity claim. However, the complex predicate 
modifier *S* is adequate for representing essentialist claims. The 
simplest way of showing this is by noting that * formulas are 
reducible to normal form in a language AQp U {Ell where EI is the 
existence predicate. For (23) holds 
(23) (* [(Ax 1 ) •.•• (Axn ) [(ax 1 •• xn ]], [u1 ••• un ]) iff 
EIU1 1\ Elu21\ ••• I\ElUn 1\'" ([ (Ax1 ) ••• (Axn ) [(ax 1 •. xn )], [u 1 ·· .un ) 
Hence, (,S*[(Ax) [(ax]), [u]) is equivalent to (24), whereas 
(*S* [(Ax) [(ax]] , [u]) is equivalent to (25). 
(24) A(Elu -> ([(Ax) [(ax]],[u]» 
(25) Elu 1\ A(Elu -> ([ (Ax) [(ax]], [u]». 
These reduction theses are discussed in Section 7.1. (Clearly, in the 
case of AQp U {Ell the introduction of A abstraction merely adds to 
the syntactic richness of the languages without adding to the 
semantics) . However, we shall use the reduction thesis (23) to help 
unravel what a * formula means. 
In the case of weak omnitemporality 'Socrates was always a person' is 
representable by (26). 
(26) p (* S* [ ( Ax) [x is a person]] , [Socrates] ) 
Representing it by (27) is objectionable 
(27) ('p* [ (Ax) [x is a person]] , [Sorates] ) 
because it is reducible to (28) 
(28) H(E!Socrates -> ([(Ax) [x is a person]], [Socrates]» 
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~hich would mean that 'Socrates will always be a mouse' is true, 
because Socrates will not exist in the future. 
Wiggins uses the A abstraction notation to distinguish between 
purported asymmetric modal properties. He says 
"Kripke maintains that it is a de re necessity for Elizabeth II 
to be the child of George VI even if George VI did not need to 
beget Queen Elizabeth." 
(1976 A p.310). 
According to this claim we need to distinguish between (29) and 
(30) 
(29) 'x necessarily begat Elizabeth II' is true of George VI 
(30) 'George VI necessarily begat x' is true of Elizabeth II 
It is claimed that (29) is false because there are possible worlds 
in which George VI exists but where he did not begat Elizabeth II 
because no-one did, for she doesn't exist there. On the other 
hand it is claimed that (30) is true because in whatever world 
Elizabeth II exists, she was begat by George VI. And clearly one 
needs a sufficiently rich language to distinguish between these 
claims. Using * (29) and (30) are represented by (29') and (30'). 
(29') ("8* [(~) [x begat Elizabeth II]], [George VI]) 
(30' ) (* S* [ ( ~) [George VI begat x]], [Elizabeth II]) 
In reduced form these are (29") and (30"). 
(29") (E!George VIII. A(E!George VI -> ([ (~) [x begat Elizabeth II)), 
[George VI]») 
(30") (E!Elizabeth II II. A(E!Elizabeth II -> ([ (~) [George VI begat x)]. 
[Elizabeth II]») 
Buw what about (31)? 
(31) 'x necessarily begat y' is true of George VI and Elizabeth II 
respectively. 
This is open to more than one reading. It may be understood as 
saying that in all possible worlds in which both George VI and 
Elizabeth II exist then that predicate is true of them. Alternatively 
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it may say that both George VI and Elizabeth II exist in the same 
possible worlds and that that predicate is true of them there. 
However, Kripkean weak necessity seems to fit the former alternative 
when he says 
"We count statements as (weakly) necessary if whenever the 
objects mentioned therein exist the statement would be true." 
(1971 p.137). 
(And this prevents a disjunctive reading here of (31) along the 
lines that if George VI or Elizabeth II exists then that pred"cate 
applies to them). It is the former alternative which is captured 
in (31') 
(31 ' ) 
The use of A abstraction here, however, does prevent a generalization 
of the distinction between (21) and (30). For instance (32) is not 
representable using *. 
(32) (E ! Y /\ A (E ! Y /\ ~xy» 
The problem here is that one cannot have free variables within the 
scope of a A operator. (Alternative notations can be given which 
preclude this problem.) We comment upon this in Section 7.1 when 
we consider the relationship between the A system (given in the 
next Section) and the reduced version. 
Is essentialist necessity a predicate modifier? Well, clearly in 
one good sense it is. Relative to AQp *S* is such a modifier. 
But given the reducibility of * in a language with an existence 
predicate then it is no longer so clear. 
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In the last Section semantic clauses were given for the language 
AQA. And as noted these clauses are an extension of those given 
for Kripke systems (see 6.3). Because of this the system which 
satisfies these clauses when linear time is assumed, called AQK , 
L 
is an extension of CQKL introduced in Section 6.4. The extension 
involved depends upon there being * formulas which are not reducible 
to normal form. In the last Section we saw how * adds to the 
expressibility of Kripke systems when considering representation of 
certain claims. In this Section we further consider * formulas, 
and provide axioms for AQpKL• 
In Section 3.5 it was suggested that one could make the past and 
perfect tense semantically distinguishable by demanding that (1) 
hold for the perfect tense 
(1) a has ~en ~ a exists 
which does fit in with ordinary usage to a large extent. So if 
distinguished in this way and where ~ is monadic the difference 
between the simple past and the perfect is that between (2) and (3) 
(2) P([(Ax
1
) [(3x
1
]],[a]) 
(3) (*"P[ (Ax 1) [l1lx1]], [aJ) 
In reduced form, in the language AQp U {E!} (3) is equivalent to (3') 
(3 ' ) E! a 1\ P ( [ ( Ax 1 ( [(3x 1 ] ] , [a] ) 
For dealing with cases where a predicate is polyadic one needs to 
distinguish the subject place (relative to a context). For example, 
'Mary has loved John' is represented by (4). 
(4) (* P [(Ax 1) [Xl loves John]], [Mary]) 
In 6.7 it was said that our aim was to bring into one two valued 
system both the advantages of Prior's tensed Q and that of the 
Kripkean CQKL• NOW, so far we have noted that Kripke's system is 
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contained in AQKL . In the case of Q, however, valid forme'as 
need to be re-expressed because of Prior's demonstrative view of 
free variables. And as we shall note this may be done in terms of 
* formulas. First, using the language of AQp we note why there is 
a breakdown between operators and their s~ndard duals in System Q 
(see Section 6.5). 
In Prior's system Q the semantic force of 'P~y' may be seen as a 
result of a combination of two sources; first from that of the 
operator P and secondly from that of his demonstrative view of free 
variables. In terms of AQpKL, which assumes a non-demonstrative 
account of variables, 'P~y' (i.e. (P~this') is true in Q iff (5) is 
true in AQpK
L
• 
(5) (*,p*, [( Ax) [~x]] , [y]) 
In reduced form (5) is equivalent to (5'). 
(5 ' ) E ! Y 1\ P (E ! Y 1\ ([ ( Ax 1 ) [0x 1 ] ] , [y] ) ) . 
On the other hand '80y' is true in Q iff (6) holds in A~KL (and 
where (6') is the reduced form). 
(6) (*,H*'[ (AX 1 ) [!3x 1 ]] , [y]) 
(6') E!y 1\ B(E!y 1\ ([(Ax1)[0x1]],[y]» 
But (6) is not the dual of (5) in AQpKL · For the dual of the 
predicate modifier *,p*, is not *~H*' but~P*, thus giving us 
(7), and in reduced form (7'). 
(7) ~P*[(Axl)[0xl]]'[Y]) 
(7') ""(E!y 1\ P(E!y 1\"" ([(AX1)[0x1]],[y]») 
We turn our attention to axiomatizing AQK . 
L 
Besides the usual 
tense axioms for Hand G we need axioms for the predicate modifiers. 
For these, except *, we use the reduction thees mentioned in the 
last section. Suppose ACt .; s a A-construct of the form 
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(8) to (10) hold. 
(8 ) 
(9) 
(10 ) 
""('-X,[u 1 .• u]) iff ('"JA~[u .• u]) n 1 n 
G (Ao, [u 1 •• un]) iff (GAo, [u 1 •• un] ) 
H(AO,[u 1 ··un ]) iff (HAo,[u 1 .• un ]) 
We also need an axiom to connect A-formulas and non-A formulas. 
(11) is this axiom 
(11) (1.0, [u 1 .. un ]) iff 0u1 .• un provided 0 is empty. 
This leaves us with providing axioms for * and the quantifiers. 
We use the following three as axioms for * 
(12) (*1.0, [u 1 .• un ]) -> ('1.0, [u1 •• un ]) 
(13) (** ).t;l[u1 • .un ]) iff (*').0, [u1 • .un ]) 
(14) (*).0, [u 1 .• un ]) -> (***1.0, [u1 • .un]). 
These are valid according to the semantics given in the last Section. 
(12) is so because h(*).a) (t) c h('Aa) (t), for the former is 
n n [~(t)] - h().a) (t) and the latter 0 - h().a) (t). We now show that 
(13) holds. 
h(**).a) (t) = [~(t)]n - ([~(t)]n - h().a) (t» 
n n 
= [~(t)] - (0 - h().a) (t» 
h(*").a) (t). 
And (14) is shown 
h t*Aa) (t) = [~( t) ] n - h ( Aa) (t) 
= [~(t)]n_ ([~(t)]nnh(Aa)(t» 
[~(t)]n _ ([~(t)]n _ ([~(t)]n - h(Aa) (t») 
= h(***Ao) (t). 
(We have also proved the converse of (14) here which is derivable 
from (13) and (12». 
In the last Section we noted a converse connection between * and , 
than that given in (12) but within a quantified formula. (See 
(10) and (11) of Section 6.9.) Thus, we also have (15). 
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(15 ) (Y1)···(Y )«,Aa,[y 1··y]) -) (*Aa,[y .. y ]» n n 1 n 
Here, we may note that (15) is a closed formula. 
What then of quantifier axioms? Our aim is to have an open system. 
But, the usual quantifi~r axiom with the usual restriction, 
would mean that * and, are equivalent. (From (15) one could 
derive the converse of (12». Anyway, (16) is objectionable because 
the quantifier is restricted. However, what is valid is (17). 
(17) 
In reduced notation (17) is (17') 
(17' ) Z 
-> (E!Z -> ([()\xl)[~xl]]'[ /y]» 
which is, in this monadic case, the free logic axiom for quantif-
ication theory. 
We now give axioms for AQK followed by some comments. 
L 
Soundness 
and completeness proofs are given in the appendix. We assume that 
B, 6 are any AQ formulas and that Aa is a construct of the form 
Xl x 
O[(AX1) ... (AXn ) [Y /zl'" n/ zn ]] where y is any AQp formula. 
AQKL l) Any S.C. instance. 
AQKL 2) G(8 .> 6) -> (F8 -> F6) 
AQKL 3) H (8 ->6) -> (PS ->p6) 
AQ~ 4) G8 -> GGS 
AQKL 5) HS -) HHS 
AQKL 6) PGS -> S 
AQ~ 7) FHS -> 8 
AQKL 8) FB A F6 -> F(B " 6) V F(B " F6) v F(FB " 6) 
AQKL 9) PS " p6 -> PCB " 6) v PCB " P6) v pcpS " 6) 
AQKL10) -(Aa, [u l · .un ]) iff hAa, [u1 .. un] ) 
AQ~l1) G(Aa, [u1 · .un ]) iff <GAa, [u l .. un] ) 
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AQKL 12 ) H(Aa, [u l · .un}) iff (HAa, [u l · .un ]) 
AQKL 13) (ACY.,[ul··un }) iff 
u l un 
y /Zl·· /zn provided that 0 is empty 
AQKL 14) (*ACY., [u l · .un }) -> ('Aa, [u l · .un }) 
AQKL 15) (**ACY., [u l · .un}) iff (*'ACY., [u l · .un }) 
AQKL 16) (*Aa, [u l · .un ]) -> (***Aa, [u l · .un ]) 
AQKL 17) (Y l )··· (Yn ) «'Aa, [Y 1· .Ynl) -> (*ACl, [y l' ·yn }» 
AQKL 18} (y) (8 -> ~) -> ( (y) 8 -> (y)~) 
AQKL 19) (y) (Aa, [y,u2 · .un ]) -> ('*Aa, [z/y,u2 · .un ]) 
The rules are RG,RH, Gen and MP. 
Axioms 2) to 9) enSUE a system for dense linear time. 10) to 
13) are the reduction axioms. 14) to 17) are * axioms and the rest 
are quantifier axioms. 17) is, perhaps, more 'open' than expected. 
This is because (,*)n,n>l is equivalent to'* (and (*,)n is equivalent 
to *'). This is shown. 
Therefore, an instance of (18) is (19). 
For the converse we have (20) 
(20) (*Aa, [u
1 
• • u
n
]) -> (*"*ACl, [u 1 • • un ]) from Ax. 16 + 15. 
Therefore 
Our aim was to bring together the advantages of both Kripke's and 
Prior's systems. We noted in Section 6.5 that within Prior's 
system Q the following tensed mixing formulas (and their minor 
images) are valid. 
(22) G(y)~y -> (y)~~y 
(23) (3y)F~y -> F(3y)~y 
(24) F(y)~y -> (y)~y 
(25) (3y) ~y -> G (3y) ~y 
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In Kripke's systelli there are no valid mixing formulas ~nalogous 
to (22 ) to ( 25) . However, in AQK there are such formulas even 
L 
though the system is two valued, 
(26) G (y) ([ (Ax) [Ii'x]] , [y]) -> (y) G(' * [(Ax) [(3x]] , [y]) 
(27) (3 y )F(*'[ (Ax) [0x]], [y]) -> F(3y ) ([ (Ax) [Ii'x]], [y]) 
(28) F (y) ([ (Ax) [0x]] , [y]) -> (y)""'G (* [(Ax) [Ii'x]] , [y] ) 
(29) (3 y )G(*'[ (Ax) [0x]], [y]) -> G(3y ) ([ (Ax) [0x]], [y]) 
together with their mirror images. These have the same semantic 
force as Prior's (22) to (25). (27) and (26) are versions of the 
tensed converse Barcan For-"iulas where (29) and (28) are versions of 
the Buridan formulas. To finish off this Section we prove (26) and 
(28). «27) and (29) are straightforwardly derivable from the other 
two. ) 
i) Z (y) ([ (Ax) [0x]], [y]) -> (,* [(Ax) [~x]], [ /y]) Ax. 17 
H) G (y) ( [ (Ax) [0x] ] • [y]) -> G (-r * [ (Ax) [0x] ] , [z/y] ) Rule RG and Ax. 2 
Hi) G(y) ([ (Ax) [~x]), [y) -> (z)G('''*[ (Ax) [~x)], [z) Gen + q-theory 
Z 
i) (y) ([(Ax) [0x)], [y]) -> ..... (*[(Ax) [0x]), [/y]) Ax. 17 + 10 
H) F (y) ([ (Ax) [0x]] , [y]) -> F ..... (* [(Ax) [0x]] , [Zjy]) RG and Ax. 2 
Hi) F(y) ([ (Ax) [Iilx]], [y]) -> (z).-..<;(* [(Ax) [~x)), [z]) Gen + q-theory and 
defn. of G. 
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CHAPTER 7 EXISTENCE AND TENSE. 
7.1 The Reducibility Theses. 
The system ~QKL of Section 6.10 depended upon making the syntax of 
Kripkean languages more complex. If we also add to the language 
~Qp the tensed existence predicate, E!x, then a * reducibility 
formula is available. 
(1) (*[(~1) .. (~n)[0x1 ... xn]],[u1 .. un]) iff 
E!U 1 A ... AElUn AIV( [(~1)··· (~xn) [0x 1 · .xn ]], [u i · .un ]) 
Here we assume that the semantics for Ely is given by (2). 
(2) g(EJ) (t) = [1jJ(t)] 
(Here, we are treating E! as an atomic predicate.) 
Given the exists predicate, ~ abstraction becomes unnecessary. 
For we can reduce all ~-formulas containing predicate modifiers 
to ones which do not, and thus re-express these formulas without 
the use of ~ abstraction. In fully reduced form the quantifier 
axiom of ~QKL becomes (3). 
( 3 ) (y) 0y - > (E I z - > 0 z / y) 
This is the 'free logic' axioms for quantification theory. The 
resulting Kripkean semantics for linear time, without ~ abstraction, 
and with the existence predicate clause, is satisfied by a system 
Its axiomatization is simply that for standard quanti-
ficational tense logic, assuming time's linearity, except instead 
of the standard quantifioation axiom (x)0x -> 0 z /y, one has (3). 
AQK and FQK are not equivalent because there are formulas in L L 
For instance, (4) is a FQKL which cannot be expressed in AQKL . 
theorem of FQ~ which has no AQKL counterpart. 
(4) (E!X A F(EI A 0xy» V ~(Elx A F(E!x A 0xy». 
The problem here is that the notation we have used for A abstraction 
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does not allow free variables to occur within a A-construct. Hence 
the formula (4') which would be equivalent to (4) without this 
restriction is not well-formed. 
However, if a formula in AQKL then there is a related formula which 
is a theorem of FQK
L
. This followsstraightforwardly from the 
reduction theses of AQKL together with the * reduction thesis and 
the fact that the reduced quantification axiom of AQKL is (3). 
(See theorem below for an explicit method to show how this could be 
proved. ) 
As we noted in Section 6.4 the introduction of the free-logic axiom 
(3) is Thomason's solution to the problem of the invalidity of the 
mixing formulas. For now the valid modal versions of the ).QKL 
'mixing' formulas of Section 6.10 become in FQKL , (5) to (8). 
(5) A(x)a -> (x)A(Elx -> a) 
(6) (Jx)S( Elx A a) -> S(3x)a 
(7) S(x)a -> (x)F(E!x -> a) 
(7) (3x)A(E!x A a) -> A(3x)a. 
And (5) is provable in FQK as follows. L 
(i) (x) a -> (Ely -> aY/x) 
(ii) A«x)a-> (Ely -> aY Ix) ) 
(iii) A(x)a -> A(E!y -> aY/x) 
(iv) A(x)a -> (x)A(E!a -1> a). 
This shows, then, the Kripkean quantifiers are best embedded within 
what appears to be a free logic. Moreover, this also shows that 
weak necessity is expressible using open sentence operators together 
with the existence predicate. But why have tensed quantifiers 
together with a tensed existence predicate? For after all the 
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tensed existential quantifier represents tensed exi~L~nce as well as 
the tensed existence predicate. Where (VX) (-x-) and (Ex) (-x-) are 
the Kripkean quantifiers and (x) (-x~) and (3x) (-x-) the standard 
tense less quantifiers then both (9) and (10) hold. 
(9) (Vx) (-x-) iff (x) (E!x-> -x-) 
(10) (Ex) (-x-) iff (3x) (E!x -x-). 
So why not introduce Kripkean interpretations which contain clause 
(2) above yet which do not contain the Kripke quantifier clause but 
instead the standard clause as given in Section 6.2? That is, 
system FQKL is reducible to the system QKL (see 6.1) expressed in 
a language containing the tensed existence predicate. So, provided 
the introduction of the free logic axiom is motivated only by tense 
considerations and not singular term considerations then standard 
quantification theory together with an existence pre~Lcate is 
adequate. For instance (5') to (8') which are equivalent to (5) to 
(8) are valid QKL formulas. 
( 5 ' ) A (x) (E! x - > a) - > (x) (E! x - > A (E ! x - > ti» 
(6 ' ) (3x) (E! x 1\ 5 (E ! x 1\ 0» - > S (3x) (E! x 1\ a) 
(7') S(x)(E!x ->a) -> (x)(E!x ->S(E!x ->0» 
(8') (:3x) (E!x 1\ A(E!x 1\ a») -> A(3x) (E!x 1\ a). 
And (5') is provable as follows. 
(i) (x)(E!x -> a) -> (E!y -> oy/x) 
(ii) A( (x) (E!x -> 0) -> (E !y -> oy Ix) ) 
(iii) A(x)(E!x -> 0) -> A(E!y -> aY/x) 
(iv) A(x) (E!x -> 0) -> (E!y -> A(E!y -> aY/x) ) 
(v) A(x) (E!X -> 0) -> (x) (E!x -> A(E!x -> a». 
By S.C. 
Consequently, there are two reducibility theses connected with AQKL. 
First, the * reducibility thesis (1) where AQKL is reduced to FQKL 
which takes a free logic form because it involves tensed quantifiers. 
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The second reducibility thesis is given by (9) or (10) and this is 
the reducibility of FQKL to QKL which employs the standard 
quantifiers but expressed in a language involving the tensed 
existence predicate. 
Consequently, the following theorem holds where E! is the tensed 
existence predicate. 
Theorem 
If ~QKLa then ~KLU{E!}a' 
where a' is a transform of a in QKL. 
First, we specify inductively the transformation of a to at 0 
i) If a is of the form (y) S then a' is (y) (E!y -> S') 
ii) If a is of the form ~8 then a' is ~B' 
iii) If a is of the form (8 v 8) then a' is (8' v 8') 
iv) If a is of the form G then a' is G ' 
v) If a is of the form He then a' is H8' 
vi) If a is a A-formula of the form (GAa, [u l oun ]) then 
a' is G(Aa, [ulo oU
n
])' 0 
vii) If a is a A-formula of the form (HAa, [ulooun]) then 
a' is H(Aa,[uloou
n
])' 
viii) If a is a A-formula of the form (~Aa, [uloou
n
]) then 
a' is ("'(Aa, [Ulo oU
n
]»' 
ix) If a is a A-formula of the form (*Aa, [u l ooun ]) then 
a' is E!UI,.,.o 0 o""E!Un""(~(Aa, [ulo oU
n
]»' 
x) If a is a A-formula of the form ([ (Ax I ) 00 (AXn ) [0xlo oXn )), [ulo oun ) 
xi) If a is an atomic formula ~uI oou
n 
then at is 0u1.ouno 
It is sufficient to show that all the transforms of the axioms of 
AQKL are theorems of QKL U {E!} and that the restricted Gen in AQKL 
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holds in QKL U {E!}. First we show that the transforms of AQKL 
are theorems. Clearly, this has only to be done for AQK 14) to 
L 
19), excluding AQK 18). 
L 
(See 6.10) 
We have to show the following 
~ «*Ao., [ul .. u ]) -) (,Ao., [u 1 .. u ]»' KL n n 
~L «**Ao., [u l · .un ]) iff (*~ACl, [u l · .un ]»' 
I-. «*Ao., [u 1 ··u ]) -) (**~a, [ul •• u ]»' ~ n n 
t-KL «Yl)·· (Yn) « Ao., [u l · .un ]) -) (*Ao., [Y1· .Yn]»)' 
A) 
B) 
C) 
D) 
J-K «y) (ACl, [y,u2 •• un ]) -) ("*ACl, [z/y,u2 •• un))' L E) 
Suppose throughout (Ao., [u 1 •• un)' is 8 and (EIU1A .• AEIUn ) is 6 
A) Using ii), iii), viii) and ix) this reduces to the theorem 
I- 6 A"'8 - ) "'8 
KL 
B) Similarly this reduces to the theorem 
f-K 6 A (6 -) 8) iff (~A 8) 
L 
C) This becomes 
r- (6 A'" 8) -) (6 A (6 -) (6 A'" 13») 
KL 
D) This becomes 
I- (u1) •• (u ) (~-) ("'8 -) (6 A'" 13») KL n 
E) This again is a theorem 
f-K (Y) (E!y 
L 
-) 8Y lu l ) 
Since AQKL has the rule 
if GQK 0. then GQK 
L L 
Z 
-) (~ IU 1 
(v. ) Cl 
l. 
z 
-) 8 lu 1 ). 
we must show that for each AQKL-forrnula 0. 
if ~ 0.' then fK ( (vi) 0.) , 
L L 
That is, 
if ~ 0.' then ~ (v.) (Elv. -) 0.') 
L L l. l. 
But this clearly holds because 
~K 0.. -) (Elx -) 0.'). 
L 
Hence the theorem is proved. 
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But what about the modal case? Certainly, the * reducibility 
thesis is acceptable but the problem is the other reducibility thesis. 
For this depends upon allo\,ing quantifiers to range over all possible 
objects. (Scott 1970 p.145 says that he has been persuaded by the 
UCLA school that quantification over possible objects is acceptable. 
His acceptance here is based upon formal similarities between modal 
and tense logics; beca~ he believes that quantification over past 
and future objects as well as present is required in tense logics 
this is taken to show that in modal logic one has to quantify over all 
possible objects - that is, objects in all possible worlds. We 
believe that this is not a good argument for quantification over 
possible objects for reasons which are rather complex and not 
considered in this essay). 
In the tense case then the reducibility theses depend upon the 
acceptability of a tensed existence predicate in first order 
languages. And the rest of this chapter is concerned with arguing 
for this acceptability together with a discussion of existence in 
general. Furthermore, we try to argue for a particular inter-
pretation of standard quantification theory. 
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7.2 The Inclusive Ambiguity Thesis. 
The difficulties of taking 'exists' to be a first order 
predicate true of everything appear to be insurmountable. 
First, there is that paradox of reference; if 'a' is a 
semantic constituent of 'a exists' then surely it should 
also be a constituent of 'a does not exist'. But, how 
could this sentence ever be false (given the standard 
semantics for singular terms). Secondly, if 'exists' is 
a first order predicate like' ... is red' then it should 
express a property but what a seemingly odd uninformative 
property it would be. Furthermore, 'a does not exist' 
should then express that something lacks a property but 
what sort of thing may lack this property? These difficulties 
have been taken to show that 'exists' is not a first order 
predicate. Consequently, in the sentence 'a exists' the 
grammatical predicate is not the logical predicate and 
because subject and predicate are correlative 'a' is not 
the logical subject. (Geach 1969A p.54). Instead 'exists' 
is taken to be a second order predicate represented by the 
existential quantifier, '(3x)(-x-)' - see 5.2. 
Additional to this it may be asked whether this is true of 
all uses of 'exists' (see Geach ibid). Suppose, for example, 
there are good arguments for claiming that there are at 
least two senses of 'exists' one more inclusive than another 
then it appears to be legitimate to predicate non-existence 
of things in the more exclusive sense provided it is pre-
supposed that they exist in the less select sense. Now, 
let us say that an expression is 'inclusively ambiguous' 
if in one sense it is true of some of the things it is true 
of in another (closely connected) sense. For instance, 
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the predicate' ... is a man' is ambiguous in this way; 
in one sense, it is true of any member of the human race 
and in another just of the adult male population. Now, 
is 'exists' inclusively ambiguous? Belief that it is so 
was quite popular at the turn of the century where it was 
defended by both Russell and Moore during their early 
Realist days. Russell sums it up 
"Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term to 
every possible object of thought... Existence, on the 
other hand is the prerogative of some only amongst 
beings." (1903 p.449). 
(This view must be distinguished from Russell's later one 
mentioned in 4.2). Interestingly, neither Meinong nor 
the Scottish logician Maceoll held that 'exists' or 'being' 
is inclusively ambiguous - although it is difficult to see 
how else their position can be understood. This is the 
source of the view that Russell misunderstood both these 
philosophers since his criticisms of them after 1904 appear 
to be directed against inclusive ambiguity theorists. 
(see 7.4). 
What is central to the truth of this ambiguity in the case 
of 'exists' is the truth of the sentence 'Something does 
not exist' taken at face value. Recently, this has been 
accepted by a number of logicians on the basis of modal 
considerations - see comments on Scott in the previous Section. 
Rescher, for example, takes (1) (1959 p. 161) 
(1) Something is possible which does not exist. 
to be representable by (1') 
(1') (~x)(SE!x A ~E!x) 
which has (2) as immediate consequence 
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(2) (3x)(~E!x) 
thu~ contradicting (3) 'everything exists' 
(3) (x)(E!x). 
Rescher claims that his position is based upon that of 
MacColl's but that does depend upon the reading of the 
quantifiers in (2) and (3) - see comments in Section 7.4. 
Although Rescher uses 'E!x' to represent his more select 
sense of 'exists' he does leave open the question of whether 
or not it is a primitive. The main point is though that 
the inclusive ambiguity thesis could be used to show that 
certain uses of 'exists' may be construed to be first-order 
because they do not suffer from the problems posed at the 
beginning of this Section. Geach appears to argue for 
this using a different version of the ambiguity thesis 
(1969A). He claims that 'exists' is three ways ambiguous; 
one sense concerns its use in general sentences whereas 
the other two concern its use in (apparent) singular 
sentences. It is these latter two which satisfy the in-
clusive ambiguity thesis. In examples like (4) and (5) 
(4) Prior exists but Sherlock Holmes does not. 
(5) Geach exists but Prior no longer does. 
Geach claims that 'exists' is first order in (5) unlike 
(4) because of the paradox of reference .. 
Geach's basis for the ambiguity is Wittgenstein's remark 
that although the bearer of a name may pass away the name 
retains its reference. (That is, the semantic relation 
'refers' is here claimed by Wittgenstein to be ampliating, 
a position we may compare to Prior's - see 6.6). Because 
of this Geach takes those uses of 'exists' in (4) to be 
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tenseless whereas thosein (5) he says are tensed. 
Consequently, what appears to be his variant of the ambiguity 
thesis consists in there being a tenseless sense of 'exists' 
which is more incJusive than a tensed sense. Although 
'exists' is first order in (5), in (4) one has to give a 
metalinguistic account of its use. For the name 'Prior' 
is a perfectly good name in that it has a reference where-
as 'Sherlock Holmes' is only a seemingly good name because 
we only make believe its reference. 
Geach's third sense of 'exists' is its use in general 
statements like 'Tigers exist' which he takes to be under-
stood as 'There [are] tigers'; it is this use which he 
takes to be the fundamental tenseless sense and representable 
by the quantifier (1969B p.65). Consequently, it is this 
use which sh0uld connect up systematically with individual 
tenseless existence claims. 
It seems then that Geach's position is that argued for in 
the last Section via the second reducibility thesis, namely 
that tensed quantifier formulas are equivalent to tenseless 
quantifier and tensed existence predicate formulas. (And 
Rescher's position appears to be that via the second 
reducibility thesis in the case of modal logics). However, 
we want to claim that the inclusive ambiguity thesis is 
false even though the reducibility thesis is acceptable. 
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7.3 'Exists' as a First-Order Predicate. 
That 'exists' in a restricted sense is, at least, 
compatible with its being first-order places doubt on 
the conclusion that in its most inclusive sense it can 
not be first-order. For otherwise, the inclusive ambiguity 
is no longer what it seems. In Fregean terms, it appears 
to be an instance of a concept subordinate to another but 
if Geach is correct the ambiguity is that of a concept 
falling under a higher order concept. And this certainly 
seems odd if we compare the ambiguity of ' ... is a man'. 
Moreover, Geach's claim that tenseless 'exists' is second 
order whereas tensed 'exists' is first-order leaves us 
initially somewhat at a loss of how to account for the 
tensed and detensed quantifiers - however, see next Section. 
What this suggests is that those paradoxical difficulties 
which initiated 7.2 occur not so much as a consequence of 
the assumption that 'exists' is first-order but instead 
depend upon the presumption of its universal applicability. 
Moreover two theorists may appear to agree upon a sense of 
'exists' yet treat it differently according to which variant, 
if any, of the inclusive ambiguity thesis they hold. For 
instance, it is open for Rescher to treat his less inclusive 
sense of 'exists' as first-order even though this sense 
appears to be Geach's more inclusive sense. 
determining factor is the range of 'exists'. 
And here the 
Moreover, the strategy used to reject the view that 'exists' 
is first order has recently been attacked by Woods (1976 
p.249). If 'exists' (in some sense) were really a second 
order predicate then it is not clear that one should be 
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able to draw consequences from supposing it to be first 
order. For if we attempt to do the same for the predicates 
' ... is rare' or ' ... is numerous' a blank is drawn because 
it is difficult, if not impossible to make literal sense of 
'Socrates is rare' or 'Socrates is numerous'. Furthermore, 
Woods points out that if 'exists' is taken as a first-order 
predicate true of everything then, at least, the truth 
conditions of general existentials turn out correct. For 
example, 'Some tigers exist' is true iff something exists 
and is a tiger. And, of course, if everything exists only 
then does the occurrence of 'exists' in this truth condition 
become redundant. 
But, how does all this fit in with the Russellian claim that 
'(3x)(-x-)' is a second order predicate representing existence? 
One suggestion here is that it is not because '(3x)(-x-)' 
is second order that it represent existence but instead 
because of its peculiar property of binding free variables. 
And given Quine's dictum this binding must connect system-
atically the quantifier with individual existence. This 
latter connection is perspicuously brought out by that 
representation of individual existence in firt-order theories 
using quantifier and identity. And it is on this pOint 
that Geach's account of individual tenseless existence 
(see previous Section) comes into difficulty. For it is 
this sense which is to connect up with the tenseless quantifier 
But it can not quite do this unless everything has a name. 
This problem then, is due to Geach's metalinguistic analysis. 
If it is accepted that '[exists]' is a first order predicate 
there is still that question of whether or not it expresses 
a property. The disquiet felt on this pOint is brought out 
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by the ninth century Arab logician Al Farabi. He asks 
whether or not 'exists' in 'Man exists' is a predicate. 
"This is a problem on which both the ancients and moderns 
disagree; some say that this sentence has no predicate and 
some say that it has ••• To my mind both of these judgements 
are in a way correct, each in its own way... This is so 
because when a natural scientist who investigates perishable 
things considers this sentence .•• it has no predicate, for 
the existence of a thing is nothing other than the thing itself, 
and for the scientist a predicate must furnish information 
about what exists and what is excluded from being. Regarded 
from this point of view, this proposition does not have a 
predicate. But when a logician investigates this proposition 
he will treat it as composed of two expressions .•• [which] is 
liable to truth and falsehood. And so it does have a predicate 
from this point of view." (Quoted from Rescher (1968) p.71-2). 
There is much in common here with Kant's discussion of 
existence in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' as Rescher 
points out (ibid). Kant is traditionally associated with 
the view the 'exists' is not a predicate but his position 
is somewhat puzzling. On the one hand he claims that 
existential judgements are synthetic (B626) where a synthetic 
judgment is one whose predicareadds to the concept of the 
subject (B11). On the other hand, he claims that 'exists' 
is not a real predicate (B626) where a real predicate is 
one which determines a thing (B626). His claim that 'exists' 
is not a real predicate is based upon a similar point made 
by Al Farabi, that the existence of a thing is nothing other 
than the thing itself. 
"By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a 
thing ... nothing is really added to it, if I add that the 
thing exists. Otherwise, it would not be the same that 
exists but something more than was contained in the concept 
and I could not say that the exact object of my concept 
existed." (Critique of Pure Reason B628). 
Campbell argues that Kant is not inconsistent here 
(1974 and 1976 p.55ff). He claims that when Kant denies 
that 'exists' is a real predicate he is denying that it is 
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a determining predicate in much the same way that Al 
Farabi denies that it is a predicate for the scientist. 
A determining predicate is one like , is red' which, 
according to Kant, not only adds to the concept of the 
subject but also 'enlarges' it. (B626). Consequently, 
order to claim that there is compatibility between the 
point that existential judgments are synthetic and that 
'exists' is not a real (that is, determining) predicate 
sense must be made of the view that 'exists' adds to the 
concept of the subject without enlarging it. Campbell 
claims that sense can be made here for he argues that 
for Kant 'exists' is really relational. 
"Through its existence [the object] is thought as belonging 
to the context of experience as a whole. In being thus 
connected with the content of experience as a whole, the 
concept of the object is not, however, in the least enlarged." 
(B628-9). 
We shall suggest below a way in which this generality of 
in 
the connection between existence and experience as a whole 
may be more formally brought out, a way in which 'exists' 
can be thought to express a property. 
One interesting and important point about standard first 
order theory is its apparent compatibility with either the 
view that 'exists' is or is not first order. This under-
determination may be taken as a virtue of first order theory 
but it also lends itself to certain confusions. For 
example, it means that philosophical questions about existence 
can not be simply answered by appeal to such a theory which 
shows why Thomson's claim that philosphers who argue that 
'exists' is not a predicate just mean that 'exists' is not 
a predicate of first order logic can not be correct 
(1967 p.l04). 
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What happens then if we consider 'exists' against the 
backcloth of a second order theory? From Campbell's dis-
cussion of Kant it is natural to conclude that objects 
exist in virtue of their possession of determining properties. 
And it is this relation to other properties, we believe, 
that undo :lies the oddity of saying that 'exists' expresses 
a property. More formally expressed this may be taken 
to show that 'exists' is impredicative,a view argued for by 
Cocchiarella (1968 and 1969). A member of a set is 
impredicative if in its analysis appeal must be made to 
other members of that set. This comes out in a second-
order theory in the case of 'exists' (and possibly' is 
identical to ... ') because in its analysis quantification 
over other predicates is required as in (1). 
(1) E!x iff (3¢)¢X. 
where ¢ is a determining predicate. 
view - see 6.5). 
(This is Prior's 
The inclusive ambiguity thesis is naturally represented in 
terms of differing restrictions on quantifiers over 
predicates. For instance, if Geach's tenseless existence 
locates an object with respect to experience as a whole 
then tensed existence locates it in a more specific fashion 
by specifying, to some extent, when also. Given this, we 
can get a set of senses of 'exists' as follows. First 
Rescher's most inclusive sense which we represent as SE!x 
becomes (2) 
(2) SE!x iff (3¢)¢x 
where ¢ is any predicate barring contradictory ones. 
Geach's tenseless existence is given by (3) 
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(3) E!x iff (3¢)¢x 
where '¢' is any extensional predicate and tensed 
exisT )nce is also given by (3) but where '¢' is any non-
ampliating predicate. (We may compare here senses of 
'exists' with the suggestion in 2.5 concerning a basic notion 
of supposition). 
Seen in this light it seems strange that anyone would 
claim that existence in (3), when tenseless, is second 
order whereas when tensed is first order. Note, that we 
have not talked about definitions of 'exists' in second 
order theory here. One reason for this is that tensed 
existence is given in terms of non-ampliating predicates 
but it is unclear whether or not the notion of non-ampliating 
predicate can be given in terms independent of tensed 
existence which means that there is a mutual dependency 
here between the existence predicate and non-ampliating 
predicates. 
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7.4 Quantifiers and Existence. 
In 7.2 it was noted that Geach only offers three senses 
of 'exists'. However, it is initially somewhat strange 
that anyone should offer a contrast between tensed and 
tenseless individual existence claims while at the same 
time only offer a tenseless general sense since it may be 
claimed that the same inclusive ambiguity occurs at the 
general as well as the individual level, as instanced by 
the contrast between (1) and (2). 
(1) Elephants exist but mermaids do not. 
(2) Elephants exist but dinosaurs do not. 
So why does Geach not offer a fourth sense to take account 
of? 
Perhaps, the simplest way of representing (2) is by the 
use of tensed quantifiers discussed in the last chapter. 
But, on Geach's account this would be tantamount to actually 
accepting a fourth sense of 'exists'. However, by the 
second reducibility thesis of 7.1 (2) is representable 
simply as (2') where the quantifier is the standard quantifier 
(2') (;x)(E!xAx is an elephant)A ~(3x)(E!xAx is a dinosaur) 
That is, general tensed existence is representable using 
the tensed existence predicate and the standard quantifier 
(see 5.5). 
This bring out an interesting point. A theoretical 
constraint on quantification theory according to Frege 
(Russell and Quine) is that the only quantifiers one should 
appeal to are the unrestricted ones. 
restricted quantifier like (3) 
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Consequently, a 
(3) (:Ix: x is a person)(-x-) 
should be seen in terms of the unrestricted quantifier 
followed by a qualifying predicate as in (4) 
(4) (lX)(X is a personA -x-). 
According to this constraint, then, a tensed existential 
quantifier (5) 
(5) (3x)(-x-) 
which is tantamount to (6) where '(!x)(-x-)' is unrestricted 
(6) (3x: x now exists)(-x-) 
becomes (7) 
(7) (3x)(E!XA-X-) 
This is surprising, for although first-order theory under-
determines what sort of predicate 'exists' is in its 
universal sense this is not so in the case of its restricted 
sense given this constraint. It appears, then, that the 
tensed existence predicate somehow or other 'disappears' 
into the tensed existential quantifier (5) and which is 
explicitly brought out by (7). But couldn't this also 
be the case with the standard tenseless quantifier? 
Kennick writes 
"If a man has disappeared into the woods then (assuming 
he has not come out again) he must still be there. 
[Likewise] one may suspect that the predicate existence 
is still there [in the quantifier] too." 
(1970 p.l72). 
If this is correct then the standard existential quantifier 
performs two closely related roles, first that of being a 
quantifier - that is, representing the syncategorematic 
'some ... ' which belongs to the same class as 'each ... ' 
'all ... ' 'seven ... ' etc"' J - and secondly, that of intro-
ducing existence. Can these two roles be distinguished? 
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By distinguishing these two roles then we have the basis 
for the alleged misunderstanding by Russell of both Meinong 
and MacColl. For it seems that a fair representation of 
their views must make use of the quantifier without its 
existentirl implications. For Meinong held that there 
are objects which neither exist as Socrates does nor subsist 
like 7 does. Findlay writes 
"That an object can have definite properties, a definite 
nature, although there is no such object is the high ly 
paradoxical principle which these considerations [that is, 
something is neither existent nor subsistent] imply. 
This principle is called by E. Mally the independence of 
so-being (Sosein) from being: an object can still be so, 
i.e. such and such, even though it has no being of any 
sort. Meinong admits that the principle is very difficult 
to stomach but thinks that this is solely due to our 
prejudice in favour of the actual." ( J 963 p. J 44) • 
The inaependence of so-being is based upon the acceptance 
of the discernibility of non-existGnts (see 1.4). So by 
bringing out explicitly the existence predicate from the 
Russellian quantifier Meinong's non-existents could then 
be quantified over. Now, this position is not an example 
of the inclusive ambiguity because these non-existents are 
intended to have no being at all, and hence are to be 
contrasted with and not include existents and this contrast 
can be provided by the use of an existence predicate. 
Hugh MacColl defended the discernibility of non-existents 
in a series of papers. In particular, he was against the 
procedure of defining the null class as containing no members 
and being a subset of every class. Instead, he took the 
null class to consist of unreal members and consequently, 
to be excluded from every real class, (that is, a class 
containing real members). He writes 
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"Their convention of universal inclusion leads to awkward 
and, I think, needless paradoxes, as for example, that 
'Every round square is a triangle' because 'round squares' 
form a null class, which by them is understood to be 
contained in every class. My convention leads in this 
case to the directly opposite conclusion, namely, that 
'No round square is a triangle' : because I hold that 
every purely unreal class such as the class of round 
squares is necessarily excluded from every purely real 
class, such as the class of figures called triangles'." 
(1973 p.318). 
In defence of Russell, it is clear that he did hold the 
indiscernibility of non-existents and moreover, it is 
difficult to understand let alone accept any alternative 
to this. Nevertheless, alternatives have been proposed 
and so one could argue that Russell's position is based 
upon a certain philosophical view which can be explicitly 
represented if we do distinguish quantification from 
existential quantification by (8) 
That is (8) is not intended to be a simple tautology. 
However, this basis for distinguishing between the two 
roles of the existential quantifier is not, to say the 
least, a very strong basis. We shall now argue in this 
and the next Section that a far less controversial basis 
can be given. 
(7) is the suggested analysis of the tensed quantifier 
(5). However, (7) imputes two existential claims, a 
tenseless one given by the existential quantifier and a 
tensed one given by 'E!x'. On the other hand it seems 
that (5) only imputes one existential claim, the tensed. 
That is, in order to express general tensed existence 
one has to explicitly presume tenseless existence. On 
the other hand, when expressing individual tensed existence 
one does not have to presume explicitly tenseless existence. 
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So general tensed existence claims don't quite stand in 
the right relationship to individual tensed existence 
claims. One way in which this oddity may be overcome is 
to distinguish the quantifier from the existential quanti-
fier. Suppose 'E!x' is the tenseless existence predicate 
argued for in Section 7.3 then the existential quantifier 
may be seen as (9) 
(9) (3x)(E!x" -x-) 
where the '(3x)(-x-)' represents 'something is such that 
it ... ' and not the existential 'There is something such 
that it ... ' which includes the extra predicative 'There is ... ' 
Certainly, here, we have less objectionable grounds than 
Meinong's for distinguishing the quantifier aspect and the 
existential aspect of the standard existential quantifier. 
Nevertheless, it might be felt that this is too fine a 
point, a point of little importance provided everything 
exists tenselessly. But, if the inclusive ambiguity thesis 
is false and in particular, if from the standpoint of logics 
which take tensing into account the relation between tense-
less and tensed is not inclusive but mutually exclusive 
then there is room here for distinguishing between the two 
aspects of the existential quantifier in a non-trivial way. 
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7.5 Concluding Remarks on 'Exists'. 
Geach offers a contrast between tensed and tenseless 
individual existence (see 7.2). But is it correct to 
claim that the contrast between (1) and (2) 
(1) Prior exists but Sherlock Holmes does not. 
(2) Geach exists but Prior no longer does 
is a contrast between tenseless and tensed existence? 
Now, as (1) stands to (2), it appears that (3) stands to 
(4). 
(3) Elephants exist but mermaids don't 
(4) Elephants exist but dinosaurs no longer do. 
But is this a contrast between tenseless and tensed general 
existence? In a recent paper Miller (1975) defending 
Geach's view that tensed 'exists' is a first order predicate 
claims that whereas (3) is about kinds apparent general 
existentials like (4) are really about individuals. He 
writes 
"In (4) on the contrary neither do 'elephants' refer to 'being 
an elephant' nor 'dinosaurs' to 'being a dinosaur'. If they 
did, the proposition would not only be false but the 'but' 
would be quite misleading since there would be no point of 
contrast between the first and second clauses. The only way 
in which the contrast can be retained is if 'elephants' and 
'dinosaurs' refer to individuals." (1975 p.345). 
But is this the only way in which the contrast can be 
retained? Is it even a viable way of accounting for the 
contrast? 
Miller seems to be pushing Geach's position to its logical 
conclusion. In (3) 'exists' is a second order predicate 
whereas in (4) it is a first order tensed predicate. But 
what we seem to get is the inverse of the Russellian 
position for tensed existence. Instead of construing 
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individual existence claims in terms of general Miller 
advocates construing general tensed existence claims in 
terms of individual claims. If we have understood him 
correctly, he is claiming that 'elephants' in (4) unlike 
its occurrence in (3) refers to individuals. But this 
is rather an unhappy position. One might as well claim 
that th( restricted general term 'Indian elephants' also 
refers to its instances if the temporally restricted term 
'elephants now' does. 
We shall now examine the claim that (3) is a tenseless 
existence claim in contrast to (4). One way in which this 
may be understood is that (3) is representable within a 
framework which does not take tense considerations into 
account. That is, (3) may be claimed to involve a tenseless 
sense of 'exists' because it is representable in standard 
tenseless quantification theory in terms of predicates having 
instances. But, if our concern is with the contrast between 
(1) and (2) then in order to facilitate a fair contrast they 
must both be looked at in thecontext of a framework which 
does make allowance for tense distinctions. 
The claim that (3) does involve tenseless 'exists' within 
frameworks taking account of tense can still be made. For 
instance, it is so represented by the L~ theorist (see 5.3) 
as (3') 
(3') (3t)(3x)(x[is]-an-elephant-at t) A ~ (3t)(3x)(x[iS]-
a-mermaid-at t) 
D 
and by (3") by the LB analyst (see 5.6) 
(3") (ix)(x[is] an elephant 4 ) A ~ (3x)(x[isi a mermaid 4 ) 
and finally by (3''') by the Lp analyst where the quantifier 
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is to be understood as tenseless (see 6.1) 
(3'11) S(3x)(x is an elephant) " '" S(3x)(x is a mermaid). 
D But both the LA and Lp representations used here presuppose 
that parasitic tensing account which we argued against in 
5.5 because it is inadequate for representing certain general 
and individual existence claims. Within these frameworks 
when an existence predicate is introduced - for then they 
become adequate - (3) is to be represented by (5') and (5") 
respectively. 
(5') (3t)(3x)(E!xt" xCisJ-an-elephant-at t) " '" 
(3t)(3x)(E!xt " xCisJ-a-mermaid-at t) 
(5") S(3x)(E!x" x is an elephant) " '" S(:Jx)(E!x " x 
is a mermaid). 
In contrast a use of (4) at tn is represented by (4') and 
(4") under these analyses. 
(4') (3x)(E!xtn" x[isJ-an-elephant-at tn) " '" 
(3x)(E!xt n " xCisJ-a-dinosaur-at tn) 
(4") <3x)(E!x" x is an elephant) " '" (3x)(E!x " x 
is a dinosaur). 
That is, neither (3) nor (4) can be said to involve a tense-
less sense of 'exists' unless one takes up the L~ analysis . 
. ' 
This suggests strongly that (1) and (2) is, therefore, not 
a contrast between tenseless and tensed existence claims. 
That is, the fact that a name still has a use after the 
bearer has died is in no way tantamount to declaring that 
the bearer still exists in some strange sort of way. 
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What do sentences look like which do involve tenseless 
'exists'? The most obvious place to look is arithmetic 
(6) Odd numbers exist but transcendental numbers don't. 
(7) Seven exists but pi doesn't. 
That is, we are here arguing that 'exists' is not inclusively 
ambiguous. Instead it is ambiguous in a mutually exclusive 
way. Thus, not only do we disagree with Geach that tenseless 
'exists' is primarily a second order predicate whereas tensed 
'exists' is first order (see 7.3) but also we disagree with 
the view that what exists [exists]. 
In effect then we are arguing that when tense distinctions 
are taken into account 'exists' is not topic neutral. 
However, on the other hand, it seems to us that 'some ... ' is. 
That is, this is an argument for distinguishing between the 
two aspects of the existential quantifier. For, as we have 
already claimed, none of (5'),(5"), (4') or (4") involve a 
tenseless ascription as well as a tensed ascription of existenc, 
Consequently, what is common to both abstract and spatio-
temporal objects is not their existence but their discernibilit 
- understood as the claim that certain predicates are true 
and false of them - and, furthermore, if we claim that dis-
cernibility of x implies that x can be a value of a variable 
then there are good grounds for distinguishing those two 
aspects of the existential quantifier. And this then 
reinforces the thesis that 'exists' is a first-order predicate 
in both tensed and tenseless uses. 
One point about this view should be noted. When one uses 
standard tenseless quantification theory which makes no 
allowance for tense distinctions then it is perfectly acceptabl 
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to only have single sense of 'exists' given by the quantifier 
and identity predicate. (This is connected with the point 
that when representing an argument one should only reveal 
as much structure as is necessary). Moreover, this shows, 
then, that there is not as is commonly assumed a simple move 
from standard quantification theory to tensed counterparts. 
Certainly, syntactically tense logics should be conservative 
extensions of quantification theory - and this is part of 
the force behind the second reducibility thesis of 7.1 for 
otherwise a free logic version of quantification theory is 
required given only the first reducibility thesis. And 
for the L~ analysis the detensed quantifier (see 5.5) can be 
expressed using the standard quantifier and the existence 
predicate thus preserving a syntactic extension. But, we 
believe that we have shown that tense logics are not inter-
pretationally conservative extensions of standard tenseless 
quantification theory. And this point touches as deep as 
the quantifier and identity representation of existence. 
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